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Abstract 
The aim of this research is to examine the factors that affect and are affected by corporate 
investment efficiency. Studying how effective a firm is in managing its investment 
opportunities given the worldwide economic and political instability is quite important. This 
thesis consists of four essays. Each of them contributes to existing corporate investment 
efficiency in its own manner. To the best of my knowledge, this research contributes the 
following. First, it provides a systematic literature review of firm-related factors affecting 
corporate investment efficiency identifies gaps and offers opportunities for future research. 
Second, it investigates the impact of macroeconomic factors on corporate investment 
efficiency. Third, it examines the impact of corporate investment efficiency on voluntary 
disclosure. Finally, it examines the joint effect of corporate governance and investment 
efficiency on voluntary disclosure. Therefore, this thesis considers investment efficiency as 
being both a dependent and an independent variable. It also takes the internal and external 
factors related to investment efficiency into consideration. OLS regression analyses are used 
to test the research hypotheses. The results of the thesis highlight gaps in prior studies and 
provide opportunities for future research. The findings also reveal that Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) growth and inflation rates affect corporate investment efficiency. Also, it is 
found that corporate investment efficiency has a positive impact on voluntary disclosure, but 
has a negative impact on disclosure tone. Moreover, when introducing the joint effect of 
governance and investment efficiency, the analysis shows that both variables have a 
complementary influence on voluntary disclosure, yet have a substitution effect on disclosure 
tone. The findings are relevant for diverse stakeholders and could assist them in making 
decisions. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
1.1  Overview 
 
Due to the worldwide political and economic instabilitytoday, and over the last decade, as 
well as the manipulationand lack of transparency present in corporations, investigating firms’ 
performance has become a critical issue. Detecting the performance does not only occur by 
checking profit declines and boosts but by also examining how efficient firms are in dealing 
with their investment opportunities (Biddle et al., 2009). Therefore, the aim of this thesis is 
to study, from both perspectives, how corporate investment efficiency can be, as a dependent 
variable, affected by macroeconomic factors and an independent one that influences 
managerial decisions (e.g. disclosure practice). 
Optimal investments take place in a perfect capital market when only positive net present 
value (NPV) projects are financed by firms and surplus cash is returned to shareholders, but 
this conception has already vanished. Due to information asymmetries, firms deviate from 
their optimal investment behavior and do not exclusively depend on their investment 
opportunities as would be expected to occur in an ideal world (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). 
The existence of information asymmetry and its two subproblems, the moral hazard and 
adverse selection, provoke firms to over or under-invest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Biddle 
et al., 2009; Garcia-Lara et al., 2016).  
Over or under investment occur due to companies’ internal problems such as agency costs, 
information asymmetries as well as deficiencies of a firm’s liquidity and financing status, 
resulting in the acquisition of excessive or insufficient investment. In both cases, the 
enterprise value maximisation goal will undoubtedly be affected. Therefore, corporate 
investment efficiency occurs when firms only engage in positive NPV which is considered to 
be one of the most essential aspects that determine the firm value and thus investors’ wealth. 
Over-investment happens for the sake of empire building facilitated by the existence of moral 
hazards (Fama and Jensen, 1985; Biddle and Hilary, 2006), and underinvestment takes place 
when managers intend to enjoy a "quiet life" away from undertaking risky investment 
opportunities. These neglected opportunities might be of benefit to shareholders depending 
12 
 
on the adverse selection through owning private information regarding the firm's investments 
(Hubbard, 1998; Stein, 2003; Biddle et al., 2009). 
1.2  Research motivation 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate corporate investment efficiency1, as well as the 
factors which affect and are affected by it. The basic motivation behind this topic is its 
importance to corporations and different stakeholders. Examining firms’ investment 
efficiency levels assists in determining the performance at which many investment decisions 
are made. For example, potential and existing shareholders need to decide whether to invest 
in this firm or not. Banks want to know whether they will get their money back safely or not. 
Governments must make tax related decisions and must decide whether there will be any 
exemptions or subsidies. Customers and suppliers must decide whether they will terminate 
the relationship with the firm or will continue as loyal partners.  
The lack of systematic literature review articles on corporate investment efficiency motivates 
the researcher to critically review existing literature related to this topic. In chapter two, the 
review helps in identifying what has been done in this area of research, what are the research 
gaps and also how future research can fill these gaps. 
In chapter three, the motivation is to explain the variation between six countries in their 
levels of corporate investment efficiency. The selection of these countries was based upon 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) outlook calssification. It was chosen for this study in 
order to make it a cross-country one for comparison purposes. Each country’s firm 
investment efficiency levels are determined according to its macroeconomic variables. The 
comparison between countries’ firm investment efficiency levels helps investors to decide 
upon the most suitable economic conditions matched with the best firms’ performance to 
invest in. Having a cross-country study allows for a wider investigation of firms and an 
analysis of how the differences in macroeconomic conditions would affect firm investment 
efficiency levels. 
Chapter four is concerned with exploring the impact of corporate investment efficiency on 
voluntary disclosure. The motivation behind this study is the great importance of the 
                                                             
1This thesis is concerned with investment efficiency rather than effectiveness since the main concentration is on 
how the firm uses its resources when selecting its investment opportunities by over, under or optimally 
investing. The effectiveness is concerned with the output of a certain selection, so the point is starting by 
considering the selection itself not only its consequence (Mouzas, 2006). 
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information that is released to stakeholders, as many firms try to manipulate and reduce 
transparency about their performance in order to hide problems or protect their competitive 
advantage. Managing and using a firm’s investment opportunities efficiently reflect part of 
the performance levels. Thus, stakeholders can judge their firms’ transparency by checking 
whether they have voluntarily disclosed enough information regarding their investment 
efficiency or inefficiency levels. Firms in the United Kingdom (UK) were selected as the 
context for that study. Being one of highest gross domestic product (GDP) countries which 
has discourse practices mainly as voluntary nature, adoptsInternational Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) and discloses the annual reports in English, the UK is a benchmark that one 
can base this study on. 
In addition to what was started in chapter four, the motivation behind chapter five is to test if 
corporate governance complements or substitutes corporate investment efficiency when 
examining their impact on disclosure practices. The introduction of corporate governance 
occurred for two reasons. First, corporate governance is a common determinant for both 
investment efficiency (Billett et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2017) and voluntary 
disclosure (Xiao et al., 2004; Samaha et al., 2015; Habbash et al., 2016) as indicated by 
previous literature. Second, the joint effect of corporate governance and investment 
efficiency on voluntary disclosure must be considered. This joint effect may have diverse 
implications and scenarios other than only checking the single effect of each variable alone, 
similar to the scenarios applied by Hussainey and Walker (2009). 
1.3  Research aim and objectives 
 
The aim of this thesis is to understand the factors that affect and are affected by corporate 
investment efficiency. There are four objectives derived from the aim of the study2: 
1. To review relevant literature in order to identify factors affecting corporate 
investment efficiency, as well as to identify gaps in prior literature and to offer 
opportunities for future research. 
2. To investigate the relationship between macroeconomic factors and corporate 
investment efficiency. 
                                                             
2This is a compilation thesis, consisting of self-contained research articles. Each paper has its own introduction, 
conclusion and even separate references. Moreover, some explanations are repeated due to the fact mentioned 
of being independent. 
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3. To examine the association between corporate investment efficiency and corporate 
disclosure practices. 
4. To access the joint effect of corporate governance and corporate investment 
efficiency on corporate disclosure practices. 
1.4  Research questions 
 
The research aim and objectives set the base for addressing the research questions posed in 
this thesis, which are: 
1. What are the gaps and opportunities for future research which could be identified and 
provided concerning the corporate investment efficiency area? 
2. Do macroeconomic factors influence corporate investment efficiency? 
3. Does corporate investment efficiency impact corporate disclosure practices? 
4. Does the joint effect of corporate governance and investment efficiency affect 
corporate disclosure practices? 
 
1.5  Summary of research methodology 
 
Concerning chapter two, a desk study qualitative methodology is followed, since there is an 
application of systematic narrative literature review. 
The research philosophy applied in chapters three, four and five is positivism, which was 
applied using a quantitative approach. Deductive research design as research questions and 
hypotheses were developed based on theories adopted. In chapter three, there were both 
country and company level data; the data was collected from World Bank, IMF, Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)and the Bloomberg database. The 
sample comprises six countries from each continent. They were selected according to their 
GDP rank in the IMF outlook of April 2017 for the period between 2007 and 2015 to reach a 
total of 1686 firm-year observations. In chapters four and five, company level data was only 
collected from Bloomberg and Lancaster’s (CFIE “Corporate Financial Information 
Environment”) database of UK annual reports narrative disclosure scores and, more 
specifically, for voluntary disclosure data. The sample for both papers includes the FTSE all-
share index for the period from 2007 until 2014 accounting for 256 firm-year observations. 
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The statistical techniques used for analysis are Pearson’s coefficient of correlation and the 
type of analysis conducted is regression. Finally, regression diagnostics such as checking 
normality, linearity, autocorrelation and multicollinearity are applied. The statistical 
techniques are carried out using the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) version 24. 
Regarding variable measurements; only Chen et al. (2011) proxy of corporate investment 
efficiency was used in chapter three due to data availability reasons. For chapters four and 
five, Biddle et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2011) proxies were employed to measure 
investment efficiency since they are the most recent and commonly used measurements. As 
for the voluntary disclosure measurements in chapters four and five; there are two 
measurements obtained from the CFIE as stated above; the sum of the word count for the 
aggregate performance commentary known as wordcountsum_Perform and the net positive 
keywords divided by positive plus negative keywords for the performance commentary, also 
known as net_tone_performance, were selected. 
1.6  Research contributions 
 
This thesis contributes to existing corporate investment efficiency research in various ways. 
Due to the lack of research that integrates factors affecting corporate investment efficiency, a 
comprehensive literature review study was applied. Chapter two presents the first 
contribution of the thesis. It offers a comprehensive literature review study on factors 
affecting corporate investment efficiency. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first 
research to study all firm-related factors together. The methodology section supports this by 
showing the total number of studies reviewed, the number of finance, accounting and 
economics journals and which factors were mostly discussed by previous research. It also 
identifies gaps in prior research, providing opportunities for future research. 
Investigating the impact of external factors on corporate investment efficiency was one of the 
opportunities of future research identified in chapter two. Consequently, it was decided to 
test the impact of macroeconomic variables on investment efficiency. Chapter three presents 
the second contribution of the thesis. It offers the first cross-country study, to the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge that links the macroeconomic factors with corporate investment 
efficiency during and after the economic crisis (particularly from 2007 to 2015). As firm 
investment performance affects various stakeholders, it has become important to understand 
how over or under investing would be affected by fluctuating macroeconomic factors. 
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To the best of my knowledge, previous researches have not studied the impact of corporate 
investment efficiency on voluntary disclosure. Consequently, chapter four presents the third 
contribution of the thesis. It analyses the other perspective of the relationship between 
corporate investment efficiency and voluntary disclosure considering investment efficiency 
as the independent variable. That study is similar to that of Chen et al. (2017) and the 
opposite of Lai et al. (2014) with more details expressed later in the chapter. Part of the 
company’s performance is reflected in how efficient it uses and manages its investment 
opportunities and, in case of over or under investment occurrence, how this will be released 
voluntarily to stakeholders.   
Chapter five presents the fourth contribution of the thesis. It complements chapter four by 
introducing CG to the research framework. CG was introduced for two reasons. First, as 
recognised from prior literature, corporate governance is a common determinant for both 
corporate investment efficiency (Billett et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2017) and 
voluntary disclosure (Xiao et al., 2004; Samaha et al., 2015; Habbash et al., 2016). Second, 
both CG and investment efficiency are considered two indicators of corporate performance 
acting as a reflection for the management’s behaviour and actions. The current research, 
therefore, aims to examine the joint effect of investment efficiency and corporate governance 
on voluntary disclosure. To achieve this aim, the current study follows Hussainey and 
Walker (2009)’s interpretation of the joint effects between variables. Hussainey and Walker 
(2009) study the joint effect of disclosure and dividends on share price anticipation on 
earnings. The current study uses the same research method to examine the joint impact of 
corporate investment efficiency and corporate governance on corporate disclosure practice 
(using two proxies for disclosure: performance-related disclosure and the tone of disclosure). 
The purpose of this investigation is to test if corporate investment efficiency and corporate 
governance have a substitution (or complementary) impact on corporate disclosure practices. 
1.7  Findings 
 
The findings of each chapter are shown in the following paragraphs to have a clear idea of 
how the research aim and objectives were achieved. Concerning chapter two, the research 
design and discussion sections supply a new array for investment efficiency related studies. 
To the best of our knowledge, the research design section provides two classifications for all 
previous investment efficiency related studies. First, according to the Association of Business 
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Schools (ABS) Academic Journal Guide 2018, the study is a published paper (accounting, 
finance or economics), either a book, a working paper or conference. Second, it is based on 
the variable which investment efficiency is linked to such as financial reporting quality, 
earnings management, disclosure levels…etc. The discussion section is divided into three 
subsections. The first reviews and analyses the studies which make a direct link with 
corporate investment efficiency and at the same time is published in top ranked accounting, 
finance or economics journals. The second explores the limitations and gaps of previous 
researches. The third provides opportunities for future research.  
Coming to chapter three, the results reveal that only GDP growth has a positive impact while 
inflation rates have a negative one on corporate investment efficiency, indicating that H1 and 
H4 were accepted according to the economic growth, pecking order, agency and neoclassical 
theory of investment theories. 
Chapter four results show that investment efficiency (Chen et al., 2011) positively influences 
voluntary disclosure (first measurement) positively. Firms which invest efficiently will be 
delighted to disclose and share such kind of information with their stakeholders and vice 
versa. These findings are supported by the signaling theory. Concerning disclosure tone 
(second voluntary disclosure measurement) a negative effect of investment efficiency 
detected on it. The proprietary costs theory (Verrecchia, 1983; McKinnon, 1984) explains 
this relationship, as when firms’ investment efficiency increase, managers become 
discouraged to disclose more information since they believe that the firm’s competitive 
advantage would be harmed. 
At last, chapter five illustrates that corporate governance and corporate investment efficiency 
have a complementary effect on performance-related disclosure while a substitution effect on 
disclosure tone. 
1.8  The structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis consists of four self-contained papers represented in chapters two, three, four and 
five respectively as well as an introduction and a conclusion. Each of the four papers 
addresses a precise aspect of corporate investment efficiency. The first two papers study 
corporate investment efficiency as a dependent variable and the other two papers study it as 
an independent one. More particularly, Chapter two provides a systematic literature review 
for the determinants of corporate investment efficiency. Chapter three focuses on the effect 
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of macroeconomic factors on corporate investment efficiency. Chapter four investigates the 
impact of corporate investment efficiency on corporate disclosure practices. Finally, Chapter 
five examines how corporate governance affects the relationship between corporate 
investment efficiency and voluntary disclosure. Although each chapter is independent of the 
other, still corporate investment efficiency is the common factor across the four essays. The 
chapters will be discussed in brief in the subsequent paragraphs. 
In chapter two, the determinants of corporate investment efficiency are explored and a 
systematic literature review is provided. Variables which affect corporate investment 
efficiency are expressed according to previous literature, known as firm-related variables. 
These factors are financial reporting quality (FRQ) (Mohammadi, 2014), earnings 
management (EM) (Shen et al., 2015), corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Samet and 
Jarboui, 2017), international financial reporting standards (IFRS) (Piot et al., 2015), 
corporate governance attributes (CG) (Chen and Chen, 2012), disclosure levels (DL) 
(Campbell et al., 2014) and audit quality (AQ) (Bae et al., 2017). As for the financial status 
and the role of firm-related financing factors in affecting investment efficiency, capital 
structure, and free cash flows were the major factors discussed by authors like Gao et al. 
(2015), Bari and Karamlou (2014), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Chen et al. (2016). 
This study integrates all these factors in one paper and analyses different viewpoints 
concerning their impact on corporate investment efficiency. Also, one section reviews and 
discusses corporate investment efficiency measurements in details. 
In chapter three, the effect of macroeconomic factors on corporate investment efficiency for 
six selected countries from six continents based on the IMF outlook classifications is 
explored.  The worldwide economic crisis and political instability have induced various 
researchers to study the impact of fluctuating macroeconomic variables on countries and 
companies in terms of performance and investment opportunities (Khan et al., 2017; Yang et 
al., 2017). Therefore, that study was dedicated to analyse the influence of those factors on 
corporate investment efficiency, the common variable across the thesis’s essays. The 
macroeconomic factors examined are GDP growth (Hau and Lai, 2016), trade openness 
(Brandt et al., 2017), unemployment rates (Benazić and Rami, 2016), inflation rates (Liu et 
al., 2014) and interest rates (Ippolito et al., 2018).  
In chapter four, corporate investment efficiency’s impact on corporate voluntary disclosure 
practices is examined for the UK firms listed on the FTSE over the economic crisis period. 
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Because it is one of the most developed countries, with one of the highest GDPs (according 
to the IMF outlook) and has the majority of disclosure nature as voluntary, the UK is set as a 
benchmark to apply this study on. In addition, UK firms fully adopt the IFRS in preparing 
and presenting their annual reports which is not the case for all the countries considered in 
chapter three (Cordazzo et al., 2017). Also, the annual reports’ language is English, which is 
understood by the majority of the countries as it is the lingua franca and could be easily 
analysed. 
Two measurements for voluntary disclosure are applied; the first is a general one reflected in 
the aggregate word count of the performance commentary in the UK annual reports. The 
second is a more specific measure considering the disclosure tone, through obtaining the 
percentage of good news relative to the total of good and bad news combined together using 
their indicative keywords in the performance commentary.  
Finally, in chapter five the influence of corporate governance on voluntary disclosure as an 
additional variable to the already established model in the last chapter is investigated. The 
corporate governance effect is studied as an independent variable since the preceding 
literature identified corporate governance as a common determinant for both investment 
efficiency (Billett et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2017) and voluntary disclosure 
(Xiao et al., 2004; Samaha et al., 2015; Habbash et al., 2016). Also, its joint effect with 
investment efficiency forms another independent variable like the scenarios applied by 
Hussainey and Walker (2009).  Consequently, there are two new independent variables added 
to the model; corporate governance (CG) and corporate governance interacted with 
investment efficiency (CG*INVEFF). The sample timing and country continue to be the 
same as the previous chapter, as this one is considered an extension for it.  
The thesis’ chapters provide empirical evidence that corporate investment efficiency is not 
only affected by but also has an impact on various factors. Also, investment efficiency is not 
only the responsibility of a firm’s management team, but the economic situation does affect 
it. Therefore, stakeholders need to be aware of the economic conditions and firm-related 
factors and corporate governance in specific as influencing variables before judging their 
firm’s investment efficiency. They also might need to be aware of the impact of firm 
investment efficiency levels and/or corporate governance effect on the disclosure practices. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Determinants of Corporate Investment Efficiency: 
A Systematic Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Drivers of a firm's investment are considered one of the essential questions in corporate 
finance literature. In the real world, firms deviate from their optimal investment behavior and 
do not exclusively depend on their investment opportunities as expected in an ideal world 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to review the literature on 
corporate investment efficiency and its influencing factors. The recent economic and political 
instability makes this is a critical area of research and highlight gaps in previous research that 
need to be bridged. 
Corporate investment efficiency is considered to be one of the most fundamental and 
important aspects that determine the value of the firm and thus investors’ wealth. Deviations 
from optimal investment throough over or under investing affect the stakeholders’ rights 
negatively (Biddle et al., 2009). 
Previous researchers like Fama and Jensen (1985), Hubbard (1998), Stein (2003), as well as 
Biddle and Hilary (2006) predict that information asymmetry between managers and 
suppliers of capital results in the two major imperfections of moral hazard and adverse 
selection. In order to resolve these problems, there were various factors expressed by prior 
studies made by Mohammadi (2014), Shen et al. (2015), Benlemlih and Bitar (2018), Barth 
et al. (2008), Billett et al. (2011), Campbell et al. (2014) and Luypaert and Caneghem 
(2014). These studies refer to financial reporting quality, earnings management, corporate 
social responsibility, international financial reporting standards, corporate governance 
variables, disclosure levels, and audit quality. This study contributes to this part by 
integrating all these factors together in one paper and analysing different points of view 
regarding their mitigating effect on information asymmetry and thereof investment 
efficiency. 
The financial status and the role of firm-related financing factors in affecting investment 
efficiency, capital structure, and free cash flows were the major factors discussed by authors 
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like Gao et al. (2015), Bari and Karamlou (2014), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and 
Chen et al. (2016). Diverse and opposing viewpoints are expressed in detail in the following 
sections regarding how these variables affect firm investment efficiency. 
The motivation of this study is the lack of a comprehensive review article on the topic that 
integrates and analyses research relating to corporate investment efficiency from a broad 
range of research topics encompassing numerous variables and factors impacting it. This 
chapter reviews a large number of articles that have been published in finance, accounting 
and economics journals on the factors affecting the corporate investment efficiency. 
Moreover, the study identifies limitations and gaps of prior research, provides opportunities 
for future research. 
This study is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the research methodology. Section 3 
provides background on corporate investment efficiency. Section 4 explains and discusses 
various investment efficiency measurements. Section 5 discusses the firm-related and 
financing factors determining corporate investment efficiency. Section 6 reviews related top-
ranked studies, identifies gaps and limitations and provides opportunities for future research. 
Finally, section 7 concludes the study.  
 
2.2 Research design 
 
The examination of factors influencing corporate investment efficiency was accomplished 
through searching all the investment efficiency literature, particularly the firm financing and 
information asymmetry mitigation factors from 1935 until June 2018.  
2.2.1 Keyword search 
The search for related publications was conducted mainly as a structured keyword search of 
the following terms: corporate investment efficiency, investment efficiency, and investment 
decisions, all representing the dependent variable.  
2.2.2 Sources 
For achieving an inclusive and broad literature overview, searching was not restricted to 
specific journals, conferences, working papers or books for precise research areas. Moreover, 
aiming to search for all relevant publications and studies until 2018 was the reason for not 
limiting the publication date. Main databases were used to comprehensively search for 
related papers, such as those provided by major publishers, Elsevier 
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(www.sciencedirect.com), Emerald (www.emeraldinsight.com), Springer (www.springerlink. 
com), Wiley (www.wiley.com), JSTOR (www.jstor.org), library services like Ebsco 
(www.ebsco.com) and SSRN (Social Science Research Network).  
2.2.3 Filtering 
Searching these databases resulted in a total of 210 papers classified as accounting and 
finance (as the factors included in this study are considered a mix of both fields) out of which 
169 were used in the literature review. The selection was based upon two criteria; First, 
sources must be fromstudies expressing important links to the corporate investment 
efficiency literature. Second, they are highly cited as revealed by the number of citations 
recorded on the searching engine "Google scholar." The number of citations found is 
estimated to be within the range of 800 to 1500 per paper, including papers with minor 
extremes of 3 or 4 to 65,662 citations. Therefore, they represented the keystone of our study, 
and are considered to be the most powerful academic work. 
2.2.4 Classifications 
Table (2.1) shows the classification of the studies reviewed according to the journals in 
which papers were published and variables studied. Panel (A) shows the studies reviewed 
classified by journal rankings according to the ABS list of 2018, theses, working papers, and 
books. Panel (B) shows classification by variable through listing the number of studies 
explaining each independent variable and linking it with the dependent one.   
It is clearly seen that nearly half of the reviewed publications were accounting journals and 
the other half finance ones, from which the Journal of Accounting and Economics, and 
theJournal of Financial Economics comprise the highest portions of 30% and 42% of the 
accounting and finance reviewed journals respectively. In addition, the classification of 
variables indicates that corporate governance and financial reporting quality are the major 
variables establishing a relationship with investment efficiency directly or indirectly. This 
occurs through mitigating information asymmetry, representing 34 papers out of 169 
(approximately 20%) for corporate governance and 28 papers forming on average 16% for 
financial reporting quality, followed by corporate social responsibility covering around 
13.5% of the same total, and for the firm financing factors, the free cash flows represent 20 
papers of the total forming highest percentage of 12% on average. 
Although the disclosure and firm-related financing variables (capital structure and free cash 
flows) embrace 12.5% and 17.3% of the papers correspondingly, still there are unexplored 
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areas of disclosures (like R&D disclosure) which reduce asymmetric information and 
additional variables, influencing corporate investment efficiency which needs to be 
investigated in future research as mentioned in the previous sections.   
The percentage of economic journals in the review represents around 10% of the total 
journals reviewed as well as 50% of the ‘other’ journals in table (2.1) giving a significant 
alert to the link between the topic discussed, economics, and highlighting the importance of 
studying the external economic aspects impact on firms' investment efficiency. This supports 
the targeted potential studies.    
Table (2.1) Classification of studies reviewed 
Panel A: Studies reviewed (by journal) Number of papers reviewed 
Accounting journals 
ABS 4* 38 
ABS 4 5 
ABS 3 11 
ABS 2 2 
ABS 1 0 
Finance journals 
ABS 4* 33 
ABS 4 6 
ABS 3 10 
ABS 2 6 
ABS 1 0 
Economics journals 
ABS 4* 12 
ABS 4 2 
ABS 3 2 
ABS 2 1 
ABS 1 0 
Conferences 1 
Theses 1 
Other journals 24 
Working papers 13 
Books 2 
Total  169 
Panel B: Studies reviewed (by variable) 
Corporate investment efficiency 8 
Financial reporting quality 28 
Earnings management 9 
Corporate social responsibility 22 
International financial reporting standards 7 
Corporate governance 34 
Disclosure levels 20 
Audit quality 12 
Capital structure 9 
Free cash flows 20 
Total  169 
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2.3 A theoretical framework 
 
This section clarifies and highlights an explanation for corporate investment efficiency and 
firm-related factors and their theories. 
2.3.1 Corporate investment efficiency 
As a major investment theory, the neoclassical theory initiating from a firm's optimization 
behavior explains that the objective of a firm should be to maximise the present discounted 
value of net cash flows exposed to the technological constraints summarized by the 
production function (Hayashi, 1982). 
According to the investment efficiency theory, firms tend to invest efficiently if they only 
undertake projects with a positive net present value (NPV) at which any deviations 
happening may cause underinvestment or overinvestment, both of which are classified as the 
inefficiency of investment (Biddle et al., 2009). 
Yoshikawa (1980) states that "marginal q is the fundamental determinant of investment 
because it shows how much increase in market value accompanies a dollar worth of 
investment, while the actual stock market value of the firm reflects the profitability of existing 
total capital". The author concludes that the marginal Q ratio is the single driver of the 
capital investment policy and that firms invest until the marginal cost of investment equals 
the marginal benefit in addition to adjusting the costs of installing the new capital.  
The concept of having a perfect capital market upon which an optimal investment occurs by 
financing positive NPV projects at the established economic interest rates and returning 
surplus cash to investors has already vanished. The agency theory explains the agency 
problems, conflicts, and relationships among the managers and shareholders. The theory 
introduces that even though managers may be well informed about the existence of profitable 
investment opportunities with positive NPV, they might not always pursue them. The lack of 
such investment implementation is due to the existence of imperfect capital markets. Such 
imperfection is due to the critical frictions-generating imperfections of moral hazard and 
adverse selection caused by information asymmetry existence (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Stein, 1989). As with imperfect information regarding the quality of the firms' investment 
projects, adverse selection causes a gap between the cost of external financing in an 
uninformed capital market and funds generated internally. In addition, managerial incentive 
problems and costly monitoring of their actions frequently occur. These problems push 
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external fund suppliers to require a higher return to compensate them for these monitoring 
costs and the possible moral hazards associated with the managers' agency role of controlling 
the allocation of investment funds (Hubbard, 1998).  
As a result, asymmetry between managers and investors and the accompanying problems of 
moral hazard and adverse selection, managers could prefer to deviate from the optimal 
efficient investments through two ways: overinvestment or underinvestment. First, over-
investing occurs by engaging in negative net present value (NPV) risky projects, such as 
lower return acquisitions. Mergers and diversifications are undertaken to investlarge FCF, 
unused borrowings or in order for managers to maintain their reputations by refusing to 
liquidate such negative NPV investments (Stein 2003 and Jensen 1986). Also, consuming 
available privileges like managers have advanced information than shareholders, which will 
allow them to time capital issuances for selling overpriced securities to investors according to 
the adverse selection models (Biddle, 2009). Overriding the major privilege of "Empire 
building" at which the managers would not sacrifice their positions and the excessive 
intention for running huge firms for the sake of adopting advantageous investment 
opportunities or discontinuing bad ones benefiting only shareholders' wealth (Stein, 2003). 
Second, underinvestment occurs through neglecting and refusing to undertake positive NPV 
projects which would have contributed to the management's fundamental aim towards its 
shareholders. As managers may reject to raise funds at a discounted price even if that leads to 
passing up good investment opportunities. This managerial rejection is for protecting their 
positions in companies and their reputation in the market as managers regardless of the effect 
of losing such opportunities on shareholders' wealth and firm value (Biddle, 2009). 
As a result, firms try to improve their investment efficiency by overcoming the over and 
underinvestment of their capital and resources. To overcome such deviations, information 
asymmetry must be minimised between managers and shareholders using different tools and 
solutions mentioned in details in sections 2.3.1 and 2.5. 
2.3.2 Firm-related factors and corporate investment efficiency 
 
Prior literature like Biddle et al. (2009), Billet et al. (2011), Chen et al. (2017), Lai et al. 
(2014), Shen et al. (2015), Cook et al. (2016) and Bae et al. (2017) express various 
mechanisms which affect corporate investment efficiency. Variables included in such 
literature were financial reporting quality, earnings management, corporate social 
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responsibility, international financial reporting standards, corporate governance variables, 
disclosure levels, and audit quality. In addition, there are specific financing factors which 
also affect investment efficiency like capital structure (Bari and Karamlou, 2014) and free 
cash flows (Chen et al., 2016). They are discussed in later chapters. 
2.3.2.1. Financial reporting quality (FRQ) 
First, the financial reporting quality; the principle way for a firm to communicate the results 
of its transactions and events to its stakeholders is to apply financial reporting which is then 
used for assessing the economic performance of the firm and guiding in decision-making 
processes. In order to reach this assessment, financial reporting should be of high quality. 
According to the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) (2006) and IASB (2008), 
offering high FRQ is significant since it positively influences capital providers and other 
stakeholders in making investment, credit, and related resource allocation decisions, which 
enhances overall market efficiency. 
Biddle et al. (2009) examine U.S. listed firms and Chen et al. (2011) analyse private firms 
from emerging markets to conclude that FRQ mitigates both over and underinvestment. 
Gomariz and Ballesta (2014) find that debt maturity is the main method used by creditors to 
control managers’ behavior and avoid expropriation in firms having low FRQ levels and vice 
versa. FRQ and debt maturity are considered substitutes when it comes to investment 
efficiency improvement. Also, Mohammadi (2014) investigate a positive relationship 
between FRQ and investment efficiency indicating that firms experiencing higher reporting 
quality and improved financial transparency have the potential to alleviate both under and 
overinvestment problems. 
One way to boost financial reporting quality (FRQ) in a firm is to have high accounting 
conservatism. Accounting conservatism imposes stricter verifiability requirements for the 
recognition of economic gains relative to losses (Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003). Garcia Lara et al. 
(2016) find that conservatism reduces investment inefficiency by minimising investment-
cash flow sensitivity for overinvesting firms (Biddle and Hilary, 2006) and facilitating access 
to external financing in underinvesting ones. Additionally, Francis and Martin (2010) argue 
that conservatism duties do not only encompass acquisitions, but also more obscure 
investments such as capital expenditures and research and development (R&D). Thus, 
managers of high investment capacity firms become unable to overinvest by pursuing 
30 
 
projects that have negative NPV generating private benefits for their empire building. 
Moreover, underinvestment is mitigated by conservatism among firms facing financing 
difficulties like the risk of insolvency and low profitability. Because the costs of excessively 
risky positive NPV investments are high, debt and equity holders are unwilling to contribute 
with new capital to such firms (Garcia Lara et al., 2016). 
In addition to the direct associations between FRQ and investment efficiency, there are other 
indirect relationships between both variables expressed by various authors. As Bushman and 
Smith (2001), Healy and Palepu (2001) and Balakrishnan et al. (2014) conclude, eliminating 
investment inefficiencies takes place when information asymmetries are mitigated. 
Conducting high FRQ mitigates information asymmetries which increases shareholders' 
ability to monitor managerial investment activities. As a result, management moral hazard 
problems are reduced (Roychowdhury, 2010; Bushman et al., 2011). Also, the other major 
problem associated with information asymmetry is the adverse selection which could be 
minimised by having high FRQ (Choe et al., 1993; Chang et al., 2009) through reducing 
adverse selection costs. This reduction occurs by lowering external financing costs and 
obtaining excess funds due to temporary mispricing (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Biddle et al., 
2009). 
Stressing on, and, adding to, the previous point, Garcia Lara et al. (2014) state that after an 
increase in conservatism there is a considerable progress in the accuracy of analysts’ 
forecasts and a rise in the number of analysts following the firm. Reflecting that 
conservatism improves the firm's information environment by directly affecting the analysts' 
behavior, all leading to a reduction in information asymmetries (LaFond and Watts, 2008; 
Khan and Watts, 2009). 
 
2.3.2.2. Earnings management (EM) 
Following what has been mentioned about the FRQ and its guiding role towards investors 
and other stakeholders, earnings management (EM) within a firm could be minimised, 
explaining the second mechanism improving investment efficiency. 
Shen et al. (2015) and Cohen and Zarowin (2009) specify that EM occurs when 
firmsreported that economic performance was misrepresented by insiders to mislead 
stakeholders or influence contractual outcomes. This results in a distortion in investment 
31 
 
efficiency by having over or under investment depending on the availability of capital. Tang 
(2007) finds that firms with the largest earnings management have a superior level of 
investment but lower sensitivity of investment to internal cash flows reflecting an actual 
effect on future investment efficiency and patterns. Consequently, regulating EM will have 
an expected optimistic impact on investment efficiency. Bar-Gill and Bebchuk (2003) and 
McNichols and Stubben (2008) predict that companies overstating their financial results are 
more likely to undertake inefficient investment through overinvesting in property, plant and 
equipment (PPE) and diverse projects due to cheap financing availability. Also, Wang (2006) 
stresses the same point in detail by stating that the possibility of overinvesting in R&D and 
stock-financed mergers and acquisitions rises when firms misreport their information.   
 
2.3.2.3 Corporate social responsibility (CSR)  
The third firm related factor affecting investment efficiency is corporate social responsibility 
(CSR), Which acts on improving FRQ, reducing EM and agency conflicts (Kim et al., 2012) 
along with resolving the information asymmetry problems all resulting in a boost in 
investment efficiency levels. Some of the previous literature contradicts this viewpoint as 
expressed later. 
Concerning the improved management practices, firms focusing on CSR have incorporated a 
special attention to the environment and society in their corporate strategies. Thus, managers 
at firms with stronger CSR performance are expected to demonstrate better decision abilities 
and higher monitoring level by various stakeholders (Deng et al. 2013; Guiso et al. 2014). As 
a result, it becomes more complex for management to make decisions that are in their own 
self-interest and neglect stakeholders' rights, causing a decrease in agency conflicts and an 
improvement in investment efficiency (Cook et. al., 2016). Also, firms that have 
tremendously low concern for CSR indicate a week ability to manage the complication of 
environmental and social requirements (Kytle and Ruggie 2005), leading to an increase in 
investment inefficiency. Samet and Jarboui (2017) conclude both a direct and an indirect 
positive effect of CSR on investment efficiency. Referring to the direct effect, alleviating 
investment inefficiency takes place when distinguishing factors like reduced investment-cash 
flow sensitivity, limited capital constraints, enhanced access to finance, and superior 
management quality exists in socially responsible firms. As for the indirect effect, the CSR 
performance minimises the free cash flow availability, which can be used by self-interested 
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managers to undertake unprofitable projects leading to overinvestment mitigation. Also, the 
CSR performance allows for more transparent information environment. Reducing 
information asymmetry among various stakeholders contributes to an increased investment 
level and an avoidance of underinvestment. Continuing with the indirect positive effect 
mentioned, Samet and Jarboui’s (2017) point of view is consistent with that of Benlemlih and 
Bitar (2018) stating that the moderating role of CSR enhances investment efficiency through 
reducing information asymmetry and agency conflicts. As well as improving management 
practices by taking stakeholders' rights into consideration. In addition, Cruise (2011) , Cohen 
et al. (2011) and Cho et al. (2013) explain that providing further financial and non-financial 
information assists in reducing information asymmetry, especially for high-risk firms (Cui et 
al., 2018). Such information offers a more accurate picture regarding a firm's performance. 
This indicates that having a standardized disclosure for firm CSR practices decreases EM due 
to disclosing more reliable and transparent information to investors. Furthermore, Dhaliwal 
et al. (2011) and Lopatta et al. (2016) mention that companies exhibiting high CSR are allied 
with increased information quality, better transparency, and less information asymmetry. All 
leading to an improved FRQ accompanied by lower earnings management, all reflected in 
higher levels of investment efficiency. 
On the other hand, some previous opinions notice undesirable implications for CSR 
activities, including conflicts between stakeholders (Krüger, 2015), creating a competitive 
disadvantage and reducing a corporation's resources by spending unnecessary costs (Vance, 
1975; Aupperle et al., 1985; Preston and O’Bannon, 1997). Extremely high CSR might be a 
sign of managerial agency problems (Bénabou and Tirole, 2010) due to wasting resources by 
overinvesting in CSR to achieve private managerial goals (Preston and O’Bannon, 1997; 
Benlemlih, 2017).  
 
2.3.2.4. International financial reporting standards (IFRS)  
The fourth mechanism comprises the international financial reporting standards (IFRS). 
There are opposing points of views regarding these standards indirect effect on investment 
efficiency. As Barth et al. (2008) propose that previous reporting standards, especially in 
countries with less restrictive legal systems and more concentrated ownership, were of less 
quality than IFRS. This is due to their mandatory adoption which diminishes information 
asymmetries and enhances investment efficiencies through two methods; first, increased 
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disclosures of financial information which translates to better accounting transparency and 
external improvement of monitoring. This leads to the minimisation of insiders’ 
inappropriate behaviours like moral hazards, empire building and FCF problems (Biddle et 
al., 2013). Second, using IFRS as a common standard facilitates comparability across 
companies and countries enabling capital providers to better differentiate between value-
creating and value-destroying investment opportunities. This simplifies investments and 
reduces information processing costs associated with the application of different accounting 
standards originating from various regimes (Daske et al. 2008 and Li 2010).  
Moreover, Durnev and Mangen (2009), Beatty et al. (2013) and Chen et al. (2017) 
hypothesise that excess profits disclosed by comparable foreign firms can have a positive 
spillover effect and reduce investment inefficiency. These effects of information are greater 
in the post-adoption period, supporting the idea that moving to IFRS results in the issuance of 
a higher quantity of more comparable information has a positive effect on investment 
efficiency. 
On the other hand, IFRS are presumed to reduce conservatism and so have indirect negative 
effecton investment efficiency (André et al., 2013). IFRS are normally considered to require 
a lower level of conservatism than local accounting standards explained by a reduction in 
asymmetrical recognition of gains and losses. This happens due to the greater importance 
thatis given to neutrality by the international conceptual framework. These IFRS neutrality 
requirements are difficult to reconcile with the conservatism principle and only consider 
“faithful representation” as a financial information fundamental quality characteristic. 
Faithful representation entails a spotlight on completeness, neutrality, and freedom from 
errors (Ahmed et al., 2013; Piot et al., 2015). As a result, conservatism's limiting effect on 
investment inefficiency tends to decline after IFRS adoption.  
Therefore, studies stating a positive indirect relation between IFRS and investment efficiency 
rely on information asymmetry reduction and increased comparability. While studies 
reflecting a negative indirect relation explain a reduction in FRQ post to IFRS adoption 
leading to deterioration in investment efficiency, which offsets the positive effect by 
mitigating asymmetric information. 
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2.3.2.5 Corporate governance (CG) 
Over and underinvestment could be mitigated by having effective corporate governance 
application and attributes. Therefore, corporate governance acts as a major firm related factor 
influencing corporate investment efficiency. 
Firms may overinvest in acquiring other firms, either due to overconfidence regarding their 
ability to create value or because of fulfilling the aim of empire building rather than paying 
out surplus cash flows to shareholders. And so, having strong governance would prevent 
managers from overinvesting by alleviating value destructive mergers and acquisitions 
(Masulis et al., 2007). The effect of applying an appropriate governance level also eliminates 
the underinvestment problem as managers will always bear in mind that the firm's well-
governed structure would not allow them to neglect positive NPV projects in pursuit of the 
"quiet life" and position protection goals (Billett et al., 2011). 
Ownership structures and boards of directors’ attributes provide evidence on the role of 
corporate governance in boosting investment efficiency directly or indirectly through several 
different variables. Such variables have a positive, negative or an ambiguous effect as 
expressed in the following paragraphs (Chen and Chen, 2012). 
There are opposing points of views regarding managerial ownership. Anderson et al. (2000), 
Singh et al. (2004) and Chen (2012) state that as managers' ownership increases, they would 
be encouraged to make more refocused investment decisions that benefit the shareholders 
since managers and investors interests align when it comes to maximising firm value and 
wealth. And so, a direct positive association between managerial ownership and investment 
efficiency is concluded. On the other hand, Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) find that 
managerial decisions depend in the first concern on the private benefits gained not the 
enhancement of shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, a vague relationship between managerial 
ownership and investment efficiency remains. Similarly, block holder ownership is 
explained. Chen (2012) argues that if shareholders hold more than five percent of a firm's 
outstanding shares, their controlling rights will effectively limitmanagers’ free hand and 
reduce the inefficiencies of decision making and distribution of cash flows (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986; Shome and Singh, 1995; Allen and Phillips, 2000; Singh et al., 2004; Glaser 
and Müller, 2010). Thus, there is an expectation that the investment efficiency of a firm is 
positively and directly related to its level of block holder ownership. There is further 
evidence for ownership structure variables. Guedhami et al. (2009) and Boubakri et al. 
35 
 
(2013) find support regarding the positive effect of foreign ownership on financial reporting 
quality and corporate risk-taking as a result of firms' investment decisions. Chen et al. 
(2017)’ sample cover non-financial firms privatized in four different regions which are 
Africa and the Middle East, East and South Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and Europe and Central Asia. The findings revealed a higher association between 
foreign ownership and investment efficiency. This relation exists when countries have poor 
governance institutions and governments surrender majority control, accordingly, estimating 
a direct positive impact of foreign ownership on investment efficiency. 
In addition to the direct effect that foreign ownership has on investment efficiency, indirect 
effects have been explained by some authors. Foreign ownership improves investment 
efficiency by initially reducing asymmetries through enhanced information level (Kang and 
Stulz, 1997; Chen et al., 2017) and better monitoring (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Ferreira and 
Matos, 2008; Gillan and Starks, 2003). Thus, foreign ownership may have an indirect 
positive effect on investment efficiency.  
While foreign ownership has an indirect positive effect on investment efficiency, state 
ownership has an indirect negative one. Bushman et al. (2004) and Chaney et al. (2011) 
explain that information asymmetry and agency problems arise when corporate resources are 
diversified under well concealed political motivations induced by state ownership existence. 
Chen et al. (2011) suggest that government intervention in Chinese SOEs through majority 
ownership or appointing allied managers alters investment behavior and harms investment 
efficiency. Borisova et al. (2012) provide cross-country evidence that low quality of 
governance is related to state ownership. Ben-Nasr et al. (2012) show that state ownership 
leads to increased financing costs, revealing the greater agency and information asymmetry 
problems faced in such firms. Boubakri et al. (2013) find that state ownership is negatively 
associated with corporate risk-taking. Therefore, we believe that state ownership has an 
indirect negative association with investment efficiency. 
Moving to the board of directors' attributes, corporate boards are from the major internal 
governance tools designed to alleviate investment inefficiencies since boards of directors 
monitor and advice top management to protect shareholders’ interests, as explained in the 
following paragraph. When assessing the effectiveness of corporate boards, board structure 
including size and independence is considered the most central factors.  
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Ji (2016) finds that larger boards are more likely to develop information transparency and 
reduce information asymmetry. This is due to the allocation of specific tasks, establishing 
various monitoring committees, having more directors with relevant knowledge in the 
financial reporting process and diverse experience and expertise across these board members 
(Boone et al., 2007) as well as having better access to resources such as business contacts, 
raw materials, and technologies (Anderson et al., 2004). As a result, larger board sizes have 
an indirect positive effect on investment efficiency. Contrary to previously mentioned board 
opinions, Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) argue that smaller boards eliminate the free 
rider issues and discipline the management effectively which implies that firms with smaller 
boards are more likely to allocate their funds more efficiently, concluding that smaller boards 
boost investment efficiency. In addition, Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983), Anderson et 
al. (2000), Setia-Atmaja et al. (2011) and Jaggi et al. (2009) find that one of the reasons for 
an effective monitoring of managerial decisions is a high board independence level resulting 
in more efficient investment decisions.  
2.3.2.6 Disclosure levels (DL)  
The idea behind increasing disclosure levels is crucial for capital providers whether this kind 
of disclosure is favorable or unfavorable. Therefore, various prior studies have highlighted 
different ways in which levels and types of disclosures could impact corporate investment 
efficiency. Our study considers it as the sixth factor after corporate governance that may 
resolve investment inefficiency issues. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986), Botosan and Plumlee (2002), Kothari et al. (2009) and 
Campbell et al. (2014) articulate that managers have a self-serving bias to disclose positive 
information for protecting their positions and empires. Managers do so as accounting 
information is used by stakeholders for evaluating managerial compensation and 
performance, and capital markets for determining the cost of capital and firm value. 
Therefore, it is considered that increasing both mandatory and voluntary disclosure levels 
would be of benefit to investors for tracking a firm's managerial investment decisions and 
thereof eliminating any intentions for over or under investment to occur.  
Referring to the direct positive effect of disclosure levels on investment efficiency, Lambert 
(2001), Huang and Zhang (2012) and Lai et al. (2014) argue that managers of firms having 
high disclosure levels would have a minimum incentive to invest in projects that destroy 
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shareholder value. These projects may include internal expansions and external acquisitions. 
Publicly available information about the managers’ investment decisions and performance 
will increase the investors' monitoring role regarding capital usage once provided.  
Therefore, alleviating underinvestment would prevent managers from neglecting positive 
NPV projects. Also, Verrecchia (2001) highlights committed voluntary disclosure as an 
additional aspect. Only committed disclosure can drastically enhance investors’ information 
when managers become liable to disclose bad news along with good news. Accordingly, 
investment benefits of voluntary disclosure are obvious when managers are committed to 
voluntary disclosure and vice versa if uncommitted (Miller, 2002). For example, market risk 
disclosures (MRDs) are a part of risk factor disclosure which lowers investors uncertainty 
and diversity of opinions arising from changes in foreign exchange rates, interest rates, and 
commodity prices, thus improving information transparency between traders and increasing 
amount of liquidity for firms' stocks through decreasing transaction costs (Moumen et al. 
2015 and Al-Hadi et al. 2016). Moreover, committed disclosure importance is reflected by 
another example. Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) stress that when disclosures are informative 
only about the firm’s capital stock, the equilibrium outcome is characterized by 
underinvestment. However, if disclosures communicate information only about future cash 
flow, both under and overinvestment can materialize. When firms report and disclose both 
types of information to investors about capital stock and cash flow, efficient investment 
decisions are enhanced even if both types are less than perfectly informative. As a result, in 
such cases both types of information disclosure must be committed. 
Wen (2013) offers two contradictory viewpoints regarding voluntary disclosure functions 
towards investment efficiency although the results reflect that either of the functions is 
dominant according to each firm's explicit case. The first point states a positive association, 
as passing valuable information results in more precise stock prices in the market and so 
improving investment efficiency. While the second perspective highlights the negative 
impact of an increased voluntary disclosure if firms use it to determine stock prices in their 
own favor which in turn induces over or underinvestment.   
Moreover, there is an indirect positive impact of disclosure on the efficiency of investment. 
Lai et al. (2014) and Easley and O’Hara (2004) state that high disclosure levels reduce 
information asymmetries between firms and outsiders leading to an improvement in 
investment efficiency. This enhancement of investment efficiency allows shareholders to 
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access more information for assessing the return of investment opportunities. In this case, 
investors would have a chance to increase the amount of capital provided for firms to invest 
in positive NPV projects without over investing in negative NPV ones or consuming 
privileges. For example, Miihkinen (2013) finds that the quality of firms’ mandatory risk 
disclosures reduces the information asymmetry of stock markets in Finland and that the 
usefulness of disclosures is affected by each firm’s riskiness, investor interest, and market 
conditions. Consequently, we can predict that firm investment efficiency would be enhanced. 
In addition, there was a debate concerning the Securities Offering Reform enacted by the 
SEC which aims at comforting gun-jumping disclosure rules before equity offerings. These 
rules will provide more timely investment information to investors without obligating delays 
in the offering process contradicting with the needs of issuers for timely access to capital 
(SEC, 2005). Consistent with the SEC’s point, Shroff et al. (2013) find that information 
asymmetry decreases during pre-offering andafter the enactment of the Reform.It also proves 
the ineligibility of the opponents' arguments that the relaxation of these restrictions will lead 
to market conditioning. Consequently, I suppose that these rules would have an indirect 
positive effect by reducing information asymmetry leading to a boost in firm investment 
efficiency. 
 
2.3.2.7 Audit quality (AQ) 
 
Prior research demonstrates both direct and indirect associations between audit quality and 
corporate investment efficiency. Thus, AQ is considered the seventh firm related factor for 
mitigating inefficiencies. 
Explaining the indirect positive relation between AQ and investment efficiency, Er (2010) 
expresses that high-quality independent auditors may provide appropriate environments to 
prevent probable conflicts of interest among managers and shareholders. As auditors 
guarantee investors that the financial statements of enterprises comply with GAAP or IFRS 
after exerting effort to ensure that managers prepare financial statements reliably and that 
information about the firm is reflected to the public accurately. Thus, information asymmetry 
is reduced and exact information is provided. Mansi et al. (2004), O'Reilly et al. (2006) and 
Luypaert and Caneghem (2014) stress the above ideas by explaining that external auditors 
play a dual role in financial markets. The first one is an informational role provision. They 
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offer reports about financial statements verifiability and credibility, lowering managers' 
intentions for manipulating firm's reports and financial accounts (Watts and Zimmerman 
1986). Second is the insurance role; auditors give investors the right to have a claim on them 
in case of an audit failure. Audit failures occur when an audit report is issuedthat does not 
reflect accurate financial statements status. An example of this is when an unqualified report 
shows investors that a firm's financial statements are fairly presented while the true position 
reflects material misstatements which were not discovered or revealed by the auditor (De 
Angelo, 1981 and Dye, 1993). Clinch et al. (2012) also indicate that appointing one of the 
big four audit firms and industry specialist auditors will be associated with less information 
asymmetry. Consequently, audit quality plays an important role in improving financial 
reporting information quality. Yaghoobnezhad et al. (2014)’ results reflect the above 
viewpoints with a slight difference, showing that auditor size and industry specialist auditors 
as measures of quality are negatively related to information asymmetry while auditor tenure 
has no relation to it. As a result of the above viewpoints, it is supposed that independent 
specialized auditors have a major role in minimising information asymmetry leading to 
advancement in investment efficiency.  
There are only two opposing views expressing an indirect negative association between AQ 
and investment efficiency.Varici (2013) show that the quality of audit and information 
asymmetry determining variables had a positive relationship in manufacturing enterprises 
traded at the Istanbul Stock Exchange. Hakim and Omri (2010) state that clients with longer 
tenure auditors have higher bid-ask spreads than clients with shorter tenure auditors 
especially for clients of non-specialist and non-big four auditors. This came up with a 
positive relationship between audit quality and information asymmetry. Therefore, the 
researcher believes that this positive association between AQ and information asymmetry 
will result in a decline in firm investment efficiency. 
In addition, other authors find a direct positive relation between some variables of audit 
quality with investment efficiency without getting information asymmetry involved. For 
example, Bae and Choi (2012) find that the investment efficiency of client firms with 
industry specialist auditors is dramatically higher than that with non-specialist auditors. In 
addition, Bae et al. (2017) study the effect of auditor characteristics on investment efficiency 
and concluded that when large auditors work with clients within their area of specialization, 
they exhibit higher investment efficiency.  
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 2.3.2.8 Financing factors determining corporate investment efficiency 
Understanding how firms can improve their investment efficiency either directly or indirectly 
is important, but discussing the financing aspects influencing investment efficiency levels 
within a firm is fundamental too. Following the pecking order theory and free cash flow 
(FCF) theory, and according to the previous literature, a company's capital structure and cash 
flows are firm-related financing variables that set and determine the degree of investment 
efficiency in a corporation. 
Capital structure 
Determining the best financing mix or capital structure for the firm is a major financing 
decision a manager could be concerned with (Damodaran, 2001). 
Although the combination is made with the main aim of assembling funds at the least cost 
possible for the purpose of enhancing the firm value, there are contradicting opinions and 
results regarding the appropriate percentages of debt and equity which are supposed to be 
used.  
According to the pecking order theory introduced by Myers and Majluf et al. (1984) and 
supported by Meier and Tarhan (2007) and Gao et al. (2015), there is an indirect positive link 
between a firm's capital structure and investment efficiency. Firms' financing decisions are 
affected by the information asymmetry between management and shareholders, and it is 
predicted that financing follows a hierarchy. First, internal financing is used, second, debt is 
issued, and when no more debt can be raised, equity is issued. Retained earnings avoid 
adverse selection costs completely, and issuing debt acquires lower information and adverse 
selection costs than that of equity. Issuing equity is the most information sensitive security 
having the largest adverse selection cost leading to a higher adverse selection risk premium 
demanded on equity by investors. Therefore, retained earnings are better than outside funds 
and debt is better than equity if a firm requires external funds when internal funding is not 
enough. This is because debt is perceived as "good news" by investors. 
Bari and Karamlou (2014) stress what was mentioned by stating that there is a negative 
association between the debt relative amount and information asymmetry. Firms with higher 
levels of informational asymmetry are more likely to issue debt when raising external capital 
for the purpose of avoiding conflicts with their shareholders. Consequently, using more 
internal funds and debt as sources of financing mitigates information asymmetry which in 
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turn prevents managers from taking unfavorable financing decisions leading to over or under 
investment, thereof improving firms’ investment efficiency. 
Coming to direct negative relationships, Myers (1977) states (before the introduction of the 
pecking order theory) that when firms have high debt portions, debt holders may require 
higher interest rates to compensate for a possible increase in the risk of liquidation or 
underinvestment. In such cases, debt does have a negative effect on the firm’s value and 
investment decisions. Thus, we conclude that investment efficiency is affected. Additionally, 
McConnell and Servaes (1995) and Aivazian et al. (2005) similarly conclude the negative 
impact of debt on firm investment levels and efficiency. The negative effect of debt will 
dominate the positive effect for firms with various positive NPV projects which are known as 
high-growth firms. The latter adds and assures that leverage has a significant negative impact 
on investment and this impact is stronger on firms with low growth opportunities than those 
with high growth opportunities. This is reflected by the application on different samples, 
using alternative econometric methodologies and various proxies of leverage. 
 
Free Cash flows 
The free cash flow theory clarifies that excess cash flow after funding all of a firm’s projects 
that have positive NPV when discounted at the appropriate cost of capital is called the "free 
cash flow".  
Not all firms intend to invest free cash flows efficiently and maximise value to shareholders, 
as the over and underinvesting of cash flows occurs due to multiple conditions especially 
when there is excess cash. Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990), Richardson (2006), Huang et al. 
(2011) and Chen et al. (2016) explain overinvestment idea by stating that agency costs. 
Management may decide to invest in self-serving projects which fulfill their aims of 
consuming privileges (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), empire building (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997), and diversifying acquisitions (Morck et al., 1990; Alti, 2003). Managers may 
undertake self-serving projects even if investment opportunities are poor or using the surplus 
cash to subsidize weakly performing divisions (Berger and Hann, 2003; Lamont, 1997; 
Richardson, 2006). Such projects may not be beneficial for shareholders particularly when 
they have weak monitoring over management. Also, Lang et al. (1994) and Chen et al. 
(2011) stress that managers of firms with high free cash flows may avoid further monitoring 
from capital markets through financing investments with internal funds. 
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On the other hand, Hicks (1935), Rosett (1990) and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) argue 
that the association between FCF and underinvestment depends on the managers' attitudes 
and strategies. Poorly governed managers may prefer to neglect difficult decisions regarding 
extra cash flows and enjoy a quiet life. Achieving a quiet life happens by refusing to 
undertake challenging or risky activities like opening new projects in new industries which 
may require a deep understanding of and an adaptation to the new fields. There is also a need 
for selecting specialized experts to ensure a steady positive performance of these activities. 
Amihud and Lev (1981), Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992), and Holmstrom and Ricart I Costa 
(1986) argue that managers of high FCF firms do not undertake risky projects which may 
enhance firm value in order to protect their careers. Moreover, Faleye, Mehrotra, and Morck 
(2006) show that labor may act as a source of pressure on companies when it comes to their 
job security and wages lead managers to only engage in less risky investments. Managers 
may prefer to under-invest not only due to risk aversion but also for the possibility of 
acquiring a huge personal wealth. This results in a level of carelessness towards making the 
best use of surplus FCF (John et al., 2008). 
Therefore, for a firm to efficiently invest and achieve its aim of maximising value to 
shareholders, it must pay out such free cash flow to shareholders, increase distributed 
dividends or repurchase stocks. This minimises manager powers and resources, which in turn 
reduces the possibility of neglecting positive NPV projects or undertaking negative NPV 
ones. 
2.4 Corporate investment efficiency measurements 
 
There are seven measurements for investment efficiency. The proxy applied in a specific 
study is chosen based upon the geographic region in which the study is applied and the 
availability of data in existing resources. Tobin (1982), Hubbard (1998), Rajan et al. (2000), 
Ahn and Denis (2004), Biddle et al. (2009), Chen et al. (2011) and Garcia Lara et al. (2016) 
are the initiators of these essential key proxies expressed in the following sections. 
2.4.1 First proxy “Biddle et al. (2009)” 
The major most frequently used proxy for investment efficiency is the one proposed by 
Richardson (2006) and Biddle et al. (2009). A company's total investment for a given firm-
year is indicated by equation 1. Investment is measured as the sum of R&D, capital 
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expenditures, and acquisition expenditures, minus the cash receipts from the sales of PP&E, 
multiplied by 100 and scaled by average total assets: 
 
It = RDt + CAPEXt + Acquisitionst – SalePPEt      (1) 
 
This measurement of investment is clearly distinguished from other ones since it takes into 
consideration various investment kinds by including capital expenditures, acquisitions, sales 
of assets and R&D. Such investment types have significant importance today, unlike 
olderstudies which researched and discussed these components individually. Moreover, in 
applying robustness tests, the investment could be measured as capital expenditures scaled by 
lagged PPE which will be discussed later as a separate proxy (Garcia Lara et al., 2016). 
The abnormal element of investment or the residuals reflected in the error term are then used 
as a proxy for investment inefficiency levels by determining whether there is an over or 
underinvestment. Biddle et al. (2009) state that investment inefficiency takes values between 
zero and one, where zero or values close to zero indicate underinvestment, while one or 
values close to one specify overinvestment.   
The advantage of this measurement is that it considers various types of investments, both 
clear and ambiguous ones, but the drawback is neglecting growth opportunities and their link 
to investments, which is considered by the next proxy of Chen et al. (2011) discuss in the 
following parts. 
 
2.4.2 Second proxy “Chen et al. (2011)” 
Consistent with the first proxy for measuring investment and its efficiency, Chen et al. 
(2011) measure investment efficiency as deviations from expected investment using a model 
that forecasts investment as a function of growth opportunities. More specififcally, Hubbard 
(1998) estimates a prudent model for expected investment as a function of sales growth. As 
the relation between investment and sales growth could differ between sales declines and 
sales boosts, a linear regression model is employed to permit a differential predictability for 
sales fluctuations: 
 
Investi,t=α0+ α1NEGi,t-1+ α2SalesGrowthi,t-1+ α3NEG*SalesGrowthi,t-1+εi,t  (2) 
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Subsequent to Biddle et al. (2009), in equation 2, Investi,t is the total investment of firm i in 
year t, defined as the net increase in tangible and intangible assets and scaled by lagged total 
assets. SalesGrowthi,t-1is the annual sales growth rate for firm i in year t-1 and NEGi,t-1is an 
indicator variable which takes the value of one for negative sales growth and a zero 
otherwise (Gomariz and Ballesta, 2014). 
Calculating investment efficiency or inefficiency is multiplying the absolute value of the 
residuals by negative 1 since both over or underinvestments reflectan unfavorable sign about 
the efficiency level. Consequently, the residuals from the regression model reveal the 
deviation from the expected investment level indicating that those residuals are used as a 
firm-specific proxy for investment inefficiency, consistent with Biddle et al. (2009). A 
positive residual means that the firm is making investments at a higher rate than estimated 
from sales growth, so it will overinvest. In contrast, a negative residual assumes that real 
investment is less than that estimated, reflecting an underinvestment. 
 
2.4.3 Third proxy “Tobin’s Q (1982)” 
Prior studies have measured deviations from optimum investment strategies using the 
sensitivity of capital investments to the level of internally generated cash flows known as 
investment-cash flow sensitivity. Controlling for growth opportunities using the market-to-
book (MTB) ratio as a proxy for Tobin’s Q. Potential drawbacks of MTB for investment-
cash flow sensitivity measurement in the present context are dual. First, the variation in 
growth opportunities reflected in cash flows could not be fully captured by MTB. Second, 
MTB relies on techniques of accounting which are changeable according to the IFRS 
updates. When it comes to the advantages, they are the same as those of Richardson (2006) 
and Biddle et al. (2009) proxy.  
The following linear regression model expressed in equation 3 includes measuring 
investment by adding up R&D, capital and acquisition expenditures minus cash receipts from 
selling PPE scaled by lagged total assets. Operating cash flow scaled by net PPE and MTB 
measured as the ratio of the market value of total assets (defined as total assets plus product 
of stock price and number of common shares outstanding minus the book value of equity) to 
book value of total assets at the start of the fiscal year, represented as follows: 
Investj,t= β0,t + β1,t * OCFj,t-1 + β2,t * MTBj,t-1+ εj,t        (3) 
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Similar to the previous proxy, investment efficiency is calculated using the residuals or error 
terms from the investment equation. Overinvestments are the positive residuals of the 
investment model and underinvestmentsare the negative residuals of it, multiplied by 
negative one, as both measures are lowering in investment efficiency. 
2.4.4 Forth proxy “Garcia Lara et al. (2016)” 
This proxy was developed after the application of robustness tests on Biddle et al. (2009) 
investment proxy. Garcia Lara et al. (2016) stated that specific investments like capital 
expenditures or R&D are unclear and difficult to monitor relative to acquisitions which are 
considered extremely visible and easily monitored. R&D tends to be unique to the firm by 
forming its future competitive advantages in the market. But at the same instance, investors 
cannot obtain an appropriate amount of information about a firm's R&D productivity and 
value by tracing other firm performances. The reason behind this is the absence of organised 
markets for R&D and the immediate expensing of R&D outlays preventing an exact 
reporting to investors (Aboody and Lev, 2000). The model expressing the proxy is shown as 
follows: 
It = CAPEXt + RDt        (4) 
This proxy calculates investment in equation 4 as future capital expenditures plus R&D 
abbreviated as Capex_R&D, where Capex_R&D is defined as future capital expenditure plus 
R&D scaled by lagged sales as a percentage (Garcia Lara et al., 2016). The main advantage 
of this measurement is the focus it places on the ambiguous investments as stated. For 
determining the investment efficiency levels, residuals or error terms are clearly defined from 
the investment equation. If residuals are positive then an overinvestment takes place while 
negative so an underinvestment is occurring, all multiplied by negative one. 
 
2.4.5 Fifth proxy “Rajan et al. (2000) and Ahn and Denis (2004)” 
Rajan et al. (2000) and Ahn and Denis (2004) introduce three measures of overall investment 
efficiency of diversified firms; relative investment ratio (RINV), relative value added by 
allocation (RVA) and absolute value added by allocation (AVA). 
Relative investment ratio (RINV) is defined as the sales-weighted sum of firm and industry-
adjusted investment in high-q segments less the sales-weighted sum of firm and industry-
adjusted investment in low-q segments, expressed in the following model in equation 5: 
46 
 
 
 =∑kj=1Sj(Ij/Sj-(I/S)jss-∑j=1nwj(Ij/Sj)-(I/S)jss))- ∑nj=n-k+1Sj(Ij/Sj-(I/S)jss-∑j=1nwj(Ij/Sj-(I/S)jss))  (5) 
 
TS 
where Sjis the sales of segment j, wjis the sales of segment j divided by the firm’s total sales, 
Ijis the capital expenditures of segment j, (I/S)j
ss is the capital expenditure to sales ratio of the 
median single-segment firm operating in the same three-digit SIC industry as firm j, and TS 
is the total sales of the firm. For j =1…k, the firm’s segments have an industry median q 
greater than the firm’s sales-weighted average q, while j= (n-k+1)…n indicates that the 
firm’s segments have an industry median q less than the firm’s sales-weighted average q. 
When the values of RINV are positive, this implies that a firm is investing further in its high-
q segments signaling a higher rate of efficiency. 
Although the RINV supports the main estimations of the theory, it does not directly indicate 
whether higher diversity improves or declines the efficiency of internal allocation, as the 
equation's results indicate both opposite directions. Therefore, the four separate indicators of 
transfers should be integrated into one measure of the efficiency of allocations (Rajan et al., 
2000). 
 
2.4.6 Sixth proxy “Rajan et al. (2000) and Ahn and Denis (2004)” 
The second measure added by Rajan et al (2000) and Ahn and Denis (2004) is the relative 
value added by allocation (RVA), computed due to the reasons mentioned in the previous 
paragraph. RVA's main concern is weighting the firm and industry-adjusted segment 
investment via the difference between the industry median Tobin’s q for that segment and the 
sales-weighted average q for the firm, given as: 
   =   ∑nj=1Sj(qj-q−)(Ij/Sj-(I/S)jss-∑j=1nwj(Ij/Sj-(I/S)jss))                    (6) 
                                                  TS 
In equation 6, qj is the median Tobin’s q for single-segment firms operating in the same 
three-digit SIC code as the given segment, q‾ is the sales-weighted average q of the firm, 
which means that RVA could be viewed as the covariance between industry median q and 
industry-adjusted segment investment, taking into account the extent to which the firm 
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allocates more (less) capital to divisions with better (poorer) investment opportunities. If the 
industry median q is a superior proxy for the marginal q of segment investment, RVA can be 
perceived as a measure of the overall value added (subtracted) by the firm’s investment 
allocation process overcoming the RINV drawbacks. 
The computation of RVA employed uses the firm’s average q ratio to determine whether a 
segment has excellent or poor investment opportunities relative to the other segments of the 
firm. Also, the average excess investment of a diversified firm is subtracted from each 
segment's investment in comparison with single segment firms. However, there is an 
underestimation for the value that a diversified firm adds by reallocating funds leading to the 
non-capturing of a high investment done on average across all segments by a more diverse 
firm able to raise more funds. For this reason, the AVA is computed for measuring the 
transfer as the difference between actual segment investment and single-segment firm 
investments and weighting it by the difference between the segment’s q ratio and one. This 
computation is considered as a kind of recalculation for the RVA after avoiding its 
shortcomings. 
 
2.4.7 Seventh proxy “Rajan et al. (2000) and Ahn and Denis (2004)” 
The absolute value added by allocation (AVA) is the third measure of overall investment 
efficiency of diversified firms established by Rajan et al (2000) and Ahn and Denis (2004) is 
presented in equation 7: 
 
                            =∑nj=1Sj(qj-1)(Ij/Sj-(I/S)js                     (7) 
                                                       TS 
As stated above, the AVA is a better measure of how a diversified firm improves the 
allocation of funds of single-segment firms through weighting the industry-adjusted segment 
investment by the difference between the segment’s q and 1. Other than that remains the 
same as the capital expenditure to sales ratio and total sales which the numerator is divided 
by. 
The drawbacks of Rajan et al. (2000) and Ahn and Denis (2004) three measures of 
investment efficiency is that they are only concerned with diversified firms, plus they 
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calculate and consider investment based on the Tobin’s Q ratio only without considering 
other ways of calculation as stated before. 
Table (2.2) corporate investment efficiency measurements 
Proxy Model Related 
reference 
First INVESTMENT, 
It = RDt + CAPEXt + Acquisitionst – SalePPEt 
Richardson 
(2006);  Biddle et 
al. (2009) INVEFF, 
UNDINV=0 or close to 0 residuals 
OVERINV=1 or close to 1residuals 
Second INVESTMENT, 
Investi,t =α0+ α1NEGi,t-1+ α2SalesGrowthi,t-1+ α3NEG*SalesGrowthi,t-1+εi,t 
Hubbard (1998); 
Chen et al. 
(2011);Gomariz 
and Ballesta 
(2014) 
INVEFF, 
UNDINV=negative residuals*-1 
                                                   OVERINV=positive residuals*-1 
Third INVESTMENT, 
Investj,t = β0t+ β1t* OCFj,t-1+ β2t* MTBj,t-1+ εj,t 
Tobin (1982) 
 
INVEFF, 
UNDINV=negative residuals*-1 
                                                  OVERINV=positive residuals*-1 
Forth INVESTMENT, 
It = CAPEXt + RDt 
Garcia Lara 
(2016) 
INVEFF, 
UNDINV=0 or close to 0 residuals 
                                                OVERINV=1 or close to 1residuals 
Fifth RINV=∑kj=1Sj(Ij/Sj-(I/S)jss-∑j=1nwj(Ij/Sj)-(I/S)jss))-∑nj=n-k+1Sj(Ij/Sj-(I/S)jss-∑j=1nwj(Ij/Sj)-(I/S)jss)) 
 
TS 
Rajan et al 
(2000); Ahn and 
Denis (2004) 
Sixth RVA =∑nj=1Sj(qj-q−)(Ij/Sj-(I/S)jss-∑j=1nwj(Ij/Sj-(I/S)jss)) 
 
TS 
Seventh AVA =∑nj=1Sj(qj-1)(Ij/Sj-(I/S)jss) 
TS 
 
A conclusion could be arrived upon after analysing the above measurements of corporate 
investment efficiency summarised in table (2.2). The first two proxies of Biddle et al. (2009) 
and Chen et al. (2011) are the best measures for corporate investment efficiency which 
should be employed by potential studies for various reasons. First, these are the most recent 
measurements for corporate investment efficiency. Second, they encompass and consider all 
kinds of investments, both tangible and intangible ones. Third, for Chen et al. (2011) 
specifically, it considers investment as a function of growth opportunities and how the 
association between them could differ between sales boosts and declines. 
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2.5 Discussion of the review 
 
In this section top-ranked studies published in journals classified by the ABS list for 2018 as 
4*, 4 or 3 will be reviewed and discussed. Also, the limitations and gaps present in previous 
studies will be highlighted. Then, opportunities for future research will be provided.  
2.5.1 Reviewing specific studies 
 
In the methodology section, corporate investment efficiency and factors affecting it were 
analysed. This analysis was general in terms of the studies taken as a reference in that 
research. These studies are under various categories like journals (ranked or not), books, 
theses or working papers. To narrow this investigation and come up with a clearer result, 
only top-ranked studies are taken into consideration (as shown in table 2.3). Studies 
considered are the ones with a direct link to corporate investment efficiency. Researches that 
are published in top-ranked accounting, finance or economics journals are discussed without 
a limited time frame. 
There are 20 top-ranked studies listed in table (2.3), the oldest published in 2006 and the 
most recent in 2018. The oldest of 2006 are two studies, one linking accounting quality and 
the other free cash flows with investment efficiency. These papers were the foundations for 
the major corporate investment efficiency measurements employed by recent studies. The 
most recent of 2018 linked corporate social responsibility with investment efficiency. 
Studies under review are categorised as follows: five Accounting Review articles, three 
Journal of Corporate Finance articles, three Journal of Accounting and Economics articles, 
three Banking and Finance articles, one article from Journal of Empirical Finance, one article 
from International Journal of Economics and Finance, one article from Journal of 
Accounting, Auditing and Finance, one article from Journal of Financial Economics, one 
article from Review of Accounting Studies and onearticle from Journal of Business Ethics. 
Concerning the factors influencing investment efficiency discussed in earlier sections; five 
for financial reporting quality, four for corporate governance, three studies for earnings 
management, two for auditing, one for disclosure levels, two for IFRS, one for corporate 
social responsibility, one for cash flows and one for capital structure. It is clear that all these 
researches examine only one influencing variable at a time.  
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The financial reporting quality studies that were investigated come up with results ensuring a 
positive impact of reporting quality on investment efficiency. Concerning the corporate 
governance studies, half of them indicate a positive association with investment efficiency 
(Billet et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2017) and the other half indicate a negative one (Chen et al., 
2011; Chen et al., 2017). The earnings management studies found that as earnings 
management rise, investment efficiency declines. Auditing articles show a positive influence 
of having largly specialized auditors on investment efficiency. Cheng et al. (2013) find that 
as internal control weaknesses disclosures increase, firms’ reporting quality and thereof 
investment efficiency increase as well. Studies of IFRS and investment efficiency show a 
positive relationship between them. Benlemlih and Bitar (2018) find that higher corporate 
social responsibility reduces investment inefficiencies. Free cash flows show an increase in 
over-investment (Richardson, 2006). The capital structure article states that a rise in debt 
induces underinvestment while a rise in equity induces overinvestment (Eisdorfer, 2013). 
When it comes to sampling and measurements, five studies were cross-country like Biddle 
and Hilary (2006) and Chen et al. (2011), eight were conducted on the US such as Bae et al. 
(2017) and four were applied on China like that of Guariglia and Yang (2016). The two 
remaining studies used Spain (Gomariz et al., 2014) and Taiwan (Hsu et al., 2015) as 
samples. The cross-country studies are limited to a certain region like Chen et al. (2013), 
applied to privatized companies only or concerned with a single factor that affects investment 
efficiency.  
As for the proxies, Richardson (2006), Biddle et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2011) are 
employed by eleven of the studies as being the most recent measurements and they consider 
all kinds of investments, both tangible and intangible ones. Eight used Tobin’s Q 
measurement of investment and one used Rajan et al. (2000) and Ahn and Denis (2004). 
 
Table (2.3) Related corporate investment efficiency top-ranked studies 
Authors Variables 
examined 
Sample 
(firm-
years) 
Period Country Measurement Findings 
McNichols 
and Stubben 
(2008) 
Earnings 
management and 
investment 
efficiency 
134,561 1978-
2002 
US Tobin’s Q As misreporting (EM) increase, 
investment inefficiency 
increase. 
Shen, C. et 
al. (2015) 
Earnings 
management and 
investment 
efficiency 
14,514 1998-
2010 
China Richardson 
(2006) 
Upward EM coincides with 
overinvestment 
Yu and Earnings 3,916 1997- China Tobin’s Q EM and audit quality indicate 
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Lenard 
(2012) 
management, 
audit quality and 
investment 
efficiency 
2007 over-investment. 
Guariglia 
and Yang 
(2016) 
Financing 
constraints, 
agency problems 
and investment 
efficiency 
22,373 1998-
2014 
China Richardson 
(2006) 
Limited access to capital 
markets leads to under-
investment. Weak governance 
leads managers to over-invest 
their free CFs. 
Biddle and 
Hilary 
(2006) 
Accounting 
quality and firm-
level capital 
investment  
45,000 1993-
2004 
Cross-
country 
Tobin’s Q  Accounting quality enhances 
investment efficiency. 
Biddle, G. 
et al. (2009) 
Financial 
reporting quality 
and investment 
efficiency 
34,791 1993-
2005 
Unknown Richardson 
(2006) 
Higher FRQ leads to less 
deviation from predicted 
investment levels. 
Chen, F. et 
al. (2011) 
Financial 
reporting quality 
and investment 
efficiency 
6,321 2002-
2005 
Cross-
country 
Chen et al. 
(2011) 
Accounting quality is positively 
associated with investment 
efficiency 
García Lara, 
J. et al. 
(2016) 
Accounting 
conservatism and 
investment 
efficiency 
41,626 1990-
2007 
US Biddle et al. 
(2009) 
Conservatism leads to more 
efficient investments. 
Gomariz, 
M. et al. 
(2014) 
Financial 
reporting quality, 
debt maturity and 
investment 
efficiency 
13,500 1998-
2008 
Spain Biddle et al. 
(2009) 
Higher FRQ and higher use of 
short-term debt (lower debt 
maturity) increase investment 
efficiency. 
Eisdorfer, 
A. (2013) 
Capital structure, 
executive 
compensation and 
investment 
efficiency 
2,011 2000-
2009 
US Tobin’s Q Managers compensated based 
on debt components tend to 
under-invest, while managers 
who are compensated based on 
equity tend to over-invest.  
Chen, C. et 
al. (2013) 
IFRS and 
investment 
efficiency 
8,857 2000-
2009 
Cross-
country 
Tobin’s Q and 
Biddle et al. 
(2009) 
IFRS adoption has a positive 
impact on investment efficiency. 
Hsu, A. et 
al. (2015) 
IAS 27 and 
investment 
efficiency 
4,228 2001-
2008 
Taiwan Biddle et al. 
(2009) 
Higher quality of consolidated 
financial statements under IAS 
27 leads to investment 
efficiency. 
Billett, M. 
et al. (2011) 
Governance and 
investment 
efficiency 
7,355 1990-
2007 
US Tobin’s Q Poor governance associates with 
overinvestment. 
Chen, R. et 
al. (2017)  
State ownership, 
foreign ownership 
and investment 
efficiency 
3,054 1981-
2008 
Cross-
country 
Tobin’s Q State (foreign) ownership is 
negatively (positively) related to 
investment efficiency. 
Chen, S. et 
al. (2011) 
Government 
intervention and 
investment 
efficiency 
6,393 2001-
2006 
China Tobin’s Q Government intervention 
distorts firms' investment 
behavior and harms investment 
efficiency. 
Chen and 
Chen (2012) 
Corporate 
governance and 
capital allocation 
efficiency 
22,366 1996, 
2001 and 
2006 
Cross-
country 
Rajan et al 
(2000); Ahn 
and Denis 
(2004) 
The efficiency of investment 
allocation is better for 
diversified firms with more 
effective internal or external 
governance structures. 
Cheng, M. 
et al. (2013) 
Disclosure of 
internal control 
weaknesses 
(ICW) and 
investment 
efficiency 
6,784 2004-
2007 
US Biddle et al. 
(2009) 
As ICW disclosures increase, 
FRQ and so investment 
efficiency as well. 
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Richardson, 
S. (2006) 
Free CF and 
overinvestment 
58,053 1988-
2002 
US Hubbard 
(1998), 
Richardson 
(2006) 
As free CFs increase, over-
investment increase. 
Benlemlih 
and Bitar 
(2018) 
Corporate social 
responsibility 
(CSR) and 
investment 
efficiency  
21,030 1998-
2012 
US Chen et al. 
(2011) 
High CSR involvement 
decreases investment 
inefficiency. 
Bae, G. et 
al. (2017) 
Audit and 
investment 
efficiency 
41,453 1992-
2012 
US Biddle et al. 
(2009) 
Clients of specialist and large 
auditors exhibit greater capital 
investment efficiency. 
 
 
2.5.2 Research Gaps 
 
In this section, research gaps related to corporate investment efficiency and factors affecting 
it are discussed. This should help in suggesting some ideas for future research. 
 
Financial reporting quality: To the best of our knowledge, authors over the last two decades 
agree that FRQ and accounting conservatism, being one of its major tools, have a positive 
relationship with investment efficiency either directly or indirectly by reducing information 
asymmetry. While previous studies cover plenty of research ideas, examining certain areas is 
still required. Other reporting qualities like tax incentives, bank financing, and specific 
institutional factors effect on over and underinvestment should be considered (Li and Wang, 
2010). Also, extending the sample to cover MENA region countries especially the 
developing ones due to the economic implications of 2008 crisis and political implications 
such as the Arab spring over the last decade would be an area of concern. Such economic and 
political instability would discourage firms from improving their financial reporting quality 
by disclosing information transparently. The impact of such instabilities may reduce firms’ 
investment efficiency levels, and thereof firms may not be willing to report that kind of 
information to stakeholders.  
 
Earnings management: Some prior studies had examined the factors restricting managers 
from managing the firm earnings like compensation and turnover rate and how this affects 
investment efficiency (Kim, 2016). But still, a gap exists when it comes to investigating other 
influential factors on earnings management and investment efficiency, all of which is 
discussed in detailthroughout the coming research section.  
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Also, although previous literature like Lenard and Yu (2012) show that earnings management 
isa significant indicator for investment efficiency in Chinese companies, still these results are 
not extended to other stock exchanges in different regions like Europe, Commonwealth 
countries, MENA or developed and developing economies which might be beneficial and 
important for comparison purposes. Each of these regions will have different economic, 
political and cultural conditions which might affect firms’ level of earnings, management and 
levels of investment efficiencies. 
 
Corporate social responsibility: Although many researchers had recently examined the 
relationship between CSR and investment efficiency, gaps and unexplored areas remain. For 
example, examining the direction of causation between CSR and investment efficiency, as 
this investigation takes place due to the association between good investment efficiency and 
improved financial performance. This association may result in more resources being 
available for the achievement of CSR goals (Benlemlih and Bitar, 2018). In addition, the 
impact of ethical decision making and firms’ reputation on information environments of 
diverse culturescould be examined (Cui et al., 2018). As well as exploring the effect of CSR 
and information asymmetry on long-term corporate financial performance that in turn may 
affect the firm’s investment decisions and efficiency. 
 
International financial reporting standards: Regarding the limitations and gaps in previous 
studies discussing the IFRS with investment efficiency, it can be easily concluded to the best 
of our knowledge that there are intended and unintended implications for IFRS mandatory 
adoptions which are still not studied. The intended consequences include financial reporting 
effects like transparency and comparability, also capital markets and macroeconomic effects 
such as employment, efficient markets, and growth. These intended consequences are called 
the side effect and include taxation, dividend payouts, lending agreements and compensation 
schemes (Brüggemannet al., 2013).  
Moreover, studies need to choose their sample timings differently. Choosing sample timings 
where IFRS was adopted along with the occurrence of changes happening especially in 
European financial markets and audit regulations is not an ideal option (André et al., 2013). 
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Corporate governance: To the best of our knowledge, many studies have explored the 
relationship between corporate governance attributes with investment efficiency. 
Measurements of investment efficiency employed by these studies were mostly Tobin’s Q or 
the recent ones Rajan et al. (2000) and Ahn and Denis (2004). Consequently, the limitation 
here lies in neglecting the commonly used measurements of investment efficiency founded 
by Richardson (2006), Biddle et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2011) which are discussed in 
details in the measurements section. 
 
Disclosure levels: Future research can discuss gaps in previous literature such as research 
and development (R&D) voluntary disclosure and its impact on corporate investment 
efficiency due to the reasons explained in the next section. Also, studying costs associated 
with increased disclosure levels (Lai et al., 2014) and relating it to investment efficiency 
would be beneficial. This is because a firm’s competitive advantage would be negatively 
affected by such disclosures when its competitors gather an idea about it. 
A major gap in previous studies is that there was no consideration for mandatory disclosure 
relationship with investment efficiency since most of the research had examined either both 
types of disclosures (mandatory and voluntary) or only concentrated on voluntary 
disclosures. Also, examining the impact of mandatory disclosure on investment efficiency 
may help in determining the extent of voluntary disclosure required by firms. 
Adding to the mentioned gaps, prior studies did not consider the opposite scenario, which is 
the influence of corporate investment efficiency on voluntary disclosure. This would assist in 
deciding a firm’s transparency level when being inefficient in investing or when having 
competitive advantages and investing efficiently. 
 
Audit quality: Still the relationship between major audit quality variables like audit fees, 
auditor size or discretionary accruals and investment efficiency is not studied. Studying the 
impact of these variables is crucial for comparing the results of various audit quality 
measurements and analysing how each proxy could have a similar or different effect on 
investment efficiency. Although Dashtbayaz and Mohammadi (2016) study is the only one 
that examines the effect of more than one audit quality variable on investment efficiency, it 
does not consider any of the variables mentioned at the beginning of the paragraph. That 
study was applied to Tehran in specific and it was found that audit quality increases 
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investment efficiency. Therefore, it is clearly shown that there is a shortage in cross-country 
studies directly linking most of the main audit quality variables with corporate investment 
efficiency. Cross-country studies would be of importance for two reasons. First, it is for 
investment decisions purposes, as potential investors will need to know the investment 
opportunities of various countries and compare which is the best to invest in. Second, it 
analyses the difference between audit quality in countries employing the big-four audit firms 
and those who do not and its effect on investment efficiency. 
 
Capital structure: Referring to the gaps in prior studies, the sample selected and the direct 
link between capital structure and investment efficiency were not fully justified. As to the 
best of our knowledge, only one study investigates the direct link between capital structure 
and investment efficiency and is only concerned with Tehran (Bari and Karamlo, 2014). 
Even other studies either link leverage with investment decisions or capital structure 
indirectly with investment efficiency through having other moderating factors like executive 
compensationwhich do not include a diversified sample of many countries. Including various 
countries in a study is crucial for comparison purposes, to know the extent at which leverage 
and equity comprise a country’s capital structure of its firms, to decide upon which country is 
the best to invest in and with which form of capital structure. 
The gaps discussed above are related to the firm internal factors which do affect corporate 
investment efficiency. The external macroeconomic factors influencing investment efficiency 
was not considered by the prior studies. The importance of external macroeconomic factors 
rises due to the existence of worldwide economic instabilities over the past decade such as 
the 2008 economic crisis. 
2.5.3 Opportunities for future research 
 
From the primary suggestions for future research is extending the context and sample of 
certain variables linked with corporate investment efficiency to comprise a diversified set of 
countries. This would be beneficial for comparison purposes and for analysing the different 
effects of this link on various areas like the MENA region, European region, developed or 
developing countries. Therefore, variables such as earnings management, corporate social 
responsibility, audit quality, and capital structure and their relationship with investment 
efficiency must be applied on cross-country studies to reap these benefits. As comparing will 
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allow stakeholders to assess the firms and countries that they can trust when it comes to 
gaining profits on investments, lending, supplying or purchasing from them. 
There are further opportunities for future research expressed in the following paragraphs 
concerning some of the factors mentioned other than just extending the results to other 
regions and opportunities for factors which already justify the cross-country study issue.  
FRQ has a major influence on corporate investment efficiency as stated by the vast majority 
of prior literature. These previous studies had mainly examined the direct relationship 
between FRQ and investment efficiency, without considering factors that might affect this 
relationship. For example, according to Hanlon et al. (2014), higher tax enforcement by the 
tax authority has a positive impact on financial reporting quality; and referring to Ding et al. 
(2016), firms with higher quality of accounting information have greater access to loans, and 
enjoy a lower rate of interest. Thus, assessing the impact of factors like taxes or debts on 
FRQ and eventually on investment efficiency may provide a clearer picture of this 
association.  
It would also be valuable for future studies to consider the effect of certain influential factors 
on earnings management and thereof investment efficiency as a lump sum bulk. As ethics 
might have a mitigating effect on earnings management while capital market incentives 
(economic factors) might have an encouraging effect. When managers try to boost stocks’ 
valuation in the market or avoid delisting if declaring consecutive earnings losses (the case of 
China), leading to a rise in earnings management, analysing the effect of such factors on 
earnings management and consequently on investment efficiency would be of major 
importance especially when managers claim that manipulating earnings act as a protection 
for a company’s status in specific cases. 
Concerning CSR, previous researches had linked CSR with share prices, CSR with firm 
value, CSR with information asymmetry, information asymmetry with investment efficiency 
and share prices with investment efficiency. Still, a cross-country study is needed to examine 
the whole chain linked together, which is how does CSR affect information asymmetry 
which in turn affects share price, and firm value which then influences corporate investment 
efficiency. This would be considered an important comprehensive study assessing the 
indirect effect of CSR on investment efficiency. This indirect effect takes place through the 
moderating variables information asymmetry, share price and firm value. These moderating 
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variables help in comparing different companies’ response towards the diverse CSR practices 
and analysing their stock exchanges’ reactions to it. 
Regarding IFRS, countries applying it on a mandatory basis must bear in mind the intended 
and unintended consequences of this adoption on corporate investment efficiency. The 
intended consequences of IFRS adoption are the need to study its effect on financial 
statements transparency and comparability across longer time periods. From the unintended 
consequences: First, the compensation schemes depend on market-based measures rather 
than accounting-based ones. Second, the lending agreements are affected by the changes in 
accounting rules after the adoption which may result in the transfer of wealth between 
lenders and shareholders. Third, dividend payout policies may change following the changes 
after adopting IFRS reflecting a higher importance of fair value accounting. Fourth, IFRS has 
a role in determining accounting income which in turn affects taxation. Therefore, studying 
these IFRS consequences’ implications on corporate investment efficiency could be a good 
opportunity for forthcoming research.   
In addition, although most of corporate governance (CG) attributes’ relationships with 
investment efficiency were studied before considering the cross-country sampling issue 
(Chen and Chen, 2012), the major commonly used measurements of efficiency introduced by 
Richardson (2006), Biddle et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2011) are still not applied by these 
CG comprehensive studies. The application of the suggested proxies would improve the data 
output since each and every measurement has its own perspective in clarifying the degree of 
investment efficiency or inefficiency. Then an analysis could be made about which is the 
most appropriate measurement to explain investment efficiencies when linked with CG 
attributes.  
To the best of my knowledge, the relation between the R&D disclosure and investment 
efficiency was not studied before, marking it as an area requiring further investigation due to 
the reasons mentioned afterward. 
Since accounting standards and mandatory information do not recognise or take into account 
the intangible assets like researfch and development, human resources, innovations and 
customer relations. Management should concentrate upon explaining them accurately as they 
are critical to the success of the company and assist investors in making their investment 
decisions (Franzen et al., 2007). In addition, R&D investments have numerous characteristics 
that differentiate them from ordinary investments. As on average, fifty percent of the amount 
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of the R&D investment is human capital comprising the firm's knowledge base for generating 
future profits; also, taking long periods to develop R&D investments, subjects it to higher 
uncertainty of output (Hall, 2002).  
R&D disclosure is voluntary because it provides information that exceeds mandatory 
disclosure requirements crucial in mitigating information asymmetry associated with R&D 
investments. R&D disclosure is unique due to various aspects; First, the excessive knowledge 
of managers over stakeholders regarding the specification of products development, 
feasibility and success. Second, the non-existence of markets for R&D is like the financial 
assets where prices are available for obtaining direct information about values. Third, the 
immediate expensing of value-adding R&D investments as required by recent accounting 
practices. And finally, firms consider their R&D investments as a point of competitive 
advantage which should not be disclosed to the public. Therefore, as investors become aware 
of R&D information when being disclosed, information asymmetry is minimised, investment 
decisions improve and consequently investment efficiency boosts (James, 2011). On the 
other hand, managers should have an effective management and control over R&D disclosure 
concerning the type and timing of this disclosure, in order to reduce proprietary costs 
associated with disclosing proprietary information which could be adversely used by 
competitors. Thereof, R&D investments and disclosures are considered important aspects to 
be linked with information asymmetry and investment efficiency. 
In terms of audit quality (AQ), it is noted that studies directly linking AQ and investment 
efficiency lack the examination of audit fees, auditor size, and discretionary accruals as main 
variables for indicating AQ and their effect on investment efficiency. Analysing those 
variables would be essential for comparing their results with those of the other AQ variables 
(like auditor independence, auditor reputation, auditor tenure...etc.) affecting investment 
efficiency to know which of them has the most influence and strongest relation. 
Referring to the financing factors, extending studies directly linking capital structure with 
corporate investment efficiency is crucial since only one study had examined this association 
and was only applied on Tehran. Thus, examining the relationship between leverage and 
investment efficiency is not just needed for the purpose of assessing a cross-country sample, 
but for applying additional investment efficiency measurements other than the single 
measurement used of Gomariz and Ballesta (2014). Applying more than one measurement 
59 
 
assists in evaluating whether the output would differ according to diverse measurements or 
not, and which is more appropriate to be used for these cross-country studies. 
The availability of FCF and its influence on corporate investment efficiency was studied 
previously. Still, there is a need to study the other way round, which is the effect of corporate 
investment efficiency on FCF, in order to examine whether over and underinvestment would 
negatively affect the free cash flow availability or not.   
Over and above providing opportunities for every single influencing factor, the integration 
seems to be important as well. According to table (2.3), top-ranked studies were only 
considering one affecting variable on investment efficiency. Studying the effect of firm-
related factors all together on investment efficiency in one research would be of great benefit. 
Some of these factors already affect each other like CG and FRQ (Habib and Jiang, 2015), 
IFRS and EM (Capkun et al., 2016) or CSR and CFs (Cheng, 2016). Soexamining their 
combined impact would give a clue about which variable would act as complement or 
substitute for the other, which has a moderating effect, which has the strongest and which has 
the weakest effect.   
Consistent with the above explanations, it is clearly obvious that all these variables are firm-
related ones including the financing factors. Nothing of the prior literature had highlighted 
the effect of external factors on corporate investment efficiency. According to theories like 
the economic growth, the neoclassical, the pecking order and the quantity theory of money, 
the relationship between macroeconomic factors such as the monetary policy, fiscal policy 
and FDI (foreign direct investment) effect on corporate investment efficiency should be 
investigated. Based on the mentioned theories, gross domestic savings, GDP growth, 
inflation rates, trade openness, unemployment rate, money supply and lending rates are 
monetary policy determinants that are estimated to have an association with corporate 
investment efficiency (Bhamra et al., 2011; Fathi et al., 2012; Bialowolski and Bialowolska, 
2013; Mokhova and Zinecker, 2014). All these factors comprise a substantial power and 
weight due to the occurrence of worldwide economic crises and political instabilities during 
the past decade. And so investigating the macroeconomic variables influence on investment 
efficiency levels could be recommended as a study area in future research to fulfill the gap in 
previous studies. 
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2.6 Summary 
 
To sum up, that research represents a reflection on the literature reviewhaving a number of 
aims; first, to review findings and explanations of related previous literature about the 
meaning of corporate investment efficiency. Second, it examines how information 
asymmetry is mitigated to improve investment efficiency. Third, it explores what are the 
financing factors within a firm that determine its investment efficiency and measurements of 
investment efficiency. Forth, a methodology section classifies and analyses the previous 
literature related to corporate investment efficiency. Fifth, a discussion section includes top-
ranked studies directly linked with investment efficiency, expressing limitations and 
providing opportunities for future research. 
Although the effects on corporate investment efficiency have been extensively researched 
over the last quarter of the past century, there are areas found where results are inconclusive 
and more research is required. The study highlights different research opportunities for 
researchers. According to my best knowledge, no paper has carefully investigated the effect 
of certain disclosure aspects on information asymmetry and consequently corporate 
investment efficiency or the macroeconomic factors effect on corporate investment 
efficiency. Consequently, future research should investigate macroeconomic factors impact 
on investment efficiency, the influence of R&D disclosure on investment efficiency, the 
effect of investment efficiency on voluntary disclosure, the joint effect of corporate 
governance and investment efficiency on voluntary disclosure. 
 
Table (2.4) Defining the variables influencing corporate investment efficiency 
Variable Definition Related references 
INVEFF When firms undertake only projects with positive NPV and avoid any 
deviations causing over or under investments. 
Yoshikawa (1980); Hayashi 
(1982); Hubbard (1998); Stein 
(2003); Biddle et al. (2009) 
FRQ The accuracy of reported information and annual reports to better describe a 
firm's operations. 
Myers and Majluf (1984); Basu 
(1997); IASB (2008); Biddle et 
al. (2009); Garcia Lara et al. 
(2016) 
EM The firms' misrepresented reported economic performance manipulated by 
insiders or management to mislead stakeholders or influence contractual 
outcomes. 
Shen et. al. (2015) 
 
CSR The indication of the continuing commitment by firms to behave ethically 
and contribute to economic development while improving the quality of life 
of the workforce and their families as well as of the local community and 
society. 
Dhaliwal et al. (2011); Cho et 
al. (2013); Benlemlih and Bitar 
(2018); Cook et. al. (2016) 
IFRS A set of accounting standards developed by an independent organization 
called the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) aiming to 
provide a global frame for how public companies prepare and disclose their 
Barth et al. (2008); Daske et al. 
(2008); Li (2010); Biddle et al. 
(2013) 
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financial statements. 
CG A set of mechanisms that influence the decisions of managers to align their 
interests with those of the shareholders. 
Anderson et al. (2004); Xie et 
al. (2007); Billett et al. (2011); 
Aggarwal et al. (2011); Chen et 
al. (2013);  Ji (2016); 
DISC The act of making a company's financial information available to various 
stakeholders through published annual reports to facilitate decision making. 
Disclosing information can be mandatory or voluntary.  
Watts and Zimmerman (1986); 
Verrecchia (2001); Miller 
(2009); Kothari et al. (2009); 
Lai et al. (2014); Campbell et al. 
(2014); Al-Hadi et al. (2016) 
AQ The PCAOB state that audit quality is meeting investors’ needs for 
independent and reliable audits as well as maintaining strong audit 
committee communications on financial statements, disclosures, internal 
control, and going concern warnings. 
Er (2010); Varici (2013); 
Luypaert and Caneghem (2014) 
CAPST The mix of debt and equity proportions that a company uses to finance its 
business investments. 
Damodaran (2001); Meier and 
Tarhan (2007); Gao et al. 
(2015); Bari and Karamlou 
(2014) 
FCF Excess cash flow after funding all of a firm’s projects that have positive net 
present values when discounted at the appropriate cost of capital. 
Jensen (1986); Hubbard (1998); 
Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2003); Richardson (2006); 
Chen et al. (2011); Chen et al. 
(2016) 
 
 
References  
Aboody, D. and Lev, B. (2000). Information asymmetry, R&D, and insider gains. Journal of 
Finance, 55(6), 2747-2766.  
 
Aggarwal, R. and Samwick, A. (2003). Why do managers diversify their firms? Agency 
reconsidered. Journal of Finance, 58(1), 71–118.  
 
Aggarwal, R., Erel, I., Ferreira, M. and Matos, P. (2011). Does governance travel around the 
world? Evidence from institutional investors. Journal of Financial Economics, 100(1), 154–
181.  
 
Ahmed, A., Neel, M. and Wang, D. (2013). Does Mandatory Adoption of IFRS Improve 
Accounting Quality? Preliminary Evidence. Contemporary Accounting Research, 30(4), 
1344–1372.  
 
Ahn, S. and Denis, D. (2004). Internal Capital Markets and Investment Policy: Evidence 
from Corporate Spinoffs. Journal of Financial Economics, 71(3), 489-516. 
 
Aivazian, V.A., Geb, Y. and Qiu, J. (2005). The impact of leverage on firm investment: 
Canadian evidence. Journal of Corporate Finance, 11(1-2), 277–291. 
Al-Hadi, A., Hasan, M., Taylor, G., Hossain, M. and Richardson, G. (2017). Market Risk 
Disclosures and Investment Efficiency: International Evidence from the Gulf Cooperation 
Council Financial Firms. Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting, 
28(3), 349-393. 
 
62 
 
Allen, J. and Phillips, G. (2000). Corporate equity ownership, strategic alliances, and product 
market relationships. Journal of Finance, 55(6), 2791–2815.  
 
Alti, A. (2003). How sensitive is investment expenditure to cash flow when financing is 
frictionless? Journal of Finance, 53(2), 707–722.  
Amihud, Y., and Lev, B. (1981). Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate 
mergers, Bell Journal of Economics 12(2), 605–617. 
 
Anderson, R., Bates, T., Bizjak, J. and Lemmon, M. (2000). Corporate governance and firm 
diversification. Financial Management, 29(1), 5–22. 
 
Anderson, R. C., Mansi, S. A. and Reeb, D. M. (2004). Board characteristics, accounting 
report integrity, and the cost of debt. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 37(3), 315-342. 
 
Andre, P., Filip, A. and Paugam, L. (2013). Impact of Mandatory IFRS Adoption on 
Conditional Conservatism in Europe. Retrieved from ESSEC Business School, https://hal-
essec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00862683/document. 
 
Aupperle, K., Carroll, A. and Hatfield, J. (1985). An empirical examination of the 
relationship between corporate social responsibility and profitability. The Academy of 
Management Journal, 28(2), 446-463.  
 
Bae, G.S. and Choi, S.U. (2012). Do Industry Specialist Auditors Improve Investment 
Efficiency? Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2145191 
 
Bae, G., Choi, S., Dhaliwal, D. and Lamoreaux, P. (2017). Auditors and client investment 
efficiency. The Accounting Review, 92(2), 19-40.  
 
Balakrishnan, K., Core, J. and Verdi, R. (2014). The relation between reporting quality and 
financing and investment: evidence from changes in financing capacity. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 52(1), 1-36.  
Ball, R. and Shivakumar, L. (2005). Earnings quality in UK private firms: comparative loss 
recognition timeliness. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39(1), 83-128.  
Bar-Gill. O., and Bebchuk, L. (2003). Misreporting corporate performance. Retrieved from 
Harvard University, http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/pdfs/2003.Bebchuk-
Bargill.Misreporting.pdf.  
 
Bari, S. and Karamlou, M. (2014). Capital Structure and Investment Efficiency: Empirical 
Evidence from Companies Listed in Tehran Stock Exchange. Arth Prabandh: A Journal of 
Economics and Management, 3(7), 80-93. 
 
Barth, M., Landsman, W. and Lang, M. (2008). International accounting standards and 
accounting quality. Journal of Accounting Research, 46(3), 467-498. 
Basu (1997). The Conservatism Principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, 24(1), 3-37. 
63 
 
Bénabou, R. and Tirole, J. (2010). Individual and corporate social responsibility. Economica, 
77(305), 1–19.  
 
Benlemlih, M. (2017). Corporate social responsibility and firm debt maturity. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 144(3), 491-517.  
 
Benlemlih, M. and Bitar, M. (2018). 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Investment Efficiency.Journal of Business Ethics, 
148(3), 647-671. 
 
Ben-Nasr, H., Boubakri, N. and Cosset, J. (2012). The political determinants of the cost of 
equity: evidence from newly privatized firms. Journal of Accounting Research, 50(3), 605-
646. 
 
Berger, P. and Hann, R. (2003). The impact of SFAS 131 on Information and Monitoring. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 41(2), 163–223.  
 
Bertrand, M. and Mullainathan, S. (2003). Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance 
and Managerial Preferences. Journal of Political Economy, 111(5), 1043–1075.  
 
Bhamra, H., Fisher, A. and Kuehn, L. (2011). Monetary policy and corporate default. Journal 
of Monetary Economics, 58(5), 480–494. 
 
Bialowolski, P. and Bialowolska, D. (2013). External Factors Affecting Investment 
Decisions of Companies. Economics-the open access open-assessment e-journal, 44, 8-22.  
 
Biddle, G. and Hilary, G. (2006). Accounting quality and firm-level capital investment. The 
Accounting Review, 81(5), 963–982.  
 
Biddle, G., Hilary, G. and Verdi, R. (2009). How does financial reporting quality relate to 
investments efficiency? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 48(2-3), 112–131. 
 
Biddle, G., Callahan, C., Hong, H. and Knowles, R. (2013). Do Adoptions of International 
Financial Reporting Standards Enhance Capital Investment Efficiency? Retrieved from 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2353693 
 
Billett, M., Garfinkel J. and Jiang, Y. (2011). The influence of governance on investment: 
Evidence from a hazard model. Journal of Financial Economics, 102(3), 643–670. 
 
Boone, A., Field, L., Karpoff, J. and Raheja, C. (2007). The determinants of corporate board 
size and composition: an empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 85(1), 66–101.  
 
Borisova, G., Brockman, P., Salas, J. and Zagorchev, A. (2012). Government ownership and 
corporate governance: evidence from the EU. Journal of Banking and Finance, 36(11), 2917-
2934. 
 
Botosan, C. and Plumlee, M. (2002). A re-examination of disclosure level and the expected 
cost of equity capital. Journal of Accounting Research, 40(1), 21-40.  
64 
 
 
Boubakri, N., Cosset, J. and Saffar, W. (2013). The role of state and foreign owners in 
corporate risk-taking: evidence from privatization. Journal of Financial Economics, 108(3), 
641-658. 
 
Brüggemann, U., Hitz, J. andSellhorn, T. (2013). Intended and unintended consequences of 
mandatory IFRS adoption: A review of extant evidence and suggestions for future research. 
European Accounting Review, 22(1), 1-37. 
 
Burgstahler, D., Hail, L. and Leuz, C. (2006). The importance of reporting incentives: 
earnings management in European private and public firms. The Accounting Review, 81(5), 
983-1016.  
 
Bushman, R. and Smith, A. (2001). Financial accounting information and corporate 
governance. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 32(1-3), 237-333. 
 
Bushman, R., Piotroski, J. and Smith, A. (2004). What determines corporate transparency? 
Journal of Accounting Research, 42(2), 207-252. 
 
Bushman, R., Piotroski, J. and Smith, A. (2011). Capital allocation and timely accounting 
recognition of economic losses. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 38(1-2), 1-33.  
Campbell, J., Chen, H., Dhaliwal, D., Lu, H. and Steele, L. (2014). The information content 
of mandatory risk factor disclosures in corporate filings. Review of Accounting Studies, 
19(1), 396-455. 
 
Capkun, V., Collins, D. and Jeanjean, T. (2016). The effect of IAS/IFRS adoption on 
earnings management (smoothing): A closer look at competing explanations. Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, 35(4), 352-394. 
Chaney, P., Faccio, M. and Parsley, D. (2011). The quality of accounting information in 
politically connected firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 51(1-2), 58-76. 
 
Chang, X., Dasgupta, S. and Hilary, G. (2009). The effect of auditor quality on financing 
decisions. The Accounting Review, 84(4), 1085–1117. 
 
Chen, S., Sun, Z., Tang, S. and Wu, D. (2011). Government intervention and investment 
efficiency: evidence from China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(2), 259-271. 
Chen, K., Chen, Z. and Wei, K. (2011). Agency costs of free cash flow and the effect of 
shareholder rights on the implied cost of equity capital. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 46(1), 171-207.  
Chen, S. and Chen, I. (2012). Corporate governance and capital allocations of diversified 
firms. Journal of Banking and Finance, 36(2), 395-409. 
Chen, X., Sun, Y. and Xu, X. (2016). Free cash flow, over-investment and corporate 
governance in China. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 37, 81–103. 
 
65 
 
Chen, R., El Ghoul, S., Guedhami, O. and Wang, H. (2017). Do state and foreign ownership 
affect investment efficiency? Evidence from privatizations. Journal of Corporate Finance, 
42(c), 408-421. 
 
Cheung, A. (2016). Corporate social responsibility and corporate cash holdings. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 37, 412-430. 
 
Cho, S., Lee, C. and Pfeiffer, R. (2013). Corporate social responsibility performance and 
information asymmetry. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 32(1), 71–83. 
 
Choe, H., Masulis, R. and Nanda, V. (1993). Common stock offerings across the business 
cycle. Journal of Empirical Finance, 1(1), 3-31. 
 
Clinch, G., Stokes, D. and Zhu, T. (2012). Audit quality and information asymmetry between 
traders. Journal of Accounting and Finance, 52(3), 743-765. 
Cohen, D. and Zarowin, P. (2009). Economic Consequences of Real and Accrual-Based 
Earnings Management Activities. Retrieved from New York University, 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/07ed/2d640f753d1c207b9864a1f50fd194bb437c.pdf. 
 
Cohen, J., Holder-Webb, L., Nath, L. and Wood, D. (2011). Retail investors’ perceptions of 
the decision-usefulness of economic performance, governance, and corporate social 
responsibility disclosures. Behavioral Research in Accounting, 23(1), 109-129. 
 
Cook, K., Romia, A., Sáncheza, D. and Sáncheza, J. (2016). The Influence of Corporate 
Social Responsibility on Investment Efficiency and Innovation. 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2616021 
 
Cruise, S. (2011). Investors demand improved sustainability reporting. 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/21/investorssustainability-
idUSLDE71K0W120110221. 
 
Cui, J., Jo, H. and Na, H. (2018). Does corporate social responsibility affect information 
asymmetry? Journal of Business Ethics, 148(3), 549–572. 
 
Damodaran, (2001). Corporate Finance. Theory and practice. Retrieved from 
https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Corporate_Finance.html?id=zMCtQgAACAAJ. 
 
Daske, H., Hail, L., Leuz, C. and Verdi, R. (2008). Mandatory IFRS reporting around the 
world: Early evidence on the economic consequences. Journal of Accounting Research, 
46(5), 1085-1142. 
DeAngelo, L. (1981). Auditor size and audit quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
3(3), 183-199.  
 
Deng, X., Kang, J. and Low, B. (2013). Corporate social responsibility and stakeholder value 
maximization: Evidence from mergers. Journal of Financial Economics, 110(1), 87-109. 
 
66 
 
Dhaliwal, D., Li, O., Tsang, A. and Yang, Y. (2011). Voluntary nonfinancial disclosure and 
the cost of equity capital: The initiation of corporate social responsibility reporting. The 
Accounting Review, 86(1), 59-100. 
 
Ding, S., Liu, M. and Wu, Z. (2016). Financial reporting quality and external debt financing 
constraints: The case of privately held firms. ABACUS, 52(3), 351-373. 
 
Dutta, S. and Nezlobin, A. (2017). Dynamic effects of information disclosure on investment 
efficiency. Journal of Accounting Research, 55(2), 329-369. 
 
Dye, R. (1993). Auditing standards, legal liability and auditor wealth. Journal of Political 
Economy, 101(5), 887-914. 
 
Easley, D. and O’Hara, M. (2004). Information and the cost of capital. Journal of Finance, 
59(4), 1553-1583.  
 
Er, B. (2010). Profit Forecasting and Stock Performance in Public Offerings Relationship: 
ISE Application (Unpublished PhD Dissertation). Karadeniz Technical University, Trabzon. 
 
Faleye, O., Mehrotra, V. and Morck, R. (2006). When labor has a voice in corporate 
governance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 41(3), 489-510. 
 
Fama, E. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 
88(2), 288-307.  
 
Fama, E. and Jensen, M. (1983). Agency problem and residual claims. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 26(2), 327-349.  
 
Fama, E. and Jensen, M. (1985). Organizational forms and investment decisions. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 14(1), 101-119. 
 
Fathi, Z., Ahmadinia, H. and Afrasiabishani, J. (2012). Determination of investment 
companies efficiency and effect of macroeconomic factors on their portfolio return. World 
Applied Sciences Journal, 16(5), 665-677. 
 
Ferreira, M. and Matos, P. (2008). The colors of investors' money: the role of institutional 
investors around the world. Journal of Financial Economics, 88(3), 499-533. 
Francis, J. and Martin, X. (2010). Acquisition, profitability and timely loss recognition. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 49(1-2), 161-178.  
Franklin J. and Muthusamy, K. (2011). Impact of leverage on firms investment decision. 
International Journal of Scientific and Engineering Research, 2(4), 1-16.   
 
Franzen, L., Rodgers, K. and Simin, T. (2007). Measuring distress risk: The effect of R&D 
intensity. The Journal of Finance, 62(6), 2931-2967. 
Gao, W. and Zhu, F. (2015). Information asymmetry and capital structure around the world. 
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 32(c), 131-159. 
67 
 
Garcia Lara, J., Garcia Osma, B. and Penalva, F. (2014). Information consequences of 
accounting conservatism. European Accounting Review, 23(2), 173-198.  
Garcia Lara, J., Garcia Osma, B. and Penalva, F. (2016). Accounting conservatism and firm 
investment efficiency. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 61(1), 221-238. 
Gillan, S. and Starks, L. (2003). Corporate governance, corporate ownership, and the role of 
institutional investors: a global perspective. Journal of Applied Finance, 13(2), 4-22. 
Glaser, M. and Müller, S. (2010). Is the diversification discount caused by the book value 
bias of debt? Journal of Banking and Finance, 34(10), 2307-2317.  
 
Gomariz, M. and Ballesta, J. (2014). Financial reporting quality, debt maturity and 
investment efficiency. Journal of Banking and Finance, 40(c), 494-506. 
 
Guariglia, A. and Yang, J. (2016). A balancing act: Managing financial constraints and 
agency costs to minimize investment inefficiency in the Chinese market. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 36, 111–130. 
 
Guedhami, O., Pittman, J. and Saffar, W. (2009). Auditor choice in privatized firms: 
empirical evidence on the role of state and foreign owners. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 48(2-3), 151-171. 
 
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. and Zingales, L. (2014). The value of corporate culture. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 117(1), 60-76. 
 
Habib, A. and Jiang, H. (2015). Corporate governance and financial reporting quality in 
China: A survey of recent evidence. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and 
Taxation, 24(c), 29-45.  
 
Hakim, F. and Omri, M. (2010). Quality of the external auditor, information asymmetry, and 
bid-ask spread: Case of the listed Tunisian firms. International Journal of Accounting and 
Information Management, 18(1), 5-18.  
 
Hall, B. (2002). The financing of research and development. Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, 18(1), 35-51.  
 
Hanlon, M., Hoopes, J. and Shroff, N. (2014). The effect of tax authority monitoring and 
enforcement on financial reporting quality. The Journal of the American Taxation 
Association, 36(2), 137-70.  
 
Hayashi (1982). Tobin's marginal q and average q: A neoclassical interpretation. 
Econometrica, 50(1), 213-224. 
 
Healy, P. and Palepu, K. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the 
capital markets: a review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 31(1-3), 405-440. 
 
68 
 
Hicks, J. (1935). Annual survey of economic theory: The theory of monopoly.  
Econometrica, 3(1), 1-20. 
 
Hirshleifer, D., and Thakor, A. (1992). Managerial conservatism, project choice, and debt. 
Review of Financial Studies, 5(3), 437-470.  
 
Holmstrom, B., and Costa, J. (1986). Managerial incentives and capital management. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101(4), 835-860.  
 
Holthausen, R. (2009). Accounting standards, financial reporting outcomes, and 
enforcement. Journal of Accounting Research, 47(2), 447-458.  
Hsu, A., Jung, B. and Pourjalali, H. (2015). Does international accounting standard no. 27 
improve investment efficiency? Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 30(4), 484-508. 
Huang, W., Jiang, F., Liu, Z. and Zhang, M. (2011). Agency cost, top executives' 
overconfidence, and investment-cash flow sensitivity-Evidence from listed companies in 
China. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 19(3), 261-277.  
Huang, P. and Zhang, Y. (2012). Does enhanced disclosure really reduce agency costs? 
Evidence from the diversion of corporate resources. The Accounting Review, 87(1), 199-229.  
 
Hubbard (1998). Capital-market imperfections and investment. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 36(1), 193-225.  
 
International accounting standards board (IASB) (2006). Preliminary Views on an improved 
Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting: The Objective of Financial Reporting and 
Qualitative Characteristics of Decision-useful Financial Reporting Information. Retrieved 
from https://www.iasplus.com/en/news/2006/July/news2768. 
 
International accounting standards board (IASB) (2008). An improved conceptual framework 
for financial reporting. Retrieved from 
http://www.assb.gov.sg/docs/attachments/EDofChapters1and2theJointImprovedConceptualF
ramework.pdf. 
 
Jaggi, B., Leung, S., and Gul, F. (2009). Family control, board independence and earnings 
management. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 28(4), 281-300.  
 
James, S. (2011). Strategic R&D disclosure and competition. Retrieved from Ohio State 
University, 
https://business.illinois.edu/businessadministration/wpcontent/uploads/sites/39/2014/09/jame
s_paper.pdf. 
 
Jensen, M. and Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs 
and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.  
 
Jensen, M. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers. 
American Economic Review, 76(2), 323-330. 
 
69 
 
Jensen, M. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control 
systems. Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831-880. 
 
Ji, A. (2016). The Impact of Board Size on Firm-Level Capital Investment Efficiency. 
International Journal of Economics and Finance, 8(10), 110-120. 
 
John, K., Litov, L. and Yeung, B. (2008). Corporate governance and risk-taking. Journal of 
Finance, 63(4), 1679-1728.  
Kang, J. and Stulz, R. (1997). Why is there a home bias? An analysis of foreign portfolio 
equity ownership in Japan. Journal of Financial Economics, 46(1), 3-28.  
 
Khan, M. and Watts, R. (2009). Estimation and empirical properties of a firm-year measure 
of accounting conservatism. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 48(2-3), 132-150.   
 
Kim, Y., Park, M. and Wier, B. (2012). Is earnings quality associated with corporate social 
responsibility? The Accounting Review, 87(3), 761-796.  
 
Kothari, S., Li, X. and Short, J. (2009a). The effect of disclosures by management, analysts, 
and business press on cost of capital, return volatility, and analyst forecasts: a study using 
content analysis. The Accounting Review, 84(5), 1639-1670.  
 
Kothari, S., Shu, S. and Wysocki, P. (2009b). Do managers withhold bad news? Journal of 
Accounting Research, 47(1), 241-276.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Effect of Macroeconomic Factors on Corporate Investment 
Efficiency 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Over the last decade, diverse instabilities took place worldwide economically and politically. 
Such instabilities not only affect individuals, but firms as well. They also aggregate 
economic conditions have a great impact on firm performance and investment opportunities 
(Khan et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2017). Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to investigate the 
macroeconomic factors derived by different economies’ monetary policies which are of great 
importance and the way they affect firm investment efficiency. 
When firms deviate from optimal investment by over or underinvesting, their valuebecomes 
affected and so a question is raised concerning the objective of shareholders’ wealth 
maximisation. The reason behind the incentives of over or under investments is due to the 
existence of information asymmetries and its two subproblems the moral hazard and adverse 
selection induce firms to over or underinvest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Biddle et al., 
2009; Garcia-Lara et al., 2016). Therefore, minimising these problems is of great 
consideration. 
The major contribution is to investigate the effect of macroeconomic factors on corporate 
investment efficiency from 2007 till 2015 for six countries one from each continent. As firm 
investment performance affects various stakeholders, it became important to understand how 
over or under investing would be affected by fluctuating macroeconomic factors. The 
findings obtained reveal that GDP growth and inflation rates affect corporate investment 
efficiency and the details will be discussed later. 
The subsequent sections are arranged in the following way: section two discusses relevant 
theories and literature review. Section three discusses the research methodology, data 
collection, and sample selection. Section four presents the results and reveals whether the 
hypotheses tested were accepted or rejected. Section five sums up the study, provides 
opportunities for future research, the implications of the findings and research limitations. 
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3.2 Theories and literature review 
 
This section discusses corporate investment theories and reviews relevant literature on the 
impact of macroeconomic factors on corporate investment efficiency. 
3.2.1 Theories 
 
Neoclassical theory of investment Yoshikawa (1980) assumes, according to the neoclassical 
theory of corporate investment, that management undertakes projects that only increase 
shares’ value and maximises firms’ net worth at which the benefits and future earnings 
exceed the risks and costs. In addition, the main argument of the “q” theory states that ‘the 
company should engage in an investment when its NPV of additional profits are higher than 
the repurchase cost of capital (Panageas, 2005). Therefore, as said by Gao and Yu (2018), 
any deviation from the optimal investment policy can be identified as an inefficient capital 
investment, at which the optimal investment policy of a firm is determined by its profit 
maximisation from the production function. 
This theory is tested through the variables of corporate investment efficiency and the 
macroeconomic variables explained in the subsequent section. 
  
Agency theory According to the agency theory, ownership and management separation 
results in information asymmetries and this is how agency problems occur (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Also, Prior et al. (2008) argue that this separation 
leads to the misalignment of managers and owners’ interests, therefore creating agency costs 
which is the summation of the monitoring cost, bonding cost, and the residual loss (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). 
The theory introduces that even as managers may be well knowledgeable about the existence 
of profitable investment opportunities with positive NPV, they might not always pursue 
them. The lack of such investment implementation is due to the existence of imperfect capital 
markets. Such an imperfection is due to the critical frictions-generating imperfections of 
moral hazard and adverse selection caused by information asymmetry existence (Stein, 1989; 
Hubbard, 1998).   
For testing the agency theory, corporate investment efficiency and various macroeconomic 
variables in this study are explained in detail in the following section. 
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Pecking order theory According to the pecking order theory introduced by Myers and Majluf 
et al. (1984) and supported by Meier and Tarhan (2007) and Gao et al. (2015), firms' 
financing decisions are affected by the information asymmetry between management and 
shareholders, and it is predicted that financing follows a hierarchy. First, internal financing is 
used, second, debt is issued, and when no more debt can be raised, equity is issued (Myers, 
2001). Retained earnings avoid adverse selection costs completely, and issuing debt acquires 
lower information and adverse selection costs than that of equity (Frank and Goyal, 2003). 
Issuing equity is the most information sensitive security having the largest adverse selection 
cost leading to a higher adverse selection risk premium demanded on equity by investors. 
Therefore, retained earnings are better than outside funds and debt is better than equity if a 
firm requires external funds when the internal funding is not enough as debt is perceived as 
"good news" by investors (Leary and Roberts, 2010). 
The five macroeconomic variables used by the study to test the pecking order theory are 
discussed in the next section. 
 
Economic growth theory Economies’ investment efficiency maximisation depends on the 
development of financial institutions and markets, which in turn contributes in lowering the 
transaction costs and information asymmetries (Beck and Levine, 2002; Baum et al., 2011; 
Castro et al., 2015; Khan et al., 2017). 
Romer (2006) and Singh (2010) point out that according to Ramsey’s Optimal Growth 
Model when savings increase by firms and households, the national income increases as well 
and so investments processes speed up. Therefore, the Endogenous economic growth theory 
states that the rise in savings boost economic growth is supported (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1995; Najarzadeh et al., 2014). 
In addition, the Solow-Swan model illustrates that lower population growth results in higher 
capital-labor ratio and thereof a higher per capita income level (Diamond's, 1965; Blanchard 
and Fischer, 1989; Momota, 2016). 
This theory is tested through the macroeconomic factors employed by the study. A clear 
explanation will be provided in the coming section. 
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3.2.2 Literature review 
 
The objective of a firm should be to maximise the present discounted value of net cash flows 
exposed to the technological constraints summarized by the production function (Hayashi, 
1982). Also, firms should invest until the marginal cost of investment equals the marginal 
benefit plus adjusting for the costs of installing the new capital according to the neoclassical 
theory of investment (Yoshikawa, 1980; Panageas, 2005; Gao and Yu, 2018).  
Financing positive NPV projects and returning extra cash to investors is a perfect capital 
market theory which no longer exists due to imperfections caused by the existence of 
information asymmetry (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Hubbard, 1998; Stein, 1989). Due to 
information asymmetries, firms deviate from optimal efficient investments when only 
undertaking positive NPV projects through either overinvesting or underinvesting (Biddle 
and Hilary, 2006; Biddle et al., 2009; Garcia-Lara et al., 2016).  
There are major macroeconomic factors (tools) (Filipova et al., 2014) used by an economy’s 
monetary policy such as GDP growth, trade openness, unemployment rates, inflation rates, 
and interest rates. Applying an expansionary monetary policy means a rise in money supply 
in the economy which induces demand on goods and services and thereof a boost in 
productivity and GDP (Barakchian and Crowe, 2013; Fu and Liu, 2015; Walsh, 2017). The 
GDP (economic growth) is also induced by trade openness (Brueckner and Lederman, 2015), 
especially for countries producing high-quality products (Haussmann et al., 2007). Accessing 
goods and services is provided, allocating resources efficiently is achieved and productivity 
is improved by the spreading of knowledge and technology diffusion (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 1997; Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991). 
Belongia and Ireland (2015) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) state that the power of 
either an expansionary or contractionary monetary policy can be determined through nominal 
interest rates. When an economy is following an expansionary monetary policy, money 
supply becomes greater and interest rates decline which encourages firms to demand more 
debts to engage in available investment opportunities and consumers to demand more 
housing (Caballero et al., 2008; Warnock and Warnock, 2009; Taylor, 2009; Bernanke, 
2010; Ippolito et al., 2018).  
Engaging in new investment opportunities may open the way for new industries to exist and 
so reducing unemployment levels due to requiring more labor (Alexius and Holmlund, 2007; 
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Benazić and Rami, 2016). On the other side, during a tight monetary, unemployment rates 
rise due to higher interest rates and negative impact on investment prospects and capital 
accumulation (Christiano et al., 1996; Altavilla and Ciccarelli, 2009).  
Sims (1992) argues that without an application of tight monetary policy, price inflation 
would be more violent as when there is money, growth-inflation rates rise (Jiang et al., 
2015). A tight monetary policy will decrease the money supply in an economy and so firms 
and individuals would have less available funds to demand investments, goods, and services, 
therefore, limiting prices’ inflation (Barth and Ramey, 2002; Chowdhury et al., 2006; Liu et 
al., 2014; Davig and Doh, 2014).  
The macroeconomic factors explained act as tools determined by the monetary policy applied 
in an economy. There were a lot of fluctuations in these macroeconomic variables during the 
past decade of economic instabilities such as the 2008 economic crisis at which a large 
number of economies were affected not only firms. Although these instabilities do exist, a 
major gap in prior literature remains by not studying the impact of the macroeconomic 
factors on investment efficiency. Therefore, investigating the effect of GDP growth, trade 
openness, unemployment rates, inflation rates and interest rates on firms’ performance and 
investment efficiency is a crucial area to be considered (Khan et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2017). 
The following paragraph discusses the relationship between the macroeconomic factors and 
corporate investment efficiency. 
Firms’ investment decisions and efficiency are affected by the monetary policies conducted 
by their economies. The existence of an expansionary monetary policy reduces financing 
constraints which may lead to inefficient investments by firms (Jing et al., 2012; Fu and Liu, 
2015). However, firms would make the best use out of a loose monetary policy by following 
an ongoing conservative debt financial policy and so improving their investment levels and 
their ability to obtain loans during tight monetary policies (Xuan, 2012). In addition, He and 
Kondor (2016) state that overinvestment occurs during booms where profits are high and 
investment opportunities are available, so policy-makers may apply a tight policy to 
eliminate such overinvestments (Yang et al., 2017). In contrast, during recessions, 
underinvestment is common as managers become more conservative.  
Themain contribution of this study is estimating a relationship between the macroeconomic 
factors used as reflectors of monetary policies within economies and corporate investment 
efficiency. The anticipated associations are based on the theories mentioned earlier. 
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According to the economic growth, neoclassical, agency and pecking order theories, a 
country’s economic growth could be reflected by its GDP growth, which translates into a 
boost in firms’ performance and profits (Bilych, 2012). When profits are high, there is a 
chance for increasing a firm’s retained earnings which are used instead of depending on debts 
and equity in financing investments (Myers and Majluf et al., 1984). The usage of retained 
earnings reduces the information asymmetries which might happen between the management 
and lenders or shareholders if debt or equity were issued (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). And 
so, firm investment efficiency improves as information asymmetry declines (Jensen 1986; 
Stein 2003; Biddle, 2009) leading to the formulation of the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: GDP growth has a positive relationship with corporate investment efficiency. 
 
According to the economic growth theory, the unemployment rate negatively affects the 
economic growth rate in an economy (Okun, 1962; Ahmed, 2011; Stephen, 2012), which in 
turn results in a decline in firms’ profits and performance. The reduction in profits leads in 
lower earnings retained by firms (Myers and Majluf et al., 1984), thereof depending on debt 
or equity in financing investments required as indicated by the pecking order theory. Issuing 
debt or equity translates to an increase in information asymmetries as specified by the agency 
theory and a reduction in investment efficiency within firms as explained by the neoclassical 
theory. Based on what was discussed the following hypothesis is developed: 
 
H2: Unemployment rates have a negative relationship with corporate investment efficiency. 
 
As trade openness, which is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services calculated 
as a percentage of GDP, increases, this reflects a positive impact on the economy and firms 
(Amiti and Khandelwal, 2013; Brandt et al., 2017). When firms’ exporting and importing 
activities rise, profits and performance improve, this leads to higher chances of earnings 
retained. According to the pecking order theory, investments at which firms are willing to 
engage in can be financed using retained earnings. This lowers the dependence on debt and 
equity, leads to the reduction of information asymmetry and improves investment efficiency. 
Accordingly, the following hypothesis is estimated: 
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H3: Trade openness has a positive relationship with corporate investment efficiency. 
 
Inflation rates are reflected in the rate of price change. Consistent with demand and supply 
laws, as prices of certain goods and services increase, the demands on them decrease (Moore, 
1925). The reduction in demand translates to lower sales and profits for firms, resulting in 
lower chances to retain earnings. The reliance on equity and debt increases in this case if 
needing to finance projects as stated by the pecking order theory. Therefore, information 
asymmetry rises and investment efficiency declines. In view of what was mentioned, the 
subsequent hypothesis is developed: 
H4: Inflation rates have a negative relationship with corporate investment efficiency. 
 
In agreement with the neoclassical theory of investment and the pecking order theory, when 
lending rates rise within an economy, firms’ costs of capital rise if they are willing to borrow 
(Haavelmo, 1960; Jorgenson, 1963; Hambur and La Cava, 2018; Ippolito et al., 2018). As a 
result, when needing to finance projects, firms have either of two options; to use its retained 
earnings to reduce information asymmetry and improve investment efficiency, or if retained 
earnings are not enough, the issuance of equity becomes a must and thereof information 
asymmetry increases and investment efficiency declines. Consequently, the change in 
lending rates would have a positive or negative effect on corporate investment efficiency 
based on the existence or absence of retained earnings, leading to the development of the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H5: Lending interest rates have a relationship with corporate investment efficiency. 
 
3.3 Research methodology 
 
In the previous sections, both the theoretical and the empirical aspects of the macroeconomic 
variables and corporate investment efficiency were examined and accordingly, the 
hypotheses were formulated. As acknowledged in the literature review, the overall aim of 
this study is to examine the effect of macroeconomic variables which are GDP growth, 
inflation rates, unemployment rates, trade openness and lending rates on investment 
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efficiency for the six countries representing each continent in the world. The vital aim is to 
conclude whether these macroeconomic factors have a significant effect on corporate 
investment efficiency of firms from worldwide economies for the period between 2007 and 
2015.  
The relationship tested in this research examines the relationship between macroeconomic 
factors as independent variables and investment efficiency as a dependent variable. Seven 
control variables are included in this study; firm size, financial leverage, Tobin’s Q, financial 
slack, tangibility, cash flow from operations to sales and ROA. The control variables were 
selected according to the majority of the previous studies considering them. The FRQ, EM, 
CSR, IFRS, CG, DL and AQ are not considered control variables because they were 
determinants for investment efficiency in previous studies which tested their 
effectsindividually not as the basic control variables used frequently. The corporate 
investment efficiency was measured by Chen et al. (2011) and Gomariz and Ballesta (2014) 
measure of efficiency, and the macroeconomic factors are measured according to their 
definitions by the World Bank, IMF, OECD and international financial statistics which will 
be discussed later in the section. The methodology section clarifies the strategy and methods 
used in this study, describes the sample, data type, and collection processes. It also gives an 
explanation for the variables used in the study, reasons for their choice and how they are 
calculated. 
3.3.1 Research strategy 
 
The research problem is determined according to the research aim and objectives which 
indicate whether the macroeconomic variables have a significant effect on corporate 
investment efficiency for a sample of six countries representing each continent according to 
the IMF classifications. The hypotheses previously mentioned are required to test the 
relationship between the macroeconomic variables GDP growth, inflation rates, 
unemployment rates, trade openness and lending rates with corporate investment efficiency. 
Applied quantitative research will be used as it is an appropriate strategy when there are 
testable hypotheses.  
Afterwards, statistical tools and techniques are applied to test these hypotheses using 
quantifiable data for country-level variables and for company-level variables. The statistical 
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techniques to be used are descriptive statistics, Pearson correlation and linear regression 
analyses followed by regression diagnostics, which will be explained in the next chapter.   
3.3.2 Methods of statistical analysis 
 
The statistical techniques used for analysis are descriptive statistics such as mean, maximum, 
minimum and standard deviation, Pearson’s coefficient of correlation, and the regression 
analysis. Finally, regression diagnostics such as checking normality, linearity, 
autocorrelation, and multicollinearity are done. The statistical techniques are carried out 
using the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) version 24.  
First, descriptive statistics are carried out to describe the relevant variables in the research. A 
Summary of these Statistics is used to show the Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum and 
Maximum values of all variables. Then Pearson’s correlation analysis is applied to analyse 
the relationship between macroeconomic variables and corporate investment efficiency. 
Correlation is used to show the direction and strength of the variables with one another. It 
measures the degree of linear association between two variables, stating if variables are 
correlated, it does not show any causal relationship between them. In order to analyse the 
impact of the macroeconomic variables on corporate investment, efficiency regression 
analysis is used. Regression is a more powerful method when compared to correlation 
because it does not only show the direction and strength of a relationship but determines the 
causal effect of this relationship. In this study, the ordinary least squares (OLS) method of 
regression was employed in carrying out the analysis. Since this study sets out to test the 
relationship between macroeconomic factors and efficiency of investment, the application of 
the OLS regression method is appropriate. 
3.3.3 Data collection and sample selection 
 
All data used in this research is collected from secondary sources, which include the IMF 
world economic outlook release for April 2017, World Bank and trading economics website 
for the macroeconomic independent variables (country-level data) and from Bloomberg 
database for the dependent and controlvariables (company-level data).  
The macroeconomic factors are represented by country-level data, and so this sample was 
selected based on data availability of the countries with highest GDPs across the six 
continents comprising a total of six countries (each country represents its continent). The 
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countries that were selected are as follows: the UK from the advanced economies, Ukraine 
from the Commonwealth of Independent States, China from Emerging and Developing Asia, 
Poland from Emerging and Developing Europe, Brazil from Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Egypt from MENA region, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Companies' data for each 
country were collected based on their stock exchange listings from 2007 until 2015 taking a 
cross-sectional time series (Panel) data form. The time period covered by the study is nine 
years from 2007 to 2015; this criterion was for a number of reasons. The first reason is data 
availability across countries and companies. The second reason is that it covers the timing 
during and after the occurrence of political and economic instability (2007-2015) in order to 
analyse the consequences. The third reason is that this data is considered the most recent 
economic and company level data. Based on this, the total number of observations was 1686.  
In this context, the selected sample comprises 9 different industrial sectors categorized 
according to the Bloomberg database over the period 2007-2015, as shown in Table (3.1). In 
Brazil and Egypt, the most dominant sector is materials comprising 22.5% and 30% 
respectively. While in China and Poland, the industrials sector is leading with 26.1% and 
23.7% respectively. Regarding UK and Ukraine, the main sectors were consumer 
discretionary and utilities sectors comprising 25.7% and 50% respectively.  
Finance companies are eliminated from the sample due to the differences in the regulatory 
tax requirements and the characteristics of the financial reports from those of the non-
financial companies (Alsaeed, 2006). According to Mehran, et al. (2011), there is a main 
dissimilarity in governance in the financial and non-financial sectors. The complexity of the 
finance sector, particularly the banking sector causes a difficulty of implementing formal 
regulations. By doing so, a sample of 405 worldwide firms is acquired for a period of 9 years, 
leaving us with 1686 observations. 
Table (3.1) 
Sample Sector Classification 
 
Country Sector No. of companies in the 
Sector 
% 
Brazil Materials 7 22.5% 
Consumer staples 6 19.4% 
Energy 2 6.5% 
Consumer discretionary 5 16.1% 
Utilities 4 12.9% 
Industrials 4 12.9% 
Telecommunications 2 6.5% 
Healthcare 1 3.2% 
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IT 0 0% 
Total 31 100% 
China Materials 24 15.7% 
Consumer staples 7 4.6% 
Energy 9 5.9% 
Consumer discretionary 27 17.6% 
Utilities 6 3.9% 
Industrials 40 26.1% 
Telecommunications 2 1.3% 
Healthcare 14 9.2% 
IT 24 15.7% 
Total 153 100% 
Egypt Materials 15 30% 
Consumer staples 10 20% 
Energy 1 2% 
Consumer discretionary 10 20% 
Utilities 1 2% 
Industrials 8 16% 
Telecommunications 3 6% 
Healthcare 1 2% 
IT 1 2% 
Total 50 100% 
Poland Materials 14 15.1% 
Consumer staples 11 11.8% 
Energy 3 3.2% 
Consumer discretionary 20 21.5% 
Utilities 3 3.2% 
Industrials 22 23.7% 
Telecommunications 1 1.1% 
Healthcare 2 2.2% 
IT 17 18.2% 
Total 93 100% 
UK Materials 9 12.9% 
Consumer staples 10 14.3% 
Energy 3 4.3% 
Consumer discretionary 18 25.7% 
Utilities 5 7.1% 
Industrials 16 22.9% 
Telecommunications 2 2.9% 
Healthcare 5 7.1% 
IT 2 2.8% 
Total 70 100% 
Ukraine Materials 0 0% 
Consumer staples 0 0% 
Energy 1 12.5% 
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Consumer discretionary 0 0% 
Utilities 4 50% 
Industrials 2 25% 
Telecommunications 1 12.5% 
Healthcare 0 0% 
IT 0 0% 
Total 8 100% 
 
3.3.4 Variables measurements 
 
The proxies used for measuring the dependent and independent variables are discussed in this 
section, showing what measurements were selected and consistent with which studies. The 
dependent variable, corporate investment efficiency, is measured according to Chen et al. 
(2011), while the independent macroeconomic factors are GDP growth, inflation rates, 
unemployment rates, trade openness, and lending interest rates. Moreover, the control 
variables were determined according to prior studies as explained later. 
3.3.4.1 Dependant variable 
 
Consistent with the Biddle et al. (2009) proxy for measuring investment and its efficiency, 
Chen et al. (2011) measure investment efficiency as deviations from expected investment 
using a model that forecasts investment as a function of growth opportunities. Particularly, 
Hubbard (1998) estimates a prudent model for expected investment as a function of sales 
growth. As the relation between investment and sales growth could differ between sales 
declines and sales boosts, a linear regression model is employed to permit a differential 
predictability for sales fluctuations: 
 
Investi,t =α0+ α1NEGi,t-1+ α2SalesGrowthi,t-1+ α3NEG*SalesGrowthi,t-1+εi,t         (1) 
 
Subsequent to Biddle et al. (2009), as indicated in equation 1, Investi,t is the total investment 
of firm i in year t, defined as the net increase in tangible and intangible assets and scaled by 
lagged total assets. SalesGrowthi,t-1is the annual sales growth rate for firm i in year t-1 and 
NEGi,t-1is an indicator variable which takes the value of one for negative sales growth and a 
zero otherwise (Gomariz and Ballesta, 2014). 
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Calculating investment efficiency or inefficiency occurs by multiplying the absolute value of 
the residuals by negative 1 since both over or under-investment reflects an unfavourable sign 
about the efficiency level. And so, the residuals from the regression model reveal the 
deviation from the expected investment level indicating that those residuals are used as a 
firm-specific proxy for investment inefficiency consistent with Biddle et al. (2009). A 
positive residual means that the firm is making investments at a higher rate than estimated 
according to the sales growth, so it will overinvest. In contrast, a negative residual assumes 
that real investment is less than that estimated, reflecting an underinvestment.  
This measurement of investment efficiency is applied to this study for two reasons. First, it is 
a commonly used proxy by prior studies. Second, due to data availability, issues other 
proxies like Biddle et al. (2009) are not applicable since R&D data was not available for 
certain countries’ firms as this study is a cross-country diversified one. 
3.3.4.2 Independent variables 
 
The five independent macroeconomic factors’ data were obtained from the World Bank’s site 
and calculated according to the definitions mentioned below. The control variables explained 
later are selected according to previous studies (Goodman et al., 2014; Shen et al., 2015; Hsu 
et al., 2015). 
GDP growth 
It represents the annual percentage growth rate of GDP based on the local currency. GDP is 
the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes 
and excluding subsidies not included in the value of the products.  
Inflation rates 
The inflation rate represents the rate of price change in the economy as a whole. The rate 
used in the study is the annual growth rate of the GDP deflator which is the ratio of GDP in 
current local currency to GDP in constant local currency.  
Unemployment rates 
Unemployment is the portion of the labor force that is without work but is willing and 
available for employment. This rate is measured as a percentage of the total labor force. 
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Trade openness 
This represents the sum of exports and imports of goods and services. The variable is 
measured as a percentage of GDP. 
Lending rates 
It is a rate set and received by banks for meeting the private sector's short and medium-term 
financing needs, differing according to the credit worthiness of borrowers and their 
objectives of financing. 
 
3.3.4.3 Control variables 
 
According to the dependent variable corporate investment efficiency, there are seven control 
variables to be considered based on prior literature. The control variables’ data was obtained 
from Bloomberg. First, firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets, 
indicating a positive impact on firm investment efficiency (Chen et al., 2011; Eisdorfer et al., 
2013; Shen et al., 2015; Bae et al., 2017). Second, firm financial leverage is defined as total 
liabilities divided by total assets (Bae et al., 2017). There are opposing viewpoints regarding 
the leverage relationship with investment efficiency. Biddle et al. (2009) find that as firms’ 
debts increase, their underinvestment increases, while Benlemlih and Bitar (2018) find a 
positive relationship as when leverage rises, debtholders increase their monitoring and induce 
the firm’s investment efficiency level. Third, Tobin’s Q, the proxy for it is the market value 
of equity minus total equity plus total assets then all divided by total assets (Gomariz and 
Ballesta, 2014; Hsu et al., 2015; García Lara et al., 2016). Fourth, Tangibility is calculated 
by dividing tangible assets by total assets (Biddle and Hilary, 2006; Chen et al., 2011; 
Gomariz and Ballesta, 2014). Fifth, financial slack is measured as scaling cash by total assets 
(Biddle and Hilary, 2006; Biddle et al., 2009; Benlemlih and Bitar, 2018). Sixth, cash flow to 
sales is measured by dividing cash flow by total sales (Biddle et al., 2009; García Lara et al., 
2016). Seventh, return on assets is calculated by dividing net income by total assets 
(Hovakimian, 2011; Goodman et al., 2014; Guariglia and Yang, 2016). 
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3.3.5 Research model 
 
The relationship between the dependent variable corporate investment efficiency, the 
independent variables GDP growth, inflation rates, unemployment rates, trade openness and 
lending rates and the control variables firm size, leverage, Tobin’s Q, tangibility, financial 
slack, CF from operations to sales and ROA can be expressed in the following regression 
model3:  
 
INVEFFi,t = β0 + β1GDPGi,t + β2INFi,t + β3UNEMPi,t + β4TRADi,t + β5LENDi,t + β6FSi,t + 
β7LEVi,t + β8TOBINi,t + β9TANGi,t + β10FINSi,t + β11CFOSi,t + β12ROAi,t + ∑Industry 
dummies + ∑Year dummies + εi,t 
 
Where; 
 INVEFF= Corporate investment efficiency 
 GDPG= Gross Domestic Product Growth 
 INF= Inflation rates 
 UNEMP= Unemployment rate 
 TRAD= Trade openness 
 LEND= Lending rates 
 FS= Firm size 
 LEV= Financial leverage 
 TOBIN= Tobin’s Q 
 TANG= Tangibility 
 FINS= Financial slack 
 CFOS= Cash flow from operations to sales 
 ROA= Return on assets 
 ε = Error term 
 
                                                             
3Consistent with Beeks et al. (2016) and Elshandidy et al. (2015), Chen et al. (2011), Ntim (2016) and Elamer 
et al. (2017) controlling for country-specific variables was neglected since the model already considers the 
country level variables as the main study’s independent variables and so company-related variables were the 
ones controlled for. Therefore, country control variables are applied only if the model’s (dependent and 
independent) variables are all firm-related ones.  
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According to previous literature and hypotheses developed, the predicted sign for β1, β4, β6, 
β7, β9, β10 and β12 is a positive sign, while for β2, β3 and β8 is a negative sign. The 
remaining betas β5 and β11 take either a positive or negative sign. 
The year dummies are placed as one when the year indicated matches that of the one stated 
by the sample and zero otherwise. The industry dummies are treated the same, take the value 
of one if the industry listed matches that of the firm stated in the sample and zero otherwise. 
 
3.4  Findings and analysis 
 
By the end of this section, the objectives of this research will be achieved, and its value will 
be clear. This section deals with whether the data collection and analysis done will support 
the study hypotheses or not. Based on these results, an important proposition about the most 
effective macroeconomic factors on the efficiency of firms’ investments in theselected 
countries will be highlighted. This would be beneficial for these firms in eliminating their 
over or under investments while considering the influential macroeconomic factors. This 
section presents the results of the summary statistics of each variable, showing the effect of 
the macroeconomic factors on corporate investment efficiency. 
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
In this section, the analysis results for the sample will be discussed in terms of mean, 
maximum, minimum and standard deviation. The variable used in this study as a dependent 
variable is corporate investment efficiency. The independent variables are GDP growth, 
inflation rates, unemployment rates, trade openness, and lending rates. And finally .as control 
variables firm size, firm financial leverage, Tobin’s Q, tangibility, financial slack, cash flow 
from operations to sales and ROA. 
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Table (3.2) 
Descriptive Statistics for 2007-2015 
 
 Depende
nt 
variable 
Independent variables Control Variables 
 INVEFF 
(err) 
GDPG INF UNEMP TRAD LEND FS LEV TOBIN TANG FINS CFOS ROA 
Mean -0.0003 
0.042 
0.04
74 
0.075 
0.612
9 
0.098
7 
3.17
9 
0.24 1.82 
0.864 0.24 -0.48 0.056 
Max 171.89 0.14 0.39 0.13 1.07 0.47 5.59 2.06 39.54 1.00 72.8 3.48 1.09 
Min -65.68 
-0.15 0.00 0.04 0.22 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.18 
0.00 0.00 -
973.5 
-0.58 
Std. 
Dev. 
8.3786 
0.043 
0.04
6 
0.025 0.207 0.107 
1.09
8 
0.17 1.663 
0.193 2.93 22.74 0.091 
Skewnes
s 
Statistic 
6.474 
0.286 
1.96
7 
0.366 0.132 2.109 -0.06 1.44 8.525 
-1.87 21.9 -42.7 -0.162 
INVEFF is investment efficiency measured by the negative and positive residuals of the investment equation; GDPG is 
gross domestic product growth which is the annual percentage growth rate of GDP based on the local currency. GDP is the 
sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus subsidies not included 
in the value of the products; INF is inflation rates which is of price change in the economy as a whole. The rate used in the  
study is the annual growth rate of the GDP deflator which is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant 
local currency; UNEMP is unemployment rates which is the portion of the labour force that is without work but is willing 
and available for employment. This rate is measured as a percentage of total labour force; TRAD is trade openness 
represents the sum of exports and imports of goods and services. The variable is measured as a percentage of GDP; LEND is 
lending interest rates which is a rate set and received by banks for meeting the private sector's short and medium-term 
financing needs, differing according to the creditworthiness of borrowers and their objectives of financing. All 
macroeconomic variables data are obtained from the World Bank site. FS is firm size measured as the natural logarithm of 
total assets; LEV is firm leverage measured as total liabilities divided by total assets; TOBIN is Tobin’s Q measured as the 
market value of equity minus total equity plus total assets then all divided by total assets; TANG is tangibility measured by 
dividing tangible assets by total assets; FINS is financial slack measured as scaling cash by total assets; CFOS is cash flow 
to sales measured by dividing cash flow by total assets; ROA is return on assets measured by dividing net income by total 
assets. 
 
 
 
The results of the descriptive statistics shown above in table (3.2) for the independent 
variables across the six countries of the sample indicates that, GDP growth (GDPG) showed 
an average growth percentage of 4.2%, maximum growth in GDP of 14% and minimum of -
15% reflecting the most decline in the growth rate. A standard deviation of 0.043 and 
skewness of 0.286 indicate that the distribution of GDPG data is symmetric around the mean. 
Regarding inflation rates (INF), there is a mean of 4.74%, a highest inflation rate of 39% and 
lowest of 0% showing no price fluctuations. Moreover, unemployment rates (UNEMP) show 
an average UNEMP percentage for the sample countries of 7.5%, a maximum rate of 13% 
and a minimum of 4%. In addition, trade openness (TRAD) represents an average rate of 
61.29% for importing and exporting, maximum of 107% and a minimum of 22%. The mean 
rate of lending across the tested economies’ banks is 9.87%, highest of 47% and lowest of 
0% reflecting no rate charged for lending.  
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As for the dependent variable; corporate investment efficiency (INVEFF) specified a mean of 
-0.0003 which is a value too close to zero. This value acts as a good indicator for firm 
performance of investment efficiency (Chen et al., 2011; Gomariz and Ballesta, 2014). The 
maximum values show an over-investment by 171.89% for a Polish firm operating in the 
utilities sector in 2008. The minimum values reveal an under-investment of -65.68% for the 
same Polish firm in 2009. These extreme values represent an indication for the effect of the 
economic crisis and show that with in a year, the firm became risk-averse and even good 
investment opportunities were neglected as a response to the economic situation. 
Finally, the control variables showed the following results. Firm size (FS) showed a mean of 
3.18 (1,489,410,000 billion) and a maximum of 5.59 (3,875,170,000 billion) for a Chinese 
company in the energy industry (largest firm) and a minimum of 0.50 (3,128,800 million) for 
a Polish company in the energy industry as well (smallest firm), a standard deviation of 1.098 
and skewness of -0.063 showing an approximate normal distribution of FS data. Firm 
financial leverage (LEV) represented a mean of 0.24, a maximum of 2.06 and a minimum of 
0.00 similar to the results of Benlemlih and Bitar (2018). Tobin’s Q (TOBIN) reflects that the 
investigated firms’ market value is 1.82 times their book value as an average; the maximum 
ratio is 39.54 for an IT firm in Poland and minimum of 0.18 for a Brazilian firm in the 
materials sector. Tangibility (TANG) shows a mean of 0.864, maximum of 1.00 showing that 
all assets are tangible and a minimum of 0.00 reflecting no tangible assets for a firm. 
Financial slack (FINS) has a mean of 0.241, maximum results showing that cash flows 
represent 72.8% of a firm’s total assets and minimum of 0.00 matching Biddle et al. (2009) 
results. Cash flow from operation to sales (CFOS) reflects an average of -0.48, maximum of 
3.48 and minimum of -973.5. The negative values of the mean and minimum reveal that cash 
flow from operations’ outflows exceeds that of the inflows. Return on assets (ROA) reveals a 
mean of 0.056, maximum of 1.09, minimum of -0.58, a standard deviation of 0.091 and 
skewness of -0.162. 
 
3.4.2 Regression diagnostics 
 
Cooke (1998) places an interest in the importance of data screening to assess the impact of 
distribution problems, non-linearity, in addition to the problems of outliers and 
92 
 
multicollinearity. The linear regression is used in this study by the OLS method. To justify 
using OLS, there are four main assumptions: 
1. Linearity: The relationship between the dependent variable and each independent 
variable should be linear. 
2. Independence and normality of error: The error terms are independent, which means 
that successive residuals are not correlated and there is no serial correlation. Errors 
should also be identically distributed and should follow the normal distribution with 
constant mean zero and constant variance. 
3. Homoscedasticity: the variance of the error terms is constant for each observation. 
4. Multicollinearity: There is no linear relationship between two or more independent 
variables (no multicollinearity). 
5. Autocorrelation: It determines whether there is autocorrelation in the residuals of a 
regression or not. 
If any of these five assumptions are violated whether there is nonlinearity, non-normality of 
errors, heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity or autocorrelation then the results of the 
regression model may be inefficient or seriously biased and misleading. There are some 
regression model diagnostics performed in order to check the OLS linear regression 
assumptions. These models will be discussed in the following subsections. 
 
Checking linearity 
As stated earlier, the relationship between the dependent and independent variables should be 
linear. To check this, the dependent variable values should be plotted in relation to 
independent variable values, and how well the fitted regression line represents their 
relationship. 
In this study, linearity was checked for the regression model by plotting the dependent versus 
the independent variables as shown in figure (4.1) in the appendix and results revealed that 
the relationships are linear. 
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Checking normality 
Normality means that errors should be normally distributed. Theoretically, normality is 
essential only for hypotheses tests to be valid. Normality of errors can be checked by two 
graphical methods which are P-P plot and histogram.  
Normality plots have been performed in the current study. Figures (3.2) and (3.3) in the 
appendix summarise all the methods used in this study for checking normality graphically for 
the regression model;  
 
“INVEFFi,t = β0 + β1GDPGi,t + β2INFi,t + β3UNEMPi,t + β4TRADi,t + β5LENDi,t + β6FSi,t 
+ β7LEVi,t + β8TOBINi,t + β9TANGi,t + β10FINSi,t + β11CFOSi,t + β12ROAi,t + ∑Industry 
dummies + ∑Year dummies +ɛi,t” . 
 
Normality results showed that data were normally distributed in either the histogram or P-P 
Plot. 
Checking homoscedasticity of residuals 
The homoscedasticity assumption means that the variance of the error terms is constant for 
each observation. Graphical methods can be applied to check this assumption. In this study, it 
is plotted graphically, by plotting the residuals versus predicted values and observes if 
residuals are getting larger (more spread-out) as a function of predicted values. After plotting 
the residuals versus the predicted values for the model, results of the test of homoscedasticity 
for the model as shown in figure (3.4) in the appendix, indicated homoscedasticity. 
Checking for multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity implies that there is a linear relationship between two or more independent 
variables. When multicollinearity exists, it becomes difficult to differentiate the individual 
effects of explanatory variables and OLS estimators may be biased and will tend to have 
large variances (Murray, 2006). Furthermore, if there is a perfect linear relationship among 
the independent variables, the estimates for a regression model cannot be uniquely computed. 
The two most commonly used ways to check for the presence of multicollinearity between 
independent variables are correlation coefficients and variance inflation factors (VIF) with 
tolerance values. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), (Gujarati, 1995) indicates there is no 
problem if the VIF is less than 10. This study uses both of them to check whether the 
explanatory variables or the model suffer from multicollinearity or not. Table (3.1) in the 
94 
 
appendix shows the VIF and tolerance of each explanatory variable for the regression model. 
Multicollinearity tests showed no multicollinearity. Therefore, it can be concluded that none 
of the independent variables in the study are correlated to each other. 
 
Checking autocorrelation 
Durbin-Watson (DW) Statistic is a statistic used to test for first-order serial correlation in the 
errors of a regression model under the classical linear model assumptions (Wooldridge, 
2003). It determines whether there is an autocorrelation in the residuals of a regression. The 
statistic ranges from 0 to 4. A range from 0 to 1.5 indicates a positive autocorrelation. A 
range from 2.5 to 4 shows a negative autocorrelation. A value of 2 indicates no 
autocorrelation in the sample. Field (2013) indicates that as a conventional rule of thumb, 
only values less than 1 or greater than 3 are a cause for concern, so both models’ DW values 
are within the safe limits. In this study, Durbin-Watson was calculated for the regression 
model and the result reveals that no autocorrelation exists as shown in Table (3.2) in the 
appendix. 
3.4.3 Pearson’s correlation analysis 
 
To analyse the relationship among the variables of interest in the study, Pearson correlation 
analysis has been conducted. Since the data employed is to scale and there is a linear 
relationship between variables, Pearson correlation was applied, not Spearman. Table (3.3) 
shows the direction and strengths of the relationships between all variables with one another. 
Table (3.3) 
Pearson’s Correlation Matrix for (2007-2015) 
    
 GDPG INF UNEMP TRAD LEND FS LEV TOBIN TANG FINS CFOS ROA err 
GDPG  
1 
  
.160** 
-.514** -.084** -.080** -.112** -.038   .288**   .294** -.006 
-.001    .066** .200** 
              
INF   1 .195** -.262**   .419** -.110** -.071** .013   .235** .037 .006 -.023 .037 
              
UNEMP    1  .096**   .306**  -.367** -.083** -.267** -.016 -.011 .002 -.109** -.156** 
              
TRAD     1 -.381** -.484** -.137** -.044** .018 -.088** -.026 -.011 -.003 
              
LEND  
    1 -.074** .044* -.071** .098** 
   
.109** 
-.003 -.052* -.001 
              
FS       1   .261** -.077** -.175** .021 .040* .046* .011 
              
LEV        1 -.123** -.065** .010 .033 -.241** .015 
              
TOBIN         1 .001 -.009 .001 .469** .115** 
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TANG          1 .036 -.011 -.018 .204** 
              
  FINS           1 .002 .002 -.023 
               
 CFOS            1 .042* -.483** 
               
 ROA             1 .113** 
               
 INVEFF              1 
              
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).    
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).    
Variable definitions: see table (3.2) 
The correlation matrix in Table (3.3) shows that GDPG has a positive highly significant 
relationship with corporate investment efficiency (INVEFF) while UNEMP indicates a 
negative highly significant one, both with a confidence level of 99%. The relation between 
INF, TRAD and LEND with INVEFF specifies that INF has a positive insignificant relation 
while TRAD and LEND have a negative insignificant one with INVEFF.  
With consideration to the control variables; TOBIN, TANG and ROA show a positive highly 
significant relationship with INVEFF, while CFOS confirm a negative highly significant 
relation, all with a 99% confidence level. The positive insignificant relation exists for FS and 
LEV whereas the FINS have a negative insignificant association with INVEFF. 
3.4.4 Regression analysis 
 
In the preceding section, the Pearson correlation was conducted, as stated before, to show the 
strength and direction between variables, however it cannot show the causal relationship. 
Pearson correlation is calculated between the Dependent variable Corporate investment 
efficiency (INVEFF), and the independent variables (GDPG, INF, UNEMP, TRAD, LEND, 
FS, LEV, TOBIN, TANG, FINS, CFOS, and ROA). Regression is a more powerful tool 
when compared to correlation as it does not only show the direction and strength of a 
relationship but also determines the causal effect of this relationship. 
This section presents and discusses the regression results for the relationship between 
macroeconomic factors and corporate investment efficiency. Five indicators are used to 
measure the macroeconomic variables which are GDP growth, inflation rates, unemployment 
rates, trade openness, and lending rates. There is only one indicator for measuring and 
representing corporate investment efficiency in the regression which is the one used by Chen 
et al. (2011) and Gomariz and Ballesta (2014). 
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As for firm size, financial leverage, Tobin’s Q, tangibility, financial slack, cash flow from 
operations to sales and ROA are used as control variables as stated in section 3.4. A single 
multiple regression equation, stated in the previous section, was analysed with the ordinary 
least squared method (OLS) using the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) program 
version 24.  
In the analysis in table (3.4), all of the independent variables have been regressed against the 
dependent variable, corporate investment efficiency (INVEFF). The ANOVA test showed 
that the overall model is significant. The analysis indicates a value of R square of 25% which 
implies that 25% of the variations of INVEFF are determined by GDPG, INF, UNEMP, 
TRAD, LEND, FS, LEV, TOBIN, TANG, FINS, CFOS and ROA. The remaining 75% of 
variations are attributed to other variables.  
The results show that GDPG has a positive significant relationship with INVEFF with a 
confidence level of 99%, this indicates that GDP growth does influence the firms' investment 
efficiency which contradicts the findings of Fu and Liu (2015) and He and Kondor (2016). 
An increase in GDP growth gives a positive indication about the economic growth, which in 
turn contributes to firms’ boost in productivity and profits. This allows them to undertake 
positive NPV projects and distribute excess cash flows to shareholders according to the 
pecking order (Meier and Tarhan, 2007; Gao et al., 2015) and free cash flow (Modigliani and 
Miller, 1958) theories. This result will accept H1. Also, INF has a negative significant 
association with INVEFF but with a confidence level of 95%, therefore accepting H4. 
Consistent with the economic growth theory, this association indicates that when prices rise, 
the demand for goods and services decline. These force firms’ managers to underinvest by 
not undertaking positive NPV projects or overinvest for just giving their shareholders a 
signal that the firm is still performing well even if the economic conditions are not satisfying.   
Contrary to the results shown for GDP growth and inflation rates; UNEMP, TRAD and 
LEND indicate an insignificant relationship with INVEFF; therefore, these results reject H2, 
H3, and H5. As for the control variables, LEV, TOBIN, TANG, and ROA have a positive 
significant relationship with INEFF at 99% confidence level. CFOS has a negative relation 
with INVEFF with the same confidence level. These results support the findings of Biddle et 
al. (2009), Gomariz and Ballesta (2014) and Guariglia and Yang (2016). FS and FINS show 
an insignificant association with INVEFF. 
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Table (3.4) 
Macroeconomic variables and corporate investment efficiency 
 
Variables 
 
 Model Predicted sign 
Constant Coefficient -6.275 NA 
t-value -3.104 
Sig. 0.002 
GDPG Coefficient 0.103 Positive 
t-value 2.795 
Sig. 0.005 
INF Coefficient -0.074 Negative 
t-value -2.326 
Sig. 0.020 
UNEMP Coefficient -0.057 Negative 
t-value -1.421 
Sig. 0.156 
TRAD Coefficient -0.021 Positive 
t-value -0.626 
Sig. 0.532 
LEND Coefficient 0.002 Positive/ 
Negative t-value 0.056 
Sig. 0.955 
FS Coefficient -0.054 Positive 
t-value -1.367 
Sig. 0.172 
LEV Coefficient 0.131 Positive 
t-value 5.404 
Sig. 0.000 
TOBIN Coefficient 0.088 Negative 
t-value 2.994 
Sig. 0.003 
TANG Coefficient 0.201 Positive 
t-value 7.859 
Sig. 0.000 
FINS Coefficient -0.030 Positive 
t-value -1.166 
Sig. 0.244 
CFOS Coefficient -0.153 Positive/Negative 
t-value -7.063 
Sig. 0.000 
ROA Coefficient 0.195 Positive 
t-value 7.606 
Sig. 0.000 
No. of observations 1686 
R square 25.0% 
Adjusted R square 23.7% 
F 19.73 
ANOVA 0.000 
Variable definitions: see table (3.2) 
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3.5  Summary 
 
To sum up, this study’s objective is to analyse the effect of the macroeconomic factors on 
corporate investment efficiency from 2007 till 2015 for six countries one from each 
continent. Consistent with the results and tests applied, the macroeconomic factors GDP 
growth and inflation rates were found to influence corporate investment efficiency. GDP 
growth has a positive effect while inflation rates have a negative one according to economic 
growth, pecking order and agency theories.  
For fulfilling this study’s limitations and providing opportunities for future research, some 
points should be considered; first, the sample timing is from 2007 until 2015. It would have 
been more optimal to extend it to more recent years to have a clearer picture for firm 
investment efficiency performance, but the data unavailability on both the World Bank site 
and data stream was an obstacle to that extension. Future studies should attempt to extend the 
timing when possible and available and testa sample of countries from the same continent. 
This would allow researchers to evaluate each continent’s performance separately. Second, 
also due to limited availability of data, Chen et al. (2011) was the only measurement applied 
by that study. Therefore, future researchers should extend to other measurements and 
compare their results. Third, potential studies should consider the effect of macroeconomic 
factors on variables that determine corporate investment efficiency like corporate social 
responsibility, corporate governance, IFRS and disclosure levels. The relationship between 
macroeconomic factors and the rest of investment efficiency determinants were tested by 
previous studies, such as financial reporting quality (Ghareli and Mohammadi, 2016), 
earnings management (Irungu, 2010), audit quality (Alexeyeva, 2012), capital structure 
(Mokhova and Zinecker, 2014) and cash flows (Chen and Mahajan, 2010). Taking into 
account these relationships would assist firms to determine which of the firm related factors 
are most sensitive to macroeconomic changes. And so, in periods of economic instabilities, 
for example, firms would give a greater concern for the factors sensitive to such changes in 
order to maintain or improve their investment efficiency levels. 
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Appendix (A) 
Linearity figures 
Figure (3.1) 
Checking Linearity of INVEFF vs. Independent Variables 
INVEFF vs. GDPG 
 
INVEFF vs. INF 
 
INVEFF vs. UNEMP 
 
INVEFF vs. TRAD 
 
INVEFF vs. LEND 
 
INVEFF vs. FS 
 
INVEFF vs. LEV 
 
INVEFF vs. TOBIN 
 
INVEFF vs. TANG INVEFF vs. FINS 
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INVEFF vs. CFOS 
 
INVEFF vs. ROA 
 
Variable definitions: see table (3.2) 
Normality figures 
 
Checking normality 
Figure (3.2) and Figure (3.3) 
Figure (3.2) 
 
Figure (3.3) 
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Homoscedasticity figure 
Figure (3.4) 
Checking Homoscedasticity of INVEFF model 
 
Multicollinearity table 
Table (3.1) 
Checking Multicollinearity (INVEFF and Independent Variables) 
 Tolerance VIF 
GDPG 0.362 2.766 
INF 0.580 1.723 
UNEMP 0.343 2.915 
TRAD 0.464 2.156 
LEND 0.607 1.647 
FS 0.330 3.030 
LEV 0.829 1.206 
TOBIN 0.616 1.622 
TANG 0.741 1.349 
FINS 0.961 1.040 
CFOS 0.976 1.025 
ROA 0.698 1.433 
Variable definitions: see table (3.2) 
Autocorrelation table 
Table (3.2) 
Checking Autocorrelation 
Model DW 
INVEFFi,t = β0 + β1GDPGi,t + β2INFi,t + 
β3UNEMPi,t + β4TRADi,t + β5LENDi,t + 
β6FSi,t + β7LEVi,t + β8TOBINi,t + 
β9TANGi,t + β10FINSi,t + β11CFOSi,t + 
β12ROAi,t + ∑Industry dummies + ∑Year 
dummies +ɛi,t 
 
1.512 
Variable definitions: see table (3.2) 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Does Corporate Investment Efficiency Affect Corporate 
Disclosure Practice? 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
An optimal investment occurs in a perfect capital market when firms only finance positive 
NPV projects and return excess cash to shareholders. This concept has already been violated 
by firms. The existence of information asymmetries and its two subproblems the moral 
hazard and adverse selection induce firms to over or underinvest (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Biddle et al., 2009; Garcia-Lara et al., 2016). 
These deviations from optimal investment levels must be analysed and considered. Deviating 
by over or under investing affects firms’ value and raises questions concerning the objective 
of shareholders’ wealth maximisation. One of the ways of answering these questions is 
through voluntarily disclosing information which explains whether the firm achieves its 
objectives or not. 
Voluntary disclosure is defined as the extent of information provided voluntarily since this 
level of information exceeds what is required by law (Meek et al., 1995; Core, 2001; FASB, 
2001; Chung et al., 2015). Disclosure may assist managers in influencing their firm’s stock 
price (Healy et al., 1999), enhancing their reputation and credibility (Kirk and Vincent, 
2014), preventing litigations due to non-disclosure (Field et al., 2005) and building up 
communication bases with shareholders (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Bourveau and 
Schoenfeld, 2017; Chapman and Green, 2018). This explains why voluntary disclosure is 
crucial. 
The aim of this research is to study the efficiency of investment and its impact on the 
voluntary disclosure practices for UK firms over the economic crisis period which was seen 
to be important. As one of the most developed countries, from the highest GDP ones, having 
the majority of narrative disclosure nature as voluntary, adopting IFRS when firms prepare 
their financial statements, set the UK as a standard to apply this study on. Previous literature 
had studied investment efficiency, voluntary disclosure and the effect of voluntary disclosure 
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on investment efficiency (Lai et al., 2014) but none of them examine the relation from the 
other perspective.  
The motivation behind this study is to evaluate the effect of corporate investment efficiency 
on voluntary disclosure given the above sample timing and context. The core contribution is 
to analyse this part of the company’s performance whichis reflected in how efficiently it uses 
and manages its investment opportunities, and in case of over or underinvestment occurrence, 
how this will be voluntarily released to stakeholders. Based on the results attained, it will be 
clear whether a firm’s investment efficiency (inefficiency) affects voluntary disclosure. 
Moreover, if there is an impact, the results determine if they are positive or negative.  
The following sections are organised as follows. Section two discusses relevant theories and 
reviews the relevant literature. Section three discusses the research methodology, data 
collection, and sample selection. Section four presents the findings. Section five concludes. 
  
4.2 Theories and literature review 
 
A review of previous literature and theories concerning the variables studied in this research 
is examined in detail. The literature includes an analysis and justification for estimating a 
relationship between corporate investment efficiency as an independent factor and voluntary 
disclosure as a dependent one. It not only considers voluntary disclosure in general but is 
specific by studying disclosure tone as well.  
4.2.1 Theories 
 
There are a number of various theories which explain the determinants of voluntary 
disclosure. These include the agency theory (Fama and Jensen, 1983), the proprietary costs 
theory (Verrecchia, 1983), the legitimacy theory (Mathews, 1993), the stakeholders’ theory 
(Crowther and Jatana, 2005), the capital need theory (Core, 2001) and the signaling theory 
(Spence, 1973). 
Agency theory According to the agency theory, ownership and management separation 
results in information asymmetries and thereof agency problems occur (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Also, Prior et al. (2008) argue that this separation leads to the 
misalignment of managers and owners’ interests, therefore creating agency costs which is the 
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summation of the monitoring cost, bonding cost, and the residual loss (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). 
Due to the existence of conflicts between principles and agents, full disclosure tends to 
disappear (Lev and Penman, 1990). In order to mitigate the agency problems and costs, 
managers try to act in an optimal way by increasing voluntary disclosure (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978; Chow, 1982; Lambert, 2001; Watson et al., 2002; Barako et al., 2006; 
Zayoud et al.; 2011 and Alves, 2012).  
Extensive information about profitable companies is disclosed in order to reveal managers 
and shareholders interests’alignment justify managers’ compensation and give a positive 
impression of the performance (Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). 
 
Proprietary costs theory The proprietary costs theory states that firms voluntarily disclose 
relevant information to reduce the cost of capital and information asymmetries when 
disclosure-related costs are absent (Verrecchia, 1983 and Dye, 1986).Grossman (1981) and 
Milgrom (1981) argue that companies restrict voluntary disclosure when proprietary costs 
arise which includes costs of being negatively affected by competitors, along with 
preparation and auditing information costs.Darrough and Stoughton (1990) and Wagenhofer 
(1990) conclude this because as the size and number of rivals rise, firms move from full to 
partial disclosure as proprietary costs tend to be high in this case. Moreover, Feltham and Xie 
(1992), Newman and Sansing (1993), Darrough (1993) and Gigler et al. (1994) explain this 
even if it becomes very costly to raise additional equity, firms would not disclose information 
that threatens their competitive position. 
Legitimacy theory Firms aim to legitimize and approve their actions in the face of society, as 
they are aware that their existence and continuation depends on the society’s acceptance for 
their value systems (Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Patten, 1991; Mathews, 1993; Reich, 1998; 
Deegan et al., 2002; Rizk, 2006). Since mandatory disclosure may be unsatisfactory, higher 
voluntary disclosure levels are required by firms to provide insurance that they still comply 
with the ethics, regulations and social contracts agreed upon with their societies (Guthrie et 
al., 2004; Bazine and Vural, 2011). Also, disclosing accounting ratios may assist in educating 
and informing users about changes in organization’s performance, as well as drawing their 
attention away from the issues of concern to other areas (Lindblom, 1994; Cormier and 
Gordon, 2001; Watson et al., 2002). Therefore, by voluntarily disclosing more information, 
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managers improve their communication with various stakeholders and the society and so 
boost their ability to legitimize their corporate activities and managerial positions (Patten, 
1992; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Deegan et al., 2002; O'Donovan, 2002 and O'Dwyer, 
2002). 
 
Stakeholders’ theory This theory considers the relationship between managers and all 
stakeholders not only shareholders as the agency theory does (Crowther and Jatana, 2005). 
Stakeholders are categorized into two groups, those who are crucial to the firm’s continuation 
and those who affect or are affected by the firm but are not essential to the firm’s survival 
(Clarkson, 1995). The first group includes shareholders, employees, suppliers, investors and 
the government, while the second group includes media and other lobbyists (Rizk, 2006). 
Since different stakeholders have different priorities and require different information, 
voluntary disclosure is used by managers to communicate with and acquire the support of 
stakeholders (Watson et al., 2002; Wolfe and Putler, 2002). Moreover, managers must 
consider that the disclosure decision might be influenced by a specific stakeholder’s power 
and that their disclosed information responds to the simultaneous demands of multiple 
stakeholders (Rowley, 1997; Mitchell et al., 1997). Therefore, firms’ voluntary disclosure 
practices must aim to satisfy all stakeholders’ information needs (Abdel-Fattah, 2008). 
 
Capital need theory When firms need to raise capital at the lowest cost whether, through 
equity or debt, voluntary disclosure becomes more sufficient than mandatory disclosure for 
gaining investors’ trust by reducing uncertainty and information asymmetry (Alexander and 
Archer, 1995; Core, 2001; Abdel-Fattah, 2008). Also, Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), 
Cooke (1993), Meek et al. (1995), Hossain et al. (1994), Botosan (1997), Sengupta (1998) 
and Healy and Palepu (2001) stress that increased disclosure reduces the cost of capital and 
information risk, and improves shares’ prices. 
 
Signaling theory The aim of the signaling theory is to clarify and reduce information 
asymmetry in the market (Spence, 1973; Morris, 1987; Bazine and Vural, 2011). One of the 
signaling means is voluntary disclosure, at which managers disclose further information than 
the mandatory ones to attract investments through enhancing a firm’s reputation (Ross, 1977; 
Verrecchia, 1983; Campbell et al., 2002). Also, managers from well-performing profitable 
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companieshave higher incentives to increase the information disclosed, in order to justify 
their compensation and benefit from any rise in the company’s price and value of shares 
(Foster, 1986; Inchausti, 1997). 
Not only is good news disclosed by well performing firms, but also firms with bad news or 
no news to disclose. The bad news is disclosed by firms to reduce the reputation costs as well 
as to checkthe competitors’ reactions towards it (Skinner, 1994; Abdel-Fattah, 2008). On the 
other hand, non-disclosure might occur if the market is highly competitive (Ockabol and 
Tinker, 1993), there is uncertainty about the effect of disclosure on managers’ performance 
or when managers do not have information to disclose (Penno, 1997; Nagar, 1999).  
The mentioned theories were all the possible ones that explain the independent and 
dependent variables, but there are specific theories out of these which explain the relationship 
between corporate investment efficiency and voluntary disclosure. These theories are the 
signaling and the proprietary costs theories and their selection is justified in the following 
sections. 
 
4.2.2 The relationship between corporate investment efficiency and voluntary 
disclosure 
 
Unlike prior studies, this study investigates the impact of corporate investment efficiency on 
voluntary disclosure and not vice versa. Considering investment efficiency as the 
independent variable is justified as follows. According to Bamber et al. (2010), top 
executives exert unique and economically significant influence (manager-specific fixed 
effects) on their firms’ voluntary disclosures. For example, managers from finance and 
accounting and those with military experience favor more accurate disclosure styles. Baik et 
al. (2011) state that consistent with Trueman’s 1986 theory, the likelihood and frequency of 
management earnings forecasts increase with CEO ability. Baik et al. (2017) conclude that as 
managers have higher equity incentives (ability), firms’ information environment (broader 
than the specific financial reporting disclosures) improves. Gul et al. (2018) find that higher 
managerial ability increases audit fees for financially distressed firms and vice versa for non-
distressed ones. Also, Abernathy et al. (2018) find that managerial ability has a positive 
influence on the timeliness of financial reporting. These mentioned studies prove the link 
between managerial ability and voluntary disclosure. The main measurement of managerial 
114 
 
ability is the MA-score developed by Demerjian et al. (2012). The score generates an 
estimate of how efficiently managers use their firms’ resources. Firms use inputs like COGS, 
selling and administrative expenses, net PP&E, net R&D and purchased goodwill to generate 
outputs such as revenues or income (Demerjian et al., 2013). Higher ability managers must 
generate higher revenues from their available set of resources than other members in the 
same industry (Habib and Hasan, 2018; Lee et al., 2018). Therefore, the researcher predicts 
that corporate investment efficiency can be a precise proxy for managerial ability, moreso 
than the general firm efficiency measurement. In other words, this study examines the impact 
of increased management ability in terms of higher investment efficiency on firms’ voluntary 
disclosure. 
The association between corporate investment efficiency and different disclosure types has 
been investigated by many studies. To the best of our knowledge, all studies with the 
exception of one investigated the effect of disclosure types or transparency on investment 
efficiency but not vice versa. For example, Cheng et al. (2013) find that internal control 
weakness disclosures improve investment efficiency through better monitoring and increased 
financial reporting quality. Also, Lai et al. (2014) and Al-Hadi et al. (2016) conclude that 
increasing market risk disclosures or disclosures in general in terms of quantity and quality 
boost a firm’s investment efficiency. Plus, raising the reporting level of corporate social 
responsibility, future cash flows and capital stock would surely reduce investment 
inefficiencies (Dutta and Nezlobin, 2017; Zhong and Gao, 2017). However, the research 
conducted by Chen et al. (2017) investigate both directions of the relationship considering 
investment efficiency and investment transparency came up with unique results. There was 
no positive impact of investment transparency on investment efficiency found which 
contradicts the results of Biddle et al. (2009) and Gomariz and Ballesta (2014) who suggest 
that FRQ mitigates investment inefficiencies through reducing information asymmetry. The 
lack of association could be due to the unconfirmed managers’ forecasts regarding projects’ 
profitability. Thus, the reduction of information asymmetry, in this case, turns to be less 
effective. 
While a negative one was determined concerning investment efficiency effect on a 
company’s investment transparency. Analysing the negative association, Chen et al. (2017) 
argue that managers investing inefficiently may disclose more information to justify their 
deviations from optimal investments and empire building. On the contrary, when managers 
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engage in optimal investments, regulators and investors will demand less information from 
them. 
This study examines the effect of corporate investment efficiency on voluntary disclosure. 
Voluntary disclosure is considered to be a more general term than investment transparency. 
As Chen et al. (2017) consider only certain projects’ capital expenditure announcements 
when determining the disclosure quality, which is the measurement of investment 
transparency. To solve this limitation, voluntary disclosure was considered, as when firms 
invest efficienctly or inefficienctly this does not only impact the transparency about 
investments but also various operating and financial aspects. Therefore, investigating the 
performance commentary indicates how firms’ profits, expenditures, productivity and cash 
flows are affected by their levels of investment efficiency. In addition, the sample 
investigated includes UK listed firms unlike that of Chen et al. (2017) which investigate 
Australian firms. Accordingly, the first estimation is to find a positive effect of corporate 
investment efficiency on voluntary disclosure. Firms investing efficiently tend to issue higher 
disclosures to attract potential investors, satisfy current shareholders, calm down lenders and 
creditors, and reduce information asymmetries and costs of equity financing. The second 
estimation is to find a negative impact similar to that of Chen et al. (2017). When firms over 
or underinvest, firms are more encouraged to use impression management (Godfrey et al., 
2003; Aerts, 2005). Managers would be eager to disclose more by giving a self-serving view 
to stakeholders to control and modify their impressions about firms’ performance (Courtis, 
2004; Merkl-Davies et al., 2011; Leung et al., 2015). I test to see which of these expectations 
is present in the UK context. Therefore, I state the following hypotheses the first one (H1a 
and H1b) is related to performance voluntary disclosure, while the second one (H2a and 
H2b) is related to the disclosure tone: 
 
H1a: Firms with higher corporate investment efficiency have higher levels of voluntary 
disclosure. 
 
H1b: Firms with lower corporate investment efficiency have higher levels of voluntary 
disclosure. 
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H2a: Firms with higher corporate investment efficiency have higher net disclosure tone 
levels. 
 
H2b: Firms with lower corporate investment efficiency have higher net disclosure tone 
levels. 
4.3  Research methodology 
 
In the previous sections, both the theoretical and the empirical aspects of corporate 
investment efficiency and disclosure were reviewed and accordingly, the hypotheses were 
formulated. As acknowledged in the literature review, the overall aim of this study is to 
examine the effect of corporate investment efficiency on the voluntary disclosure for all the 
available companies listed on the FTSE. The vital aim is to conclude whether investment 
efficiency has a significant effect on voluntary disclosure of firms listed in the UK stock 
exchange for the period 2007-2014.  
The relationship tested in this research examines the relationship between corporate 
investment efficiency as the independent variable and voluntary disclosure as the dependent 
variable measured using two proxies explained later. Six control variables for voluntary 
disclosure first proxy are included in this study; firm size, financial leverage, firm 
profitability, firm liquidity, firm growth, and firm age. Eight control variables for voluntary 
disclosure second proxy are included in this study; firm size, financial leverage, firm 
profitability, firm loss, firm growth, market-to-book, dividends, and firm age. The corporate 
investment efficiency was measured by Biddle et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2011) proxies. 
The voluntary disclosure proxies’ data is collected through the CFIE Wmatrix-import web 
tool to permit batch scoring of UK annual report narratives which will be discussed later. The 
methodology section clarifies the strategy and methods used in this study and describe the 
sample, data type, and collection processes. It also gives an explanation for the variables used 
in the study, reasons for their choice and how they are calculated. 
4.3.1 Research strategy 
 
The research problem is determined according to the research aim and objectives which 
indicate whether corporate investment efficiency has a significant effect on voluntary 
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disclosure for a sample of UK stock exchange (FTSE) companies. The hypotheses previously 
mentioned are required to test the relationship between investment efficiency and voluntary 
disclosure. When testable hypotheses are present, applied quantitative research is the most 
appropriate strategy to be used.  
Afterwards, statistical tools and techniques are applied to test these hypotheses using 
quantifiable data for the company level variables examined in this study. The statistical 
techniques to be used are descriptive statistics, Pearson correlation and linear regression 
analyses followed by regression diagnostics will be explained in the next chapter.  
 
4.3.2 Data collection and sample selection 
 
Data was gathered for the non-financial FTSE all share index from 2007 until 2014. 
Financial companies were excluded due to the highly regulated disclosure environment they 
have to comply with (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008; Athanasakou and Hussainey, 2014). The 
sample timing was chosen to cover the economic crisis year (2008) and the years after in 
order to analyse its long-term consequences. Lancaster’s (CFIE) list of UK annual reports 
narrative disclosures scores only provide data until 2014, therefore the sample’s timing ends 
that year. And in order to ensure the consistency of data, the CFIE’s software was not used to 
obtain scores for the years till 2018. 
Disclosing information to capital markets assist firms in raising capital, justifying 
compensations and improving firms’ images (Healy and Palepu, 2001). With respect to 
disclosure, UK firms disclose according to the voluntary best practice guidelines (Pappas, 
2015). The UK was selected for this study’s sample for a number of reasons. First, the nature 
of mandatory rules is minimal as disclosure in the UK is mainly voluntary, thus regulatory 
and litigation costs are low compared to other countries such as US and Canada (La Porta et 
al., 2006; Aerts and Tarca, 2010). Second, there are considerable parts of UK’s annual report 
narratives that are not willingly verifiable or auditable (Athanasakou and Hussainey, 2014). 
Third, UK annual reports have a significant level of impression management regarding firms’ 
performance (Clatworthy and Jones, 2006). Fourth, preparing and issuing the annual reports 
according to IFRS and in English. 
Therefore, the mirroring of UK firms’ investment efficiency or inefficiency in its voluntarily 
disclosed information was the main concern to be investigated. Examining whether firms will 
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transparently reflect their true investment performance over the economic crisis period given 
the above reasons in such a developed country was a major research question to be answered. 
The FTSE all-share index was filtered to only include in the sample companies which 
continue to be listed between 2007 until 2014 accounting for 256 firm-year observations. 
Corporate investment efficiency and control variables’ data were downloaded from the 
Bloomberg database. Then, available investment efficiency and control variables’ data were 
matched with the existing disclosure scores (from CFIE).   
The number of companies that have available investment efficiency, control variables and 
voluntary disclosure scores (first proxy) are 151 with a total of 441observations. While for 
the disclosure tone (second proxy), the number of companies with available investment 
efficiency, control variables and disclosure tone scores are 151 with a total of 428 
observations. 
In this framework, the selected sample includes 9 different industrial sectors categorized 
according to Bloomberg database over the period 2007-2014, as shown in table (4.1). The 
industrial sector represents the highest number of companies among other sectors of 33.77%, 
while the lowest numbers of companies are from the telecommunications sector forming only 
2.66% of the total companies.  
 
Table (4.1) 
Sample Sector Classification 
 
Sector No. of companies in the 
Sector 
% 
Materials 14 9.27% 
Consumer staples 12 7.95% 
Energy 7 4.64% 
Consumer discretionary 37 24.5% 
Utilities 6 3.97% 
Industrials 51 33.77% 
Telecommunications 4 2.66% 
Healthcare 6 3.97% 
IT 14 9.27% 
Total 151 100% 
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4.3.3 Methods of statistical analysis 
 
The statistical techniques used for analysis are descriptive statistics such as mean, maximum, 
minimum and standard deviation, Pearson’s coefficient of correlation, and the regression 
analysis is performed. Finally, regression diagnostics such as checking normality, linearity, 
autocorrelation, and multicollinearity are done. The statistical techniques are carried out 
using the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) version 24.  
First, to portray the relevant variables in the research, descriptive statistics are carried out. A 
Summary of these Statistics is used to show the Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum and 
Maximum values of all variables. Then, Pearson’s correlation analysis is applied to analyse 
the relationship between corporate investment efficiency and voluntary disclosure. 
Correlation is used to illustrate the direction and strength of the variables with one another. 
Correlation measures the extent of linear association between two variables, stating whether 
variables are correlated, but it does not show any causal relationship between them. In order 
to analyse the impact of corporate investment efficiency on voluntary disclosure, regression 
analysis is used. Regression is a more powerful method when compared to correlation 
because it does not only show the direction and strength of a relationship but determines the 
causal effect of this relationship. In this research, the ordinary least squares (OLS) method of 
regression was employed in carrying out the analysis. Since this study sets out to test the 
relationship between the efficiency of investment and voluntary disclosure, the application of 
the OLS regression method is appropriate. 
 
4.3.4 Variables measurements 
 
This section will discuss the measurements used for each variable in this research. The 
dependent variable is voluntary disclosure; the independent variable is represented by 
corporate investment efficiency and the control variables. These control variables were 
selected based on previous researches in which voluntary disclosure and disclosure tone were 
studied as dependent variables. This will be discussed in details later. 
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4.3.4.1 Dependent variable 
 
The two proxies for the dependent variable voluntary disclosure are expressed in this section, 
explaining why these proxies where selected and from which source. 
First proxy “Wordcountsum” 
To obtain the disclosure scores, the CFIE Wmatrix-import web tool which permits batch 
scoring of UK annual report narratives was used4. Wmatrix has the ability to process 
unstructured annual reports in an electronic format and produce word count frequencies 
based on predetermined dictionaries (Pappas, 2015). CFIE collects electronic versions of the 
UK reports for the years 2002-2014.The collection started from 2007 and ends in 2014, 
covering the period during and after the economic crisis; moreover, to maintain the 
consistency between the other samples’ timings of my study.   
The considered sections of UK annual reports were the performance commentaries which 
discuss any aspect of operating activities or financial performance that is why they were 
taken into consideration instead of the overall voluntary disclosure. The overall voluntary 
disclosure is more general, as it includes, for example, CSR reports, remuneration reports or 
governance statements which might not reflect a firm’s investment efficiency or inefficiency 
practices as the performance commentaries can do. 
The total number of words of a section “s” in an annual report was used as a proxy, known as 
wordcountsum. Therefore, the disclosure scores attained as data gathered were the word 
count for the aggregate performance commentary identified as wordcountsum_Perform. The 
performance-related keywords as searched for by Wmatrix are as follows: 
 
Performance keywords (# stands for any number of characters): 
 
Sales Revenue 
Revenues Turnover 
Trading Cost 
Costs Expense 
Expenses Income 
Earnings e.p.s 
Profit Profits 
Profitability Loss 
Losses Margin 
Margins Result 
Results 
                                                             
4 The CFIE Wmatrix web import tool is available at https://cfie.lancaster.ac.uk:8443/.   
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Second proxy “Disclosure tone” 
 
Continuing with UK annual reports performance commentaries and for being more specific 
and narrowing the focus, disclosure tone was selected as a reflection of a company’s 
performance. Given the same time interval and source of data, the net positive keywords 
divided by positive plus negative keywords for the performance commentary were selected 
known as net_tone_performance. And so, disclosure tone is a dependent variable reflecting 
the percentage of good news relative to the total of good and bad news combined together. 
This variable is crucial for companies that have changes in investment efficiencies by 
checking the impact of such changes not only on the level of voluntary disclosure but also the 
way it is discussed in the form of being good or bad news about the companies. The 
negativity and positivity related keywords as searched for by Wmatrix are as follows: 
 
Negativity keywords (# stands for any number of characters): 
 
abando# abdica# aberra# abetti# abnorm# abolis# abroga# 
abrupt# absenc# absent# abuse# abusin# abusiv# accide# 
accusa# accuse# accusi# acquie# acquit# adulte# advers# 
afterm# agains# aggrav# alerte# alerti# aliena# allega# 
allege# allegi# annoy# annul# anomal# antico# antitr# 
argue# argued# arguin# argume# arrear# arrest# artifi# 
assaul# assert# attrit# averse# backda# bad# bail# 
bailou# balk# balked# bankru# bans# barred# barrie# 
below# bottle# boycot# breach# break# bribe# bribin# 
bridge# broken# burden# burned# calami# cancel# carele# 
casual# catast# cautio# cease# ceasin# censur# challe# 
charge# circum# claimi# claims# clawba# closed# closeo# 
closin# closur# coerce# coerci# collap# collis# collud# 
collus# compla# compli# compul# concea# conced# concer# 
concil# condem# condon# confes# confin# confis# confli# 
confro# confus# conspi# constr# contem# conten# contes# 
contra# contro# convic# correc# corrup# costly# counte# 
crime# crimin# crises# crisis# critic# crucia# culpab# 
cumber# curtai# cut# damage# damagi# dampen# danger# 
deadlo# deadwe# debarm# debarr# deceas# deceit# deceiv# 
decept# declin# decrea# deepen# deeper# deepes# deface# 
defama# defame# defami# defaul# defeat# defect# defend# 
defens# defer# defici# defrau# defunc# degrad# delay# 
delaye# delayi# delays# delete# delibe# delinq# delist# 
demise# demisi# demoli# demote# demoti# denial# denied# 
denies# denigr# deny# deplet# deprec# depres# depriv# 
dereli# deroga# destab# destro# destru# detain# detent# 
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deter# detrac# detrim# devalu# devast# deviat# devolv# 
diffic# dimini# diminu# disadv# disaff# disagr# disall# 
disapp# disass# disast# disavo# discip# discla# disclo# 
discon# discou# discre# disfav# disgor# disgra# dishon# 
disinc# disint# disloy# dismal# dismis# disord# dispar# 
displa# dispos# dispro# disput# disqua# disreg# disrep# 
disrup# dissat# dissen# dissid# dissol# distor# distra# 
distre# distur# divers# divert# divest# divorc# divulg# 
doubt# down# drag# drasti# drawba# drop # droppe# 
droppi# drops # drough# duress# dysfun# easing# egregi# 
embarg# embarr# embezz# encroa# encumb# endang# enjoin# 
erode# eroded# erodes# erodin# erosio# errati# erred# 
erring# errone# error# errors# errs# escala# evade# 
evaded# evades# evadin# evasio# evasiv# evict# exacer# 
exagge# excess# exculp# exoner# exploi# expose# exposi# 
exprop# expuls# extenu# fail# fall # fals# fatal# 
fault# fear# fell # feloni# felony# fictit# fined# 
fines# fired# firing# flaw# forbid# force# forcin# 
forecl# forego# forest# forfei# forger# fraud# frauds# 
fraudu# frivol# frustr# fugiti# gratui# grieva# grossl# 
ground# guilty# halt# hamper# harass# hardsh# harm# 
harsh# hazard# hinder# hindra# hostil# hurdle# hurt# 
hurtin# idle# idling# ignore# ignori# illega# illegi# 
illici# illiqu# imbala# immatu# immora# impair# impass# 
impede# impedi# impend# impera# imperf# imperi# imperm# 
implic# imposs# impoun# imprac# impris# improp# imprud# 
inabil# inacce# inaccu# inacti# inadeq# inadve# inadvi# 
inappl# inappr# inatte# incapa# incarc# incide# incomp# 
inconc# incons# inconv# incorr# indece# indefe# indict# 
ineffe# ineffi# inelig# inequi# inevit# inexpe# inferi# 
inflic# infrac# infrin# inhibi# inimic# injunc# injure# 
injuri# injury# inordi# inquir# insecu# insens# insolv# 
instab# insubo# insuff# insurr# intent# interf# interm# 
interr# intimi# intrus# invali# invest# involu# irreco# 
irregu# irrepa# irreve# jeopar# justif# kickba# knowin# 
lack# lag# lapse# lapsin# late# launde# layoff# 
least # less # lie# limita# linger# liquid# litiga# 
lockou# lose# losing# loss# lost# low # lying# 
malfea# malfun# malice# malici# malpra# manipu# markdo# 
misapp# misbra# miscal# mischi# miscla# miscon# misdat# 
misdem# misdir# mishan# misinf# misint# misjud# mislab# 
mislea# misled# misman# mismat# mispla# misrep# miss# 
mistak# mistri# misund# misuse# misusi# monopo# morato# 
mothba# negati# neglec# neglig# nonatt# noncom# noncon# 
nondis# nonfun# nonpay# nonper# nonpro# nonrec# nonren# 
nuisan# nullif# object# obscen# obsole# obstac# obstru# 
offenc# offend# omissi# omit# onerou# opport# oppose# 
opposi# outage# outdat# outmod# overag# overbu# overca# 
overch# overco# overdu# overes# overlo# overpa# overpr# 
overru# oversh# overst# oversu# overtl# overtu# overva# 
panic# panics# penali# penalt# peril# perils# perjur# 
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perpet# persis# pervas# petty# picket# plaint# plea# 
pled# poor# poses# posing# postpo# precip# preclu# 
predat# prejud# premat# pressi# pretri# preven# proble# 
prolon# prone# prosec# protes# protra# provok# punish# 
puniti# purpor# questi# quit# racket# ration# reasse# 
reassi# recall# recess# reckle# redact# redres# refina# 
refusa# refuse# refusi# reject# relinq# reluct# renego# 
renoun# repara# reposs# repudi# resign# restat# restru# 
retali# retrib# revoca# revoke# revoki# ridicu# risk # 
sabota# sacrif# scanda# scruti# secrec# seize# seizin# 
senten# seriou# setbac# sever# severe# severi# sharpl# 
shocke# shorta# shortf# shrink# shrunk# shut# slande# 
slippa# slow# sluggi# slump # smalle# solven# stagge# 
stagna# stands# stolen# stoppa# stoppe# stoppi# stops# 
strain# stress# string# subjec# subpoe# substa# sue# 
suffer# suing# summon# surren# suscep# suspec# suspen# 
suspic# taint# tamper# tense# termin# testif# threat# 
tighte# tolera# tortuo# traged# tragic# trauma# troubl# 
turbul# turmoi# unable# unacce# unacco# unanno# unanti# 
unappr# unattr# unauth# unavai# unavoi# unawar# uncert# 
uncoll# uncomp# uncons# uncont# uncorr# uncove# undeli# 
under # undesi# undete# undisc# undocu# undue# unduly# 
unecon# unempl# unethi# unexcu# unexpe# unfair# unfavo# 
unfeas# unfit# unfore# unfors# unfort# unfoun# unfrie# 
unfulf# unfund# uninsu# uninte# unjust# unknow# unlawf# 
unlice# unliqu# unmark# unmerc# unnece# unneed# unobta# 
unoccu# unpaid# unperf# unplan# unpopu# unpred# unprod# 
unprof# unqual# unreal# unreas# unreco# unreim# unreli# 
unreme# unrepo# unreso# unrest# unsafe# unsala# unsale# 
unsati# unsavo# unsche# unsett# unsold# unsoun# unstab# 
unsubs# unsucc# unsuit# unsure# unsusp# unsust# untena# 
untime# untrut# unusab# unwant# unwarr# unwelc# unwill# 
upset# urgenc# urgent# usurio# usurp# usurpe# usurpi# 
usurps# usury# vandal# verdic# vetoed# victim# violat# 
violen# vitiat# voided# voidin# volati# vulner# warn# 
warned# warnin# warns# wasted# wastef# wastin# weak# 
willfu# worr# worse# worsen# worst # worthl# writed# 
writeo# wrong#      
 
Positivity keywords (# stands for any number of characters): 
 
able# above# abunda# acclai# accomp# achiev# adequa# 
advanc# advant# allian# assure# assuri# attain# attrac# 
beat# beauti# benefi# best# better# bolste# boom# 
boost# breakt# brilli# certai# charit# collab# compli# 
conclu# conduc# confid# constr# courte# creati# defini# 
deligh# delive# depend# desira# desire# despit# destin# 
dilige# distin# dream# easier# easily# easy# effic# 
empowe# enable# enabli# encour# enhanc# enjoy# enthus# 
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exceed# excel# except# excit# exclus# exempl# expand# 
expans# fantas# favora# favore# favori# friend# gain# 
good# great# grew# grow# happi# high# honor# 
ideal# impres# improv# increa# incred# influe# inform# 
ingenu# innova# insigh# inspir# integr# invent# larger# 
larges# leader# leadin# loyal# lucrat# merito# more# 
most# opport# optimi# outper# outsta# perfec# pleasa# 
please# pleasu# plenti# popula# positi# preemi# premie# 
presti# proact# profic# profit# progre# prospe# reboun# 
recept# record# regain# resolv# revolu# reward# rise# 
rising# rose# satisf# smooth# solid# solves# solvin# 
specta# stabil# stable# streng# strong# succee# succes# 
superi# surpas# transp# tremen# unmatc# unpara# unsurp# 
upturn# valuab# versat# vibran# win# worthy#  
 
4.3.4.2 Independent variables 
 
The independent variables of this study are divided into two categories. First, the main 
independent variable, corporate investment efficiency, at which the two most commonly used 
proxies are employed to measure it (Biddle et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2011). Second, the 
control variables discussed based on prior studies (Barako et al., 2006; Lan et al., 2013; 
Ressas and Hussainey, 2014; Habbash et al., 2016; Aly et al., 2018). 
Investment efficiency’s first proxy  
Chen et al. (2011) measure investment efficiency as deviations from expected investment 
using a model that forecasts investment as a function of growth opportunities. This 
measurement is consistent with Biddle et al. (2009) for measuring investment efficiency. 
Chen et al. (2011) measure efficiency as deviations from expected investment using a model 
that forecasts investment as a function of growth opportunities. Principally, Hubbard (1998) 
estimates a prudent model for expected investment as a function of sales growth. Since the 
relation between investment and sales growth could differ between sales declines and sales 
boosts, a linear regression model is employed to consent a differential predictability for sales 
fluctuations: 
 
Investi,t=α0+ α1NEGi,t-1+ α2SalesGrowthi,t-1+ α3NEG*SalesGrowthi,t-1+εi,t      (1) 
 
125 
 
In equation 1, Investi,t is the total investment of firm i in year t, defined as the net increase in 
tangible and intangible assets and scaled by lagged total assets5. SalesGrowthi,t-1is the annual 
sales growth rate for firm i in year t-1 and NEGi,t-1is an indicator variable which takes the 
value of one for negative sales growth and a zero otherwise (Gomariz and Ballesta, 2014). 
Calculating investment efficiency or inefficiency occurs by multiplying the absolute value of 
the residuals by negative 1 since both over or underinvestment reflects an unfavorable sign 
about the efficiency level. And so, the residuals from the regression model reveal the 
deviation from the expected investment level indicating that those residuals are used as a 
firm-specific proxy for investment inefficiency. A positive residual means that the firm is 
making investments at a higher rate than estimated according to the sales growth, so it will 
overinvest. In contrast, a negative residual assumes that real investment is less than the 
estimated, reflecting an underinvestment.  
 
Investment efficiency’s second proxy 
The most frequently used proxy for investment efficiency is the one proposed by Richardson 
(2006) and Biddle et al. (2009). A firm’s total investment for a given year, indicated in 
equation 2 by Investment (I), is measured as the sum of R&D, capital expenditures, and 
acquisition expenditures minus the cash receipts from the sales of PPE multiplied by 100 and 
scaled by average total assets: 
 
It = RDt + CAPEXt + Acquisitionst – SalePPEt                      (2) 
 
This measurement of investment is clearly distinguished from other ones since it takes into 
consideration various investment classes by including capital expenditures, acquisitions, 
sales of assets and R&D. These investment types incorporate a significant importance 
nowadays, unlike old previous research which studied and discussed these components 
individually.  
The abnormal element of investment or the residuals reflected in the error term are then used 
as a proxy for investment inefficiency levels by determining whether there is an over or 
                                                             
5Chen et al. (2011) is a mearurement consistent with Biddle et al. (2009) differing in the part of forecasting 
investments as a function of growth opportunities. The investment is calculated by Chen et al. (2011) as the net 
increase in tangible and intangible assets and scaled by lagged total assets. So the available data for assets 
purchased or disposed is accounted for, unlike Biddle et al. (2009) measurement of investment which specifies 
certain items for measuring. 
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underinvestment. Biddle et al. (2009) state that investment inefficiency takes values between 
zero and one, where zero or values close to zero indicates underinvestment, while one or 
values close to one specifies overinvestment. 
 
Voluntary disclosure control variables (first proxy “Wordcountsum”) 
According to previous literature, firm size, leverage, profitability, liquidity, growth, and age 
are considered the major firm characteristics used to control for their effect on the 
relationships between the dependent and independent factors in the model. The firm size is 
measured by the natural logarithm of assets (Cooke, 1989a; Hassan et al., 2006; Al-Hadi et 
al., 2016; Mohamed and Schwienbacher, 2016). Leverage or gearing of a company is 
measured through the book value of debt to total assets ratio (Eng and Mak, 2003; Allegrini 
and Greco, 2013; Al-Hadi et al., 2016). For measuring profitability, a firm’s ROA ratio is 
employed (Meek et al., 1995; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Habbash et al., 2016). The current 
ratio is used to account for firms’ liquidity to test the ability of funds to meet their short-term 
obligations (Watson et al., 2002; Barako et al., 2006; Lan et al., 2013). Firms’ growth rate is 
determined by the change in sales from one year to another (Hassanein and Hussainey, 
2015). Also, the company’s age is expressed as the natural logarithm of the number of years’ 
since their establishment (Hossain, 2008; Sehar et al., 2013; Habbash et al., 2016). 
 
Voluntary disclosure control variables (second proxy “Disclosure tone”) 
Considering the prior research firm size, leverage, profitability, a dummy variable for 
reporting a net loss, firm growth, market-to-book ratio, a dummy variable for dividend 
payments and firm age are employed to control for the association between the dependent 
and independent variables. Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets 
(Hackston and Milne, 1996; Kang and Gray, 2011; Hassan et al., 2006; Ressas and 
Hussainey, 2014; Aly et al., 2018). Financial leverage is proxied for by the total debt to total 
assets (Barako et al., 2006; Ressas and Hussainey, 2014; Aly et al., 2018). Firm profitability, 
a firm’s ROA ratio is used (Kun Wang et al., 2008; Ressas and Hussainey, 2014). LOSS is a 
dummy variable for reporting a net loss (Rogers et al., 2011). Firms’ growth rate is 
calculated as the change in sales from one year to another (Ressas and Hussainey, 2014; 
Hassanein and Hussainey, 2015; Aly et al., 2018). Market-to-book ratio is employed to 
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control for a company’s investment opportunity and growth potential (Martikainen et al., 
2016; Czerney et al., 2017). DIV is a dummy variable for dividend payments (Hussainey and 
Aal-Eisa, 2009; Ressas and Hussainey, 2014) and firm age is shown as the natural logarithm 
of the number of years’ since their establishment (Muttakin and Khan, 2014; Aly et al., 
2018). 
4.3.5 Research model 
 
The relationship between the dependent variable voluntary disclosure (first proxy “VOLDIS” 
and second proxy “DISTONE”), the independent variable corporate investment efficiency 
and the control variables can be expressed in the following regression models. Models 1 and 
2 show the relationship between voluntary disclosure first proxy “VOLDIS” and both of 
investment efficiency measurements employed by the study. Models 3 and 4 present the 
association between voluntary disclosure second proxy “DISTONE” and both of investment 
efficiency measurements. 
 
VOLDISi,t = β0 + β1INVEFF(1)i,t + β2FSi,t + β3LEVi,t + β4PROFi,t + β5LIQi,t + β6SGi,t + 
β7AGEi,t + ∑Industry dummies + ∑Year dummies +ɛi,t                                 (Model 1) 
 
VOLDISi,t = β0 + β1INVEFF(2)i,t + β2FSi,t + β3LEVi,t + β4PROFi,t + β5LIQi,t + β6SGi,t + 
β7AGEi,t + ∑Industry dummies + ∑Year dummies + εi,t                                 (Model 2) 
 
Where; 
 VOLDIS= Voluntary disclosure 
 INVEFF(1)= Corporate investment efficiency (measurement 1) 
 INVEFF(2)= Corporate investment efficiency (measurement 2) 
 FS= Firm size 
 LEV= Financial leverage 
 PROF= Firm profitability 
 LIQ= Firm liquidity 
 SG= Firm’s sales growth 
 AGE= Firm age 
 ε = Error term 
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DISTONEi,t = β0 + β1INVEFF(1)i,t + β2FSi,t + β3LEVi,t + β4PROFi,t + β5LOSSi,t + β6SGi,t + 
β7MTBi,t + β8DIVi,t + β9AGEi,t +∑Industry dummies + ∑Year dummies +ɛi,t                                 
(Model 3) 
 
DISTONEi,t = β0 + β1INVEFF(2)i,t + β2FSi,t + β3LEVi,t + β4PROFi,t + β5LOSSi,t + β6SGi,t + 
β7MTBi,t + β8DIVi,t + β9AGEi,t + ∑Industry dummies + ∑Year dummies + εi,t                               
(Model 4) 
 
Where; 
 DISTONE= Disclosure tone 
 INVEFF(1)= Corporate investment efficiency (measurement 1) 
 INVEFF(2)= Corporate investment efficiency (measurement 2) 
 FS= Firm size 
 LEV= Financial leverage 
 PROF= Firm profitability 
 LOSS= A binary variable (1 if a firm reported negative net income and 0 otherwise) 
 SG= Firm’s sales growth 
 MTB= Market-to-book ratio 
 DIV= A binary variable (1 if a firm paid out dividends and 0 otherwise) 
 AGE= Firm age 
 ε = Error term 
 
4.4  Findings 
 
This section deals with whether the data collection and analysis done will support the study 
hypotheses or not. The results obtained will determine whether corporate investment 
efficiency has an effect on voluntary disclosure in UK firms or not. This would be of 
advantage for these firms to try to eliminate over or under investments which would have an 
unfavorable effect on their voluntary disclosed information. This section presents the results 
of summary statistics for each variable under each of both measurements of voluntary 
disclosure, showing the effect of the independent variable on the dependent one. 
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4.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
In this part, the analysis results for the sample will be discussed in terms of mean, maximum, 
minimum and standard deviation. The variable used in this study as a dependent variable is 
voluntary disclosure. The independent variable is corporate investment efficiency, and 
finally, the control variables are firm size, financial leverage, firm profitability, firm 
liquidity, firm growth, and firm age. 
 
Table (4.2) 
Descriptive Statistics for 2007-2014 
 
 Dependent 
variable 
Independent variable Control variables 
VOLDIS INVEFF1 
(err) 
INVEFF2 
(err2) 
FS LEV PROF LIQ SG CAPTA AGE 
Mean 3.96 0.0002 -0.0005 3.20 0.203 0.064 1.43 7.24 0.039 1.802 
Max 4.76 24.75 73.22 5.09 0.69 0.70 6.10 152.79 0.28 2.47 
Min 1.83 -9.51 -54.24 1.84 0.00 -0.48 0.35 -45.16 0.00 0.00 
Std. Dev. 0.332 4.26 10.89 0.63 0.14 0.079 0.75 16.23 0.040 0.389 
Skewness 
Statistic 
-1.850 2.384 2.37 0.464 0.653 1.482 1.914 2.063 2.432 -0.977 
VOLDIS is voluntary disclosure measured as the word count for the aggregate performance commentary identified as 
wordcountsum_Perform; INVEFF is investment efficiency measured by the negative and positive residuals of the 
investment equation; FS is firm size measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; LEV is firm leverage measured as 
total liabilities divided by total assets; PROF is firm profitability measured by the return on assets ratio of a firm; LIQ is firm 
liquidity measured by the firm’s current ratio by dividing current assets by current liabilities; SG is sales growth measured 
by the change which is sales from year to year; CAPTA is capital expenditure divided by total assets; AGE is firm age 
measured as the natural logarithm of the number of years’ since their establishment. 
 
 
The results of the descriptive statistics shown in table (4.2) indicate that the independent 
variable corporate investment efficiency for both models provide similar results. The average 
of the investment efficiency results in both models is around zero (0.0002 and -0.0005 
respectively) which is a good indication of the investigated firms. As values become closer to 
zero, investment efficiency becomes higher (Gomariz and Ballesta, 2014). The maximum 
levels show over-investment by 24.75% and 73.22% for both models respectively, 
representing the extreme positive deviations from the expected levels of investment. The 
minimum levels reveal under-investment by -9.51% and -54.24% representing extreme 
negative deviations from the expected levels of investment. 
As for the dependent variable; voluntary disclosure (VOLDIS) specified a mean of 3.96 
which indicates that 9104 words of the keywords are about performance actually disclosed 
by the firms of the sample, a maximum of 4.76 (58,150 words), minimum of 1.83 (67 words) 
and skewness of -1.850 indicating that data are symmetric around the mean. 
130 
 
Finally, the control variables showed the following results, the mean firm size for UK firms 
is 1,799,360,000 (3.20) billion GBP as the value of firm assets, a maximum of 121,840 (5.09) 
billion GBP and a minimum assets’ value of 68.408 (1.84) billion. Firm financial leverage 
(LEV) represented a mean of 20.3% indicating that the sample firms are not highly 
leveraged, and a maximum of 69%, minimum of 0% show a large dispersion in firms’ debt 
ratios (Habbash et al., 2016). Firm profitability (PROF) reflects an average of 0.064, 
maximum 0.70, minimum -0.48, standard deviation of 0.079 and skewness of 1.482. Firm 
liquidity (LIQ) shows a mean of 1.43, maximum of 6.10, minimum of 0.35, a standard 
deviation of 0.75 and skewness of 1.914. Firm sales growth (SG) has a mean of 7.24 similar 
to Hassanein and Hussainey (2015) finding, while a great dispersion between the maximum 
growing firms of 152.79 and least (minimum) growing firms of -45.16 showing a 
deterioration. Capital expenditure to total assets (CAPTA) reflects an average of 0.039, 
maximum of 0.28, minimum of 0.00, a standard deviation of 0.040 and skewness of 2.432. 
The average firm has been in existence for 65 years (as 1.802 is after applying the natural 
logarithm), maximum of 296 years (2.47), minimum of 0.00, a standard deviation of 0.389 
and skewness of -0.977. 
 
4.4.2 Regression diagnostics 
 
The linear regression is applied in this study using the OLS method. In order to justify the 
usage of OLS, the main assumptions were tested and their results were assessed (Cooke, 
1998): 
1. Linearity: there should be a linear association between the dependent and each 
independent variable. 
2. Normality of error: The error terms are independent, which means that consecutive 
residuals are not correlated and there is no serial correlation.  
3. Homoscedasticity: the variance of the error terms is steady for each observation. 
4. Multicollinearity: a linear association between two or more independent variables 
should not exist. 
5. Autocorrelation: It decides whether there is autocorrelation in the residuals or not. 
There are some regression model diagnostics performed in order to check the OLS linear 
regression assumptions. These models will be discussed in the following subsections. 
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Checking linearity 
 
The dependent variable values are plotted versus the independent variables’ values to check 
whether the relationship between them is linear or not; and how well the fitted regression line 
represents their relationship. 
As shown in figure (4.1) in the appendix, the independent and control variables are plotted 
against the dependent variable VOLDIS to check whether there is a trend (linear relationship) 
or not. Results show that there is a mostly constant relationship with a strong trend between 
the independent, dependent and control variables; which supports and justifies the regression 
models done. 
Checking normality 
 
Normality means that errors should be normally distributed. Hypothetically, normality is 
essential only for hypotheses tests to be valid. Normality of errors can be determined by two 
graphical methods which are P-P plot and histogram.  
Normality plots have been performed in this study. Figures (4.2) and (4.3) in the appendix 
summarize all the methods used in this study for checking normality graphically for each of 
the regression models. 
Data show the normaldistribution in either the histogram or P-P Plot. 
 
Checking homoscedasticity of residuals 
 
The homoscedasticity assumption means that the variance of the error terms is stable for each 
observation. In this study, it is plotted graphically, by plotting the residuals versus predicted 
values and observes if residuals are getting more spread-out as a function of predicted values. 
After plotting the residuals versus the predicted values for the model, figure (4.4) in the 
appendix indicated homoscedasticity of the results. 
  
132 
 
Checking for multicollinearity 
 
Variance inflation factors (VIF) and tolerance values are widely used to check for the 
presence of multicollinearity problems. Table (4.1) in the appendix shows the VIF and 
tolerance of each explanatory variable.  
The tests showed no multicollinearity for all variables except for the VIF of the independent 
variable (INVEFF) and CAPTA (control variable) in the first model. Therefore, CAPEX was 
removed from the model to solve this problem and this would be easily tracked in the 
regression coming results. 
 
Checking for autocorrelation 
 
Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic is used to determine whether there is an autocorrelation in the 
residuals of a regression. The test statistic can vary between 0 and 4 with a value of 2 
meaning that the residuals are uncorrelated. A value greater than 2 indicates a negative 
correlation between adjacent residuals, whereas a value ofless than 2 indicates a positive 
correlation. The size of the Durbin–Watson statistic depends upon the number of variables in 
the model and the number of observations (Durbin and Watson, 1951). DW critical value 
tables are used to arrive on the exact DW value for a specified model. In this study, the 
number of variables existing (K) were not found in any of the tables, so an exact value was 
not found.  
Durbin-Watson was calculated for the two regression models and the results are shown in the 
table (4.2) in the appendix of 1.512 and 1.496 respectively. Therefore, no autocorrelation was 
found in the sample. Field (2013) indicates that as a conventional rule of thumb, only values 
less than 1 or greater than 3 are a cause for concern, so both models’ DW values are within 
the allowable limits. 
4.4.3 Pearson’s correlation analysis 
 
For analysing the relationship among the variables of interest in the study, Pearson 
correlation analysis has been conducted. Table (4.3) shows the direction and strengths of the 
relationships between all variables with one another. 
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Table (4.3) 
Pearson’s Correlation Matrix for (2007-2014) 
 
 FS LEV PROF LIQ SG CAPTA AGE err err2 VOLDIS 
FS  
1    .291** -.052 -.198** -.028 
    .024 
 
.110* .050   -.116**   .391** 
           
LEV   1 -.140** -.249** -.008 .256** .073 .209** .030   .094* 
           
PROF    1 .036   .129** .072  .126** .068   .131** .006 
           
LIQ     1 .006 -.108* .087* -.081 -.054 -.057 
           
SG      1 .100* .017 .000 .000 .019 
           
CAPTA       1 .079   .943**   .303** .020 
            
AGE        1 .046 -.050 .026 
           
Err         1 .388** .055 
           
err2          1 .030 
           
VOLDIS           1 
           
 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Variable definitions: see table (4.2) 
The correlation matrix in Table (4.3) shows that both models of investment efficiency (err 
and err2) have an insignificant positive relationship with voluntary disclosure. Considering 
the control variables; FS and LEV show a positive significant relationship with VOLDIS, 
having a 99% and 95% confidence levels respectively. The remaining variables have an 
insignificant relation with VOLDIS, with respect to liquidity having a negative association. 
4.4.4 Regression analysis 
 
In the preceding section, the Pearson correlation was conducted, as stated before, to show the 
strength and direction between variables however it cannot show the causal relationship. 
Pearson correlation is calculated between the Dependent Variable VOLDIS, and the 
independent variables INVEFF (err and err2), FS, LEV, PROF, LIQ, SG, and AGE. 
Regression is a more powerful tool when compared to correlation as it does not only show 
the direction and strength of a relationship but also determines the causal effect of this 
relationship. 
134 
 
This section presents and discusses the regression results for the relationship between 
corporate investment efficiency and voluntary disclosure. Two proxies are applied to 
measure the corporate investment efficiency. These measurements are Chen et al. (2011) and 
Biddle et al. (2009). Concerning the voluntary disclosure, its data were obtained directly 
from Lancaster’s (CFIE) list of UK annual reports narrative disclosures scores as stated 
before in the methodology section (Pappas, 2015). 
As for firm size, financial leverage, firm profitability, firm liquidity, firm growth, and firm 
age are used as control variables. A single multiple regression equation, stated in the previous 
section, was analysed with the ordinary least squared method (OLS) (Biddle et al., 2009; Lai 
et al., 2014; Hassanein and Hussainey, 2015; Al-Hadi et al., 2016) using the Statistical 
Package for Social Science (SPSS) program version 24.  
When conducting the regression analysis, some measures were calculated as R-Squared, 
Adjusted R-Squared, F-Statistic and T-Statistic. The most important of these is the R-
Squared which measures how much variability is caused in the dependent variable due to a 
given change in the independent variable.  
The following tables (4.4) and (4.5) present the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression used in testing the relationship between investment efficiency, voluntary 
disclosure, and control variables.  
The analysis in tables (4.4) and (4.5), all of the independent variables (INVEFF, FS, LEV, 
PROF, LIQ, SG, and AGE) have been regressed against the dependent variable (VOLDIS). 
The ANOVA test showed that both models are significant. The analysis indicates a value of 
R squared for model 1 and 2 of 34.3% and 35.7% which implies that 34.3% and 35.7% of the 
variations of VOLDIS are determined by INVEFF, FS, LEV, PROF, LIQ, SG, and AGE. The 
remaining 65.7% and 64.3% of variations are attributed to other variables.  
The results reveal that the independent variable (err2) in the second model for measuring 
INVEFF has a highly positive significant relationship with VOLDIS. The first model’s 
variable (err) still has a negative insignificant relation with VOLDIS. The second model’s 
results are supported by the signaling theory, as Foster (1986) and Inchausti (1997) state that 
profitable well-performing firm managers are encouraged to disclose more. Disclosure is 
considered one of the signaling means to attract investments, improve firms’ reputation and 
justify managers’ compensation (Ross, 1977; Verrecchia, 1983; Campbell et al., 2002). 
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Investing efficiently is a sign of good performance and so disclosing such information would 
achieve the stated benefits. Therefore, accepting and supporting H1a. 
As for the control variables for both models, FS shows a positive significant relation with 
VOLDIS with a 99% confidence level, while PROF has a positive significant relation with 
confidence level 90% for model 1 only. The remaining control variables reveal an 
insignificant association with VOLDIS with respect to LEV and AGE having a positive 
relationship and LIQ and SG having a positive one.   
Table (4.4) 
Corporate investment efficiency and voluntary disclosure 
Variables 
 
 Model 1 Predicted sign 
Constant Coefficient 3.382 NA 
t-value 36.48 
Sig. 0.000 
err Coefficient -0.013 Positive 
t-value -0.290 
Sig. 0.772 
FS Coefficient 0.499 Positive 
t-value 10.182 
Sig. 0.000 
LEV Coefficient 0.017 Positive 
t-value 0.357 
Sig. 0.721 
PROF Coefficient 0.079 Positive 
t-value 1.761 
Sig. 0.079 
LIQ Coefficient -0.014 Positive/Negative 
t-value -0.313 
Sig. 0.754 
SG Coefficient -0.044 Positive 
t-value -0.983 
Sig. 0.326 
AGE Coefficient 0.042 Positive 
t-value 0.919 
Sig. 0.359 
No. of observations 441 
R square 34.3% 
Adjusted R square 30.6% 
F 9.429 
ANOVA 0.000 
Variable definitions: see table (4.2) 
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Table (4.5) 
Corporate investment efficiency and voluntary disclosure 
 
Variables 
 
 Model 2 Predicted sign 
Constant Coefficient 3.314 NA 
t-value 36.001 
Sig. 0.000 
err2 Coefficient 0.126 Positive 
t-value 2.967 
Sig. 0.003 
FS Coefficient 0.518 Positive 
t-value 10.800 
Sig. 0.000 
LEV Coefficient 0.011 Positive 
t-value 0.228 
Sig. 0.820 
PROF Coefficient 0.060 Positive 
t-value 1.342 
Sig. 0.180 
LIQ Coefficient -0.003 Positive/Negative 
t-value -0.068 
Sig. 0.946 
SG Coefficient -0.028 Positive 
t-value -0.625 
Sig. 0.533 
AGE Coefficient 0.046 Positive 
t-value 1.022 
Sig. 0.307 
No. of observations 441 
R square 35.7% 
Adjusted R square 32.1% 
F 10.032 
ANOVA 0.000 
Variable definitions: see table (4.2) 
4.4.5 Considering DISTONE as the dependent variable 
 
The results obtained will determine whether corporate investment efficiency has an effect on 
disclosure tone in UK firms or not. This would be of advantage for firms to have knowledge 
about their over or under investments’ levels and so will try to eliminate it as they would 
have an unfavorable effect on their good or bad news disclosed. 
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4.4.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
In this part, the analysis results for the sample will be discussed in terms of mean, maximum, 
minimum and standard deviation. The variable used in this study as a dependent variable is 
disclosure tone. The independent variable is investment efficiency. And finally, the control 
variables are firm size, leverage, profitability, an indicator variable in case of a loss, growth, 
market-to-book ratio, a dummy variable for distributing dividends and firm age. 
 
Table (4.6) 
Descriptive Statistics for 2007-2014 
 
 Dependent 
variable 
Independent variable Control variables 
 DISTONE INVEFF1 
(err) 
INVEFF2 
(err2) 
FS LEV PROF LOSS SG MTB DIV AGE 
Mean 0.33 0.0002 -0.0005 3.198 0.203 0.064 0.077 7.24 1.66 0.93
6 
1.805 
Max 0.69 24.75 73.22 5.09 0.69 0.70 1.00 152.79 5.47 1.00 2.47 
Min -0.12 -9.51 -54.24 1.84 0.00 -0.48 0.00 -45.16 0.55 0.00 0.00 
Std. Dev. 0.15 4.26 10.89 0.63 0.14 0.079 0.267 16.23 0.738 0.24 0.38 
Skewness 
Statistic 
-0.309 2.38 2.37 0.464 0.653 1.482 3.184 2.063 1.695 -
3.58
0 
-0.866 
DISTONE is disclosure tone measured as the net positive keywords divided by positive plus negative keywords for the 
performance commentary selected known as net_tone_performance; INVEFF is investment efficiency measured by the 
negative and positive residuals of the investment equation; FS is firm size measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; 
LEV is firm leverage measured as total liabilities divided by total assets; PROF is firm profitability measured by the return 
on assets ratio of a firm; LOSS is a dummy variable for reporting a net loss; SG is sales growth measured by the change 
which is sales from year to year; MTB is market-to-book ratio; DIV is a dummy variable for dividend payments;AGE is 
firm age measured as the natural logarithm of the number of years’ since their establishment. 
 
 
The results of the descriptive statistics shown in table (4.6) for the independent variable 
corporate investment efficiency (first and second models) indicate identical results as those 
of table (4.2) when the first proxy for voluntary disclosure was used. 
As for the dependent variable; disclosure tone (DISTONE) specified a mean of 0.328 which 
indicates that only 0.33% of the performance keywords actually reflect good news and are 
disclosed by firms of the sample, a maximum of 0.69, minimum of -0.12, standard deviation 
of 0.148 and skewness if -0.309 indicating that data are symmetric around the mean. 
Finally, the control variables showed the following results, Firm size (FS), financial leverage 
(LEV), profitability (PROF), growth (SG), and age (AGE) showed identical results as those 
of table (4.1). Firm loss (LOSS) shows a mean of 0.077, maximum of 1.00, minimum of 
0.00, a standard deviation of 0.267 and skewness of 3.184. Market-to-book ratio (MTB) 
reflects an average of 1.664, maximum of 5.47, minimum of 0.55, a standard deviation of 
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0.738 and skewness of 1.695. Dividends distribution (DIV) shows a mean of 0.936, 
maximum of 1.00, minimum of 0.00, a standard deviation of 0.245 and skewness of -3.580 
showing that the data are skewed to the left.  
 
4.4.5.2 Regression diagnostics 
 
The linear regression is applied using the OLS method. In order to justify the usage of OLS, 
the assumptions were tested and their results were assessed. These assumptions are checking 
for linearity, normality, homoscedasticity, multicollinearity, and autocorrelation (Cooke, 
1998). There are some regression model diagnostics performed in order to check the OLS 
linear regression assumptions. These models will be discussed in the following subsections. 
 
Checking linearity 
 
Figure (4.5) in the appendix reflects the independent and control variables plotted against the 
dependent variable DISTONE to check whether there is a trend or not. Results show that 
there is a typically constant relationship with a strong trend between the independent, 
dependent and control variables; which supports the findings in the regression model done. 
Checking normality 
Figures (4.6) and (4.7) in the appendix summarize all the methods used in this study for 
checking normality graphically for each of the regression models. 
Normality results showed that data were normally distributed in either the histogram or P-P 
Plot. 
 
Checking homoscedasticity of residuals 
The residuals are plotted graphically versus predicted values and then residuals are checked 
if they are getting more spread-out or not. Results of testing the model as shown in figure 
(4.8) in the appendix indicated homoscedasticity (no hetroscedasticity is present). 
Checking for multicollinearity 
Table (4.3) in the appendix shows the VIF and tolerance. The tests showed no 
multicollinearity indicating that none of the independent variables do depend on each other. 
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Checking for autocorrelation 
DW was calculated for the regression models and the result shown in table (4.4) in the 
appendix is around 1.5, consequently, no autocorrelation was found in the sample. Field 
(2013) indicated that as a conventional rule of thumb, only values less than 1 or greater than 
3 are a cause for main concern, so both models’ DW values are within the safe sides.  
4.4.5.3 Pearson’s correlation analysis 
 
Table (4.7) shows the direction and strengths of the relationships between all variables with 
one another. 
 
Table (4.7) 
Pearson’s Correlation Matrix for (2007-2014) 
 
 FS LEV PROF LOSS SG MTB DIV AGE err err2 DISTONE 
FS  1 0.291** -0.052 -0.019 -0.028 -0.181** -0.118** 0.110* 0.050 -0.116** -0.046 
            
LEV   1 -0.140** 0.043 -0.008 -0.182** 0.011 0.063 0.209** 0.030 -0.085 
            
PROF    1 -0.455** 0.129** 0.451** 0.122** 0.070 0.068 0.131** 0.167** 
            
LOSS     1 -0.109* -0.178** -0.126** -0.083 -0.053 0.018 -0.192** 
            
SG      1 0.101* 0.090* 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.151** 
            
MTB       1 0.125
** -0.034 0.046 0.170** 0.217** 
            
DIV        1 0.057 0.017 -0.033 0.050 
            
AGE         1 0.041 -0.098* 0.002 
             
err          1 0.388** -0.080 
            
err2           1 -0.060 
            
DISTONE            1 
  ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
  * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Variable definitions: see table (4.6) 
The correlation matrix in Table (4.7) shows that both models of investment efficiency (err 
and err2) have an insignificant negative relationship with disclosure tone. Considering the 
control variables; PROF, SG, and MTB show a positive significant relationship with 
TONEDIS, having a 99% confidence levels. Also, LOSS has a significant but negative 
relationship with TONEDIS with a confidence level of 99%. The remaining control variables 
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FS, DIV, LEV, and AGE have an insignificant relationship, as FS and LEV have a negative 
relation while DIV and AGE has a positive one. 
4.4.5.4 Regression analysis 
 
The relationship between corporate investment efficiency and disclosure tone in terms of 
regression results is presented and discussed in this section. 
The following tables (4.8) and (4.9) present the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression used in testing the relationship between investment efficiency, disclosure tone, 
and control variables. 
In this analysis, all of the independent variables (INVEFF, FS, LEV, PROF, LOSS, SG, 
MTB, DIV, and AGE) have been regressed against the dependent variable (DISTONE). The 
ANOVA test showed that both models are significant. The analysis indicates a value of R 
square for models 1 and 2 of 28.6% and 28.3% respectively. These percentages imply that 
28.6% and 28.3% of the variations of DISTONE are determined by INVEFF, FS, LEV, 
PROF, LOSS, SG, MTB, DIV, and AGE. The remaining 71.4% and 71.7% of variations are 
attributed to other variables.  
Results show that INVEFF for model 1 (err “Chen et al. (2011)”) has a significant 
relationship with DISTONE while model 2 (err2 “Biddle et al. (2009)”) has an insignificant 
one. The results obtained support Chen et al. (2017) results for over-investment as they find a 
negative association between INVEFF and transparency. Therefore, H2b will be accepted. 
When firms are having investment inefficiencies through over or underinvesting, they would 
try to cover these inefficiencies through disclosing more good news. Managers would never 
give a negative impression about the firm by disclosing the true investment decisions or 
activities (Aerts, 2005; Merkl-Davies et al., 2011; Leung et al., 2015). On the opposite, if 
managers are undertaking efficient investment opportunities, they would not be eager to 
disclose such kind of information. As according to the proprietary costs theory, firms must be 
aware of the costs of information dissemination if disclosing too much information which 
could result in the damage of their competitive advantage (Verrecchia, 1983; McKinnon, 
1984). 
Considering the control variables, SG and MTB show a positive significant relation with 
DISTONE with confidence levels of 99% for SG while 90% and 95% for MTB in the two 
models respectively. LOSS and AGE have a negative significant association with DISTONE 
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with 90% and 95% as well. On the contrary, FS, LEV, PROF and DIV have an insignificant 
relationship with DISTONE. 
 
Table (4.8) 
Corporate investment efficiency and disclosure tone 
 
Variables 
 
 Model 1 Predicted sign 
 
Constant 
Coefficient 0.293 NA 
t-value 4.958 
Sig. 0.000 
 
err 
Coefficient -0.090 Positive 
t-value -1.885 
Sig. 0.060 
 
FS 
Coefficient -0.044 Positive 
t-value -0.851 
Sig. 0.395 
 
LEV 
Coefficient 0.060 Positive 
t-value 1.184 
Sig. 0.237 
 
PROF 
Coefficient 0.075 Positive 
t-value 1.026 
Sig. 0.306 
 
LOSS 
Coefficient -0.099 Positive/Negative 
t-value -1.930 
Sig. 0.054 
 
SG 
Coefficient 0.136 Positive 
t-value 2.920 
Sig. 0.004 
 
MTB 
Coefficient 0.123 Positive 
t-value 1.930 
Sig. 0.054 
 
DIV 
Coefficient 0.034 Positive/Negative 
t-value 0.755 
Sig. 0.451 
 
AGE 
Coefficient -0.097 Positive 
t-value -2.103 
Sig. 0.036 
No. of observations 428 
R square 28.6% 
Adjusted R square 24.3% 
F 6.727 
ANOVA 0.000 
Variable definitions: see table (4.6) 
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Table (4.9) 
Corporate investment efficiency and disclosure tone 
 
Variables 
 
 Model 2 Predicted sign 
 
Constant 
Coefficient 0.290 NA 
t-value 4.916 
Sig. 0.000 
 
err2 
Coefficient -0.070 Positive 
t-value -1.527 
Sig. 0.128 
 
FS 
Coefficient -0.035 Positive 
t-value -0.676 
Sig. 0.499 
 
LEV 
Coefficient 0.049 Positive 
t-value 0.989 
Sig. 0.323 
 
PROF 
Coefficient 0.066 Positive 
t-value 0.907 
Sig. 0.365 
 
LOSS 
Coefficient -0.098 Positive/Negative 
t-value -1.896 
Sig. 0.059 
 
SG 
Coefficient 0.133 Positive 
t-value 2.851 
Sig. 0.005 
 
MTB 
Coefficient 0.135 Positive 
t-value 2.096 
Sig. 0.037 
 
DIV 
Coefficient 0.034 Positive/Negative 
t-value 0.738 
Sig. 0.461 
 
AGE 
Coefficient -0.102 Positive 
t-value -2.191 
Sig. 0.029 
No. of observations 428 
R square 28.3% 
Adjusted R square 24.1% 
F 6.656 
ANOVA 0.000 
Variable definitions: see table (4.6) 
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4.5  Summary 
 
In summary, this study’s aim was to test the effect of corporate investment efficiency on 
voluntary disclosure. The sample was selected from FTSE all share index for the period from 
2007 until 2014. According to the results obtained, investment efficiency does affect 
voluntary disclosure (first measurement) positively for the second model only (Biddle et al., 
2009). Consistent with the signaling theory, an increased level of transparency when firms 
invest efficiently would act as a positive signal to stakeholders, and thereof improves 
managers’ image, firms’ reputation and the ability to raise equity when needing. Vice versa 
in a situation of over or under investment, the non-disclosure of such information would 
protect managers from being replaced or a decline that might happen on the share price. On 
the other side, the inefficiency of investments would not be of good news to be shared with a 
firm’s stakeholders. Firms will not prefer to disclose such information which would have an 
adverse effect on all parties. These results are not consistent with that of Chen et al. (2017) 
which found a negative effect of investment transparency on voluntary disclosure. As for the 
disclosure tone (second measurement of voluntary disclosure), the first model (Chen et al., 
2011) shows a negative effect of investment efficiency on it. This negative association was 
explained by the proprietary costs theory as when a firm’s investment efficiency rise, 
managers become aware that disclosing more information would harm their firms’ 
competitive advantage. 
The study’s limitations lie in the sample timing and voluntary disclosure measurement. The 
sample timing is from 2007 until 2014, it was better to extend it to more recent years to have 
a clearer picture for firms’ performance. The voluntary disclosure measurement considered 
only the performance commentary scores not the overall disclosure score. A justification was 
provided for both limitations; data availability was the reason for limiting the sample timing 
by 2014 as these are the only provided data by the CFIE. Also, choosing the performance 
commentary was due to the need of being precise and explores the commentary which most 
reflects a company’s investment efficiency performance instead of analysing an aggregate 
one.  
There is more than one opportunity for extending this research in the future; a comparative 
study including more than one country would be beneficial, as well as employing other 
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investment efficiency and managerial ability proxies to study their effect on voluntary 
disclosure.  
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Appendix (B) 
Regression diagnostics “Volunatry disclosure” 
Linearity figures 
Figure (4.1) 
Checking Linearity of VOLDIS vs. Independent Variables 
VOLDIS vs. INVEFF1 
 
VOLDIS vs. INVEFF2 
 
VOLDIS vs. FS 
 
VOLDIS vs. LEV 
 
VOLDIS vs. PROF 
 
 
VOLDIS vs. LIQ 
 
VOLDIS vs. SG VOLDIS vs. CAPTA 
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VOLDIS vs. AGE 
 
Variable definitions: see table (4.2) 
Normality figures 
Checking normality 
Figure (4.2) and figure (4.3) 
Figure (4.2) 
Model 1 
 
Figure (4.3) 
Model 1 
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Model 2 
 
Model 2 
 
 
Homoscedasticity figures 
Figure (4.4) 
Checking Homoscedasticity of both models 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Multicollinearity table 
Table (4.1) 
Checking Multicollinearity (VOLDIS and independent variables) 
 Model 1 (err) Model 2 (err2) 
Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
INVEFF 0.088 11.307 0.772 1.295 
FS 0.684 1.463 0.699 1.430 
LEV 0.639 1.564 0.660 1.514 
PROF 0.882 1.133 0.875 1.143 
LIQ 0.811 1.233 0.806 1.241 
SG 0.764 1.309 0.833 1.201 
CAPTA 0.086 11.696 0.745 1.342 
AGE 0.803 1.246 0.806 1.240 
Variable definitions: see table (4.2) 
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Autocorrelation table 
Table (4.2) 
Checking Autocorrelation 
Model DW 
 1 (err) 1.512 
2 (err2) 1.496 
 
Regression diagnostics “Disclosure tone” 
Linearity figures 
Figure (4.5) 
Checking Linearity of DISTONE vs. Independent Variables 
DISTONE vs. INVEFF1 
 
DISTONE vs. INVEFF2 
 
DISTONE vs. FS 
 
DISTONE vs. LEV 
 
DISTONE vs. PROF 
 
DISTONE vs. LOSS 
 
DISTONE vs. SG DISTONE vs. MTB 
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DISTONE vs. DIV 
 
DISTONE vs. AGE 
 
Variable definitions: see table (4.8) 
Normality figures 
Checking normality 
Figure (4.6) and figure (4.7) 
Figure (4.6) 
Model 1 
 
Figure (4.7) 
Model 1 
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Model 2 
 
Model 2 
 
 
Homoscedasticity figures 
Figure (4.8) 
Checking Homoscedasticity of both models 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
 
Multicollinearity table 
Table (4.3) 
Checking Multicollinearity (DISTONE and independent variables) 
 Model 1 (err) Model 2 (err2) 
Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
INVEFF 0.846 1.182 0.849 1.177 
FS 0.678 1.476 0.675 1.481 
LEV 0.705 1.419 0.722 1.385 
PROF 0.593 1.685 0.594 1.684 
LOSS 0.769 1.301 0.764 1.309 
SG 0.819 1.220 0.820 1.219 
MTB 0.623 1.604 0.619 1.615 
DIV 0.890 1.124 0.886 1.129 
AGE 0.843 1.186 0.837 1.195 
Variable definitions: see table (4.8) 
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Autocorrelation table 
Table (4.4) 
Checking Autocorrelation 
Model DW 
 1 (err) 1.452 
2 (err2) 1.462 
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Appendix (C) 
Table (A) 
Managerial ability and investment efficiency 
 
Study’s title Authors/Year Contributions Gaps 
What’s My 
Style? The 
Influence of 
Top 
Managers on 
Voluntary 
Corporate 
Financial 
Disclosure 
Bamber, L., Jiang, 
J. and Wang, I. 
(2010) 
A) Personal style plays a significant 
incremental role in explaining 
differences in voluntary corporate 
financial disclosure. 
B) Better understanding of the 
choices managers make once they 
decide to issue earnings forecasts. 
C) When, why and how 
characteristics of managers’ 
personal backgrounds likely 
affect their idiosyncratic 
disclosure styles. 
D) Individual managers’ 
idiosyncratic styles play a more 
important incremental role in 
explaining detailed characteristics 
of the forecasts. 
A) Studying managers’ ability 
and managerial efficiency 
effect on voluntary 
disclosure should be 
considered, not only the 
managers’ individual 
demographic 
characteristics. 
CEO Ability 
and 
Management 
Earnings 
Forecasts 
Baik, B., Faber, D. 
and Lee, S. (2011) 
A) Examining management 
incentives for issuing forecasts by 
showing that the CEO-specific 
characteristic of ability is crucial 
for determining the likelihood and 
frequency of issuing a forecast. 
B) Providing evidence that CEO 
ability is related to firms’ policies 
including investing and financing 
decisions and executive 
compensation. 
C) CEO ability helps to explain 
cross-sectional variation in the 
voluntary issuance of earnings 
forecasts. 
D) The market is more responsive to 
the news in management earnings 
forecasts when CEOs are of high 
ability than to the news in 
forecasts associated with low-
ability CEOs. 
A) There is a possibility that 
the proxies used do not 
capture the CEO ability, 
therefore different proxies 
should be developed. 
B) The sample needs to be 
more diversified by not 
only concentrating on large 
firms. 
 
 
Managerial 
Ability and 
Earnings 
Quality 
Demerjian, P., Lev, 
B., Lewis, M. and 
McVay, S. (2013) 
A) Establishing a positive and 
significant relation between 
managerial ability and earnings 
quality. 
B) Proving that more reputable 
managers are associated with 
lower accruals quality. 
C) Offering a modification of the 
A) The association between 
managerial ability and 
earnings management is not 
investigated. 
B) The inter-relations between 
ability and governance or 
internal control quality 
were not detected as they 
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Dechow and Dichev accruals 
quality measure that more 
effectively partitions accruals 
quality from firms underlying 
earnings processes. 
are considered 
infrastructure choices that 
have been shown to 
improve earnings quality. 
Managerial 
Ability and 
the Quality 
of Firms’ 
Information 
Environment 
Baik, B., Brockman, 
P., Farber, D. and 
Lee, S. (2017) 
A) Addressing the impact of 
managerial ability on firms’ 
broader information environment 
rather than only specific 
disclosure channels. 
B) Providing evidence about the 
relation between managerial 
ability and financial reporting 
quality considering it as an 
important aspect of firms’ broader 
information environment.  
C) Finding that higher managerial 
ownership that is coupled with 
higher ability managers can 
improve information 
environments. 
D) Demonstrating that managerial 
ability helps in explaining cross-
sectional variation in firms’ 
information environment quality.  
E) Expressing the role of managerial 
ability as an economic factor 
affecting firms’ outcomes. 
A) Still an all-encompassing 
proxy for managerial ability 
is needed since it is not 
readily observable. 
B) The sample needs to be 
more diversified by not 
only considering large 
firms. 
 
 
 
Managerial 
ability, 
investment 
efficiency 
and stock 
price crash 
risk 
Habib, A. and 
Hasan, M. (2017) 
A) Enriching the managerial ability 
literature through documenting 
the association between 
managerial ability and investment 
efficiency. 
B) Extending the literature on 
investment efficiency 
determinants by incorporating 
managerial ability as a human 
side into the equation. 
C) Documenting an association 
between investment efficiency 
and crash risk conditional on 
managerial ability. 
A) Examining the two-way 
relationship between 
managerial ability and 
investment efficiency. 
Evidence on 
the relation 
between 
managerial 
ability and 
financial 
reporting 
timeliness 
Abernathy, J., 
Kubick, T. and 
Masli, A. (2018) 
A) Documenting a positive and 
significant association between 
managerial ability and financial 
reporting timeliness in addition to 
firm and audit specific 
characteristics. 
B) Showing that managerial ability 
matters in the timeliness of 
financial reporting, an important 
feature of decision usefulness. 
A) Using only one single 
proxy for managerial 
ability. 
B) Not considering financial 
reporting quality as a whole 
and only concentrating on 
financial reporting 
timeliness. 
Managerial Lee, C., Wang, C., A) Explaining the effect of A) Applying the study on more 
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ability and 
corporate 
investment 
opportunity 
Chiu, W. and Tien, 
T. (2018) 
managerial ability on investment 
opportunity. 
B) Indentifying which kind of firms 
gain more economic benefits 
when employing extraordinary 
managers. 
C) Adopting a new proxy for 
investment opportunity named 
“Total q”. 
D) Deriving various economic 
implications for board of 
directors, investors and policy 
makers. 
than one country would be 
efficient for comparison 
purposes. 
Managerial 
Ability, 
Financial 
Distress, and 
Audit Fees 
Gul, F.,  
Khedmati, M., 
Lim, E. and 
Navissi, F. (2018) 
A) Higher managerial ability 
determines the pricing of audit 
services which is dependent on 
financial distress. 
B)  The results provide a better 
understanding of the incentives 
that encourage high-ability 
managers to act opportunistically. 
C) Offer additional evidence about 
the managerial ability as being a 
critical factor in audit and fraud 
assessments. 
A) The application of tests 
which could terminate 
possible endogeneity and 
financial distress 
measurement errors. 
B) The capturing and testing 
of opportunistic behavior 
directly. 
C) Needing to apply a 
managerial ability 
measurement that focuses 
on the role of CFOs and 
their delegates rather than 
the entire team. 
D) Investigating the impacts of 
high-ability managers’ 
opportunistic behaviors on 
future performance and 
shareholders’ wealth while 
taking corporate 
governance into 
consideration. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Corporate Investment Efficiency Effect on Voluntary Disclosure: 
Does Governance Matter? 
5.1 Introduction 
 
A perfect investment takes place when firms only undertake positive NPV projects and return 
surplus cash to shareholders. Due to information asymmetries occurrence, this concept 
vanished and was replaced by over or under investment (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Biddle 
et al., 2009; Garcia-Lara et al., 2016). 
These deviations from optimal investment levels must be analysed and considered. Deviating 
by over or under investing affect firms’ value and thereof raises a question mark concerning 
the objective of shareholders’ wealth maximisation. One of the ways of answering these 
question marks is through voluntarily disclosing information which explains whether the firm 
achieves its objectives or not. 
Voluntary disclosure, when boards of directors determine the extent of information provided 
voluntarily since this level of information exceeds what is required by law (Meek et al., 
1995; Core, 2001; FASB, 2001; Chung et al., 2015). Disclosure may aid managers in 
influencing their firm’s stock price (Healy et al., 1999), enhances their reputation and 
credibility (Kirk and Vincent, 2014), avoids arising litigations due to non-disclosure (Field et 
al., 2005) and builds up communication bases with shareholders (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; 
Bourveau and Schoenfeld, 2017; Chapman and Green, 2018). This explains why voluntary 
disclosure is crucial. 
In the last chapter, the impact of corporate investment efficiency on voluntary disclosure was 
studied controlling for only firm characteristics. So the aim of this chapter is to study the 
impact of introducing corporate governance to the previous chapter’s models. Continuing 
what was started and the major contribution of this chapter is to introduce corporate 
governance into the research framework. There are a number of reasons for adding corporate 
governance into the models. First, as recognized from prior literature, corporate governance 
is a common determinant for both corporate investment efficiency (Billett et al., 2011; Chen 
et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2017) and voluntary disclosure (Xiao et al., 2004; Samaha et al., 
2015; Habbash et al., 2016). Second, due to considering investment efficiency as the 
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independent variable and voluntary disclosure as the dependent one, the joint effect of both 
corporate governance and investment efficiency must be considered. Third, both corporate 
governance and investment efficiency are considered two indicators of corporate 
performance. Fourth, as indicated by Hussainey and Walker (2009), there are several 
scenarios to study this joint effect which opens new insights and analysis for the results 
obtained.   
The following sections are arranged as follows: section two discusses the theoretical 
background for the relationship between corporate governance, voluntary disclosure and 
disclosure tone in specific as well as discussing the joint effect of investment efficiency and 
corporate governance on voluntary disclosure. Section three investigates the research 
methodology, data collection, and sample selection. Section four analyses the results and 
reveals whether the hypothesis tested was accepted or rejected. Section five sums up and 
provides a conclusion for the overall study. 
 
5.2 Literature review 
 
This section discusses the relationship between corporate governance and voluntary 
disclosure and how the first affects the second. Also, the association between corporate 
governance and disclosure tone is examined as the tone of disclosure is considered as the 
second measurement for voluntary disclosure. Then, the combined joint effect of investment 
efficiency and corporate governance on voluntary disclosure is investigated with the possible 
scenarios and hypothesis development according to these scenarios. 
5.2.1 Relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure 
 
According to previous studies, determinants of voluntary disclosure are various. Corporate 
characteristics (Watson et al., 2002; Wang and Hussainey, 2013; Chen et al., 2017) and 
corporate governance (CG) attributes (Abdel-Fattah, 2008) do affect a company’s voluntary 
disclosure practices. Most of the corporate characteristics were used as control variables for 
the study and will be explained in the next section.  
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5.2.1.1 Board characteristics 
 
Board size Large boards have great expertise and influential powers which potentially boost 
a board’s supervisory capacity and so contribute in promoting corporate transparency and 
disclosure (Abeysekera, 2010; Hidalgo et al., 2011; Samaha et al., 2015). Opposing the 
views mentioned, Herman (1981) and Lorenzo and Sanchez (2010) suggest that large boards 
are ineffective and difficult when arranging meetings and making decisions. Thus, 
monitoring capability becomes less and disclosure of voluntary information. 
Dual role When the CEO is the chairman of the board, lines of authority are clear and a 
unified leadership structure exists leading to a reduction in information sharing costs, 
conflicts of interests and improving decision making (Anderson and Anthony, 1986; Rhoades 
et al., 2001). Consequently, CEO duality may lead to a higher voluntary disclosure (Samaha 
et al., 2015). Duality does not always win, as it may limit the entire transfer of information 
between the CEO and board members resulting in lower disclosure (Kim et al., 2008; Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2002). Also, Foker (1992) as well as Collier and Gregory (1999) state that the 
independent chairmen disclose adverse information to outsiders as they act as an independent 
monitor on the CEO. CEO duality is a dummy variable, where one indicates that the CEO is 
also the chairman and zero if different people occupy the two positions (Gul and Leung, 
2004; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006).  
Family members’ presence In order to legitimize, distinguish and promote their investment 
opportunities, family companies are motivated to disclose more information (Ali et al., 2007; 
Chen et al., 2008). Moreover, improving family images, creating prestige and social position 
is the main reason why families on boards do disclose more (Ghazwy, 2010). On the other 
side, controlling family members on boards might need less disclosure due to having direct 
access to the firm’s non-financial and financial information, as well as the existence of lower 
conflicts of interest (Wallace and Naser, 1995; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Ho and Wong, 2001a). 
Board composition The existence of independent non-executive directors as a ratio from the 
total number of directors on boards induces the issuance of constant earnings forecasts, 
reduces financial statement fraud and improves corporate reporting policies (Ajinkya et al., 
2005; Lim et al., 2007; García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010). In addition, acting as 
professional monitors, outside directors are respected and trusted by the public and so 
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disclosing more information voluntarily (Pincus et al., 1989; Beasley, 1996; Patelli and 
Prencipe, 2007; Samaha et al., 2012). On the other hand, dominating non-executive directors 
may have a negative impact when lacking business knowledge, lacking independence, 
monitoring excessively or being appointed by leading shareholders (Patton and Baker, 1987; 
Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Abdelsalam and Street, 2007; Samaha et al., 2015). 
Foreigners’ existence on boards The involvement of foreign members on boards gives an 
indication that a firm is willing to expand and compete globally through showing higher 
levels of disclosure and transparency (Maisonrouge, 1983; Sullivan, 1994; Claessens and 
Laeven, 2004). Also, foreign directors would use their power and voting rights to educate 
themselves about their host country’s economic environment by demanding more 
transparency (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Adam and Ferreira, 2007; Sartawi et al., 2014). 
Foreigners on boards could be accounted for as a dummy variable or as a ratio from the total 
number of directors on boards (Abdel-Fattah, 2008; Ferchichi and Skanji, 2017). 
5.2.1.2 Ownership structure 
 
Managerial ownership Bourveau and Schoenfeld (2017) argue that disclosure allows 
managers to communicate with shareholders and influence stock prices by signaling to the 
market their reputation and credibility. Agency costs and problems could be reduced through 
the proportion of ordinary shares owned by top managers, as management’s ownership works 
on aligning shareholders and managers’ interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eng and Mak, 
2003; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007). Supported by the agency theory, Warfield et al. (1995) 
provide evidence that management’s shareholding and interests are positively related to 
voluntary disclosure. On the other hand, voluntary disclosure can act as an alternate for 
monitoring. So disclosing information voluntarily increases as managerial ownership 
decrease (Ruland et al., 1990 and Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). 
State ownership The percentage of equity ownership by the government is a powerful 
portion that has a positive impact on voluntary disclosure (Jiang and Habib, 2009; Ismail and 
El-Shaib, 2012; Juhmani, 2013). States protect the public interest and ensure firms’ 
compliance with governance principles, so they always demand more disclosure 
(Alhazaimeh et al., 2014; Habbash et al., 2016). In contrast, governments guaranteed returns 
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from funding to and monitoring of firms may discourage the disclosure of detailed 
information (Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006) 
Institutional ownership It is cost effective for institutional investors with high technical 
expertise to efficiently monitor managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Guan et al., 2007). The 
number of shares owned by institutional investors to the total number of issued shares is how 
institutional ownership is calculated (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Due to the large stake of 
ownership, institutional investors usually encourage their firms to disclose more information 
so that to make sure they are on the right track (El-Gazzar, 1998; Barako et al., 2006; Guan 
et al., 2007). 
 
Block-holder ownership Owning five percent or more provides substantial shareholders 
greater power and incentives to monitor management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007). Therefore, in order to reduce agency problems 
and conflicts, managers disclose more information in annual reports (Hossain et al., 1994; 
Chau and Gray, 2002; Noe, 2002). In contradictory, Mitchell et al. (1997) and Sengupta 
(2004) argue that block holders can be controlling to the extent of accessing private 
information and would prefer to retain it rather than being disclosed publicly in details. 
Therefore, a negative association between block holding and voluntary disclosure is 
estimated (Nagata and Nguyen, 2017). 
 
Foreign ownership Information asymmetry takes place due to space and language obstacles, 
therefore firms listed on international stock exchanges would voluntarily disclose more 
information (Cooke, 1989; Xiao et al., 2004; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007). The ownership 
percentage of foreign institutions in firms participating in international markets will force 
them to raise their disclosure levels due to worldwide competition faced (Tsamenyi et al., 
2007; Aggarwal et al., 2011; El-Diftar et al., 2017). 
 
Family ownership Ho and Wong (2001) and Chau and Gray (2010) state that family-owned 
firms have less transparency due to having access directly to financial or non financial 
information which lowers their disclosure needs. But also Ghazwy (2010) and Habbash et al. 
(2016) argue that family firms may disclose more information voluntarily to improve their 
image, build prestige or expand their social position.  
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5.2.1.3 Audit characteristics 
 
Auditor type Usually external independent audit firms wish to protect their reputation 
through demanding higher disclosure of voluntary information (Datar et al., 1991; Healy and 
Palepu, 2001; Xiao et al., 2004). In addition, clients employing large (big four) audit firms 
are willing to increase their disclosure in terms of quality and quantity, since choosing such 
auditors gives a sign about the firm’s value (Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Wang et al., 2008; Habbash 
et al., 2016). As a binary variable, the auditor type takes the value of one if it is a big four 
audit firm and zero if not. 
Audit committee Exercising their role as monitoring mechanisms, audit committees who 
assist the board of directors in controlling managers’ actions and the kind of information 
passed to the shareholders should guarantee an increased disclosure level (Pincus et al., 
1989; Mangena and Pike, 2005; Khlif and Samaha, 2014). A precise evaluation for 
managers’ decisions and behaviors happens through more relevant and reliable financial 
reporting, and so protecting shareholders’ interests and reducing agency costs (McMullen, 
1999; Laksmana, 2008; Samaha and Dahawy, 2010). 
Auditor specialization Being specialized in the client’s industry will aid external auditors in 
determining the exact extent of voluntary disclosure required and will boost disclosure 
quality and transparency provided to shareholders (Peters et al., 2001 and Habbash et al., 
2016). The market-share approach (Minutti-Meza, 2013) or is a dummy variable equal to one 
if the auditor is specialized and zero otherwise (Elfeky and Nasiri, 2017) are two possible 
proxies for auditor’s specialization. 
Due to the mentioned impact of corporate governance on voluntary disclosure, the effect of 
corporate governance on investment efficiency (Billett et al., 2011; Chen and Chen, 2012; 
Chen et al., 2017) and the study’s analysis of the effect of investment efficiency on voluntary 
disclosure, the combined effect of investment efficiency and corporate governance on 
voluntary disclosure must be explored.  
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5.2.2 Relationship between corporate governance and disclosure tone 
 
According to previous studies, the corporate governance attributes determining disclosure 
tone are diverse. Board characteristics (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Martikainen et al., 2016), 
ownership structure (Carlsson and Sörenson, 2015) and audit characteristics (Rickett et al., 
2016) do affect disclosure tone the most as expressed in details in this section. 
 
5.2.2.1 Board characteristics 
 
Board member age Older managers are more risk averse (Vroom and Pahl, 1971), 
conservative and less tolerant of uncertainty (Jost et al., 2003), as well as being more 
experienced than younger managers (Menkhoff et al., 2006) which all result in more 
moderate tone (less positive and less negative). However, Roberts et al. (2006) and Chevalier 
and Ellison (2002) argue that as managers age, their intellectual curiosity, information 
processing ability and motivation decline and so there is uncertainty that aging affects 
disclosure tone. 
 
Board member uniformity as females became part of board members, the boards’ uniformity 
declined (Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994). Due to the cognitive and experiential differences 
between men and women, boards’ decisions and annual report tone are affected by this 
diversity (Spelke, 2005; Barber and Odean, 2001). For example, Lundeberg et al. (1994) find 
that men are more overconfident than women. Also, Prince (1993) states that under certain 
financial terms men tend to feel more competent than women. On the other hand, uniformity 
may not affect tone, as females voice could be limited due to being young or less experienced 
than other board members (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Martikainen et al., 2016). 
 
Board members’ human capital Knowledge about the firm, managerial capability, and 
human capital are the key indicators for the competence of the board (Boyatzis et al., 2002). 
Disclosure tone could be positively affected by human capital for two major reasons. First, 
board members’ human capital like education, experience, understanding large complex 
information and intelligence can be a source of competitive advantage (Carpenter and 
Westphal, 2001; Dalziel et al., 2011; Khanna et al., 2014). Second, human capital is 
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associated with stronger writing skills manifesting in the form of richer language when 
writing or reviewing multiple drafts (Kaufman et al., 2009). Opposite to what was 
mentioned, significant human capital may lead to less tonal disclosure if directors try to 
protect trade secrets by making disclosures more opaque or weaker language which would 
result from over analysis (Martikainen et al., 2016). 
 
Board member turnover as board member tenure lasts, the richness of disclosure tone 
decline as board members become more committed to the status quo, and so when there is 
turnover and outsiders are introduced to the board, boilerplate disclosures and its tone boosts 
(Hambrick et al., 1993; Brown and Tucker, 2011).  On the other hand, new members may be 
unfamiliar with the firm and may not be trusted as old members, so they might not affect 
disclosure tone (Martikainen et al., 2016). 
5.2.2.2 Ownership structure 
 
Family ownership The characteristics of family firms differ from those of non-family firms 
due to the presence of interaction and integration between family life and business life. 
Although there was no relationship found between firms having a family member as a CEO 
and /or chairman of the board and disclosure tone, the results show that when a family 
member has either of these roles, he or she uses a less positive tone (Habbershon and 
Williams, 1999; Carlsson and Sörenson, 2015). 
5.2.2.3 Audit characteristics 
 
Big 4 audit firms Conservative financial reporting implies the timelier inclusion of bad 
economic news relative to good news (Basu, 1997), which can determine the disclosure tone. 
Due to high litigation risk faced by big N audit firms, they tend to have strong incentives to 
limit the usage of optimistic tone when bad news is present (Simunic and Stein, 1996; Basu 
et al., 2003). Consistent with prior opinions, Czerney et al. (2017) find those firms with big 
N audit firms have constrained disclosure tone as their footnote tone significantly reflects bad 
economic news.  
Auditor tenure Continuing with accounting conservatism as a reflection of disclosure tone, 
Li (2010) finds that as auditor-client relationship extends, large firms become more 
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conservative in their financial reporting (Jenkins and Velury, 2008), while vice versa happens 
with small firms. Contrary to the mentioned opinion, Rickett et al. (2016) find that 
conservatism declines as auditors’ tenure lengthen due to exerting less effort on audits of 
clients who they are familiar with. 
5.2.3 The joint effect of investment efficiency and corporate governance on voluntary 
disclosure 
 
According to the prior chapter’s findings, corporate investment efficiency was found to have 
an impact of voluntary disclosure, considering firm characteristics as control variables but 
without the inclusion of corporate governance. The introduction of corporate governance in 
this chapter took place since it does not only affect voluntary disclosure (Xiao et al., 2004; 
Samaha et al., 2015; Habbash et al., 2016) but also investment efficiency as well (Billett et 
al., 2011; Chen et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2017). Due to the mixed results of previous 
corporate governance attributes studies, an overall corporate governance index merging all 
these attributes together is used as a measurement like that of Beeks et al. (2016). 
And so, it is obvious that voluntary disclosure is affected by corporate governance and 
investment efficiency separately. Due to the existence of these factors equivalently and their 
influences on voluntary disclosure, studying their joint effect would be of major importance. 
According to Hussainey and Walker (2009), this joint effect may have diverse possible 
implications and scenarios other than only checking the single effect of each variable alone. 
These scenarios were constructed based on Hussainey and Walker (2009) study which 
conducted similar scenarios applied on voluntary disclosure and dividend propensity’s joint 
effect on prices leading earnings. There are four estimated scenarios and hypotheses 
developed concerning this joint effect.  
 
First scenario 
 
Investment efficiency and corporate governance both provide the same information. In this 
situation, the coefficient on INVEFF will be equal to the coefficient on CG. In addition, the 
coefficient on INVEFF*CG should be negative and equal in absolute value to the coefficients 
on INVEFF or CG. As a result, the total impact of both efficiency and governance should be 
calculated as shown in equation 1: 
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INVEFF + CG + INVEFF*CG = INVEFF or CG                (1) 
 
Second scenario 
 
Both types of communication provide unrelated information. In this case, the prediction is 
that the coefficient on INVEFF*CG should NOT be significantly different from zero. As a 
result, the total impact of both investment efficiency and corporate governance should be 
calculated as revealed by equation 2: 
 
INVEFF + CG – INVEFF*CG = INVEFF + CG       (2) 
 
Third scenario 
 
Types of communication offer related information which is ‘multiplicative or ‘reinforcing’. 
In this case, the coefficient on INVEFF*CG should be significantly greater than zero. In 
other words, the sum of the coefficients on INVEFF, CG, and INVEFF*CG should be 
significantly greater than the sum of the coefficients on INVEFF and CG. In this case, 
equation 3 expresses the inference is that both efficiency and governance are strictly 
complementary. 
 
INVEFF+CG+INVEFF*CG ≥ INVEFF+CG          (3) 
 
Fourth scenario 
 
Both types of communication provide related information, but some of the information is 
common to both, i.e. ‘partially additive’. Therefore, there is an estimation that the coefficient 
on INVEFF*CG should be significantly lesser than zero (negative). In other words, the sum 
of the coefficients on INVEFF, CG and INVEFF*CG should be significantly less than the 
sum of the coefficients on INVEFF and CG. In this case, equation 4 clarifies the assumption 
that efficiency and CG are partial substitutes. 
INVEFF+CG+INVEFF*CG < INVEFF+CG          (4) 
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Following Hussainey and Walker (2009), the issue of which of these four logical possibilities 
is true is considered as a purely empirical question and no prior theoretical predictions as to 
which of these findings is the most likely is offer. Based on these arguments, the researcher 
tests which of these four possibilities is present and sets the following hypothesis: 
 
The joint effect of corporate investment efficiency and corporate governance on voluntary 
disclosure is additive 
 
5.3 Research methodology 
 
In the earlier sections, both the theoretical and the empirical aspects of corporate investment 
efficiency, corporate governance, and voluntary disclosure were examined and in view of 
this, the hypotheses were formulated. As addressed in the literature review, the overall aim of 
this study is to develop an understanding of the joint effect of corporate investment efficiency 
and corporate governance on voluntary disclosure for all the available companies listed on 
the FTSE.  
The association tested in this research examines the relationship between corporate 
investment efficiency and corporate governance as independent variables and voluntary 
disclosure as the dependent variable. There are six control variables for voluntary disclosure 
first proxy are included in this research; firm size, financial leverage, firm profitability, firm 
liquidity, firm growth, and firm age. While eight control variables for voluntary disclosure 
second proxy are considered which are; firm size, financial leverage, firm profitability, firm 
loss, firm growth, market-to-book, dividends, and firm age. Biddle et al. (2009) and Chen et 
al. (2011) measurements of investment efficiency are the ones employed by this study. Data 
for the voluntary disclosure proxies are collected from the CFIE Wmatrix-import web which 
will be discussed in the following parts. The methodology section justifies the strategy and 
methods employed by this study, describes the sample, data type, and collection procedures. 
There is also an explanation for the study’s variables, how they were calculated and why they 
were chosen. 
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5.3.1 Research strategy 
 
The research aim and objectives show whether investment efficiency and governance has a 
considerable effect on voluntary disclosure for the sample of FTSE firms. The study’s 
research problem is determined according to these aims and objectives. The relationships 
between the study’s variables are tested through the stated hypotheses in the preceding 
sections. Applying quantitative research is the most suitable strategy when there are testable 
hypotheses. 
After that statistical tools and techniques are applied to test, these hypotheses use quantifiable 
data for the firm level variables of the research. Descriptive statistics, Pearson correlation, 
and linear regression analyses are conducted followed by regression diagnostics 
5.3.2 Data collection and sample selection 
 
The sample timing 2007-2014 was chosen to cover the start of the economic crisis and six 
years after. The sample timing ends by 2014 since Lancaster’s (CFIE) list of UK annual 
reports narrative disclosures scores only provide data until this date.  
Selecting the UK as the country to apply this study on takes place for various reasons. First, 
the nature of mandatory rules is minimal as disclosure in the UK is mostly of a voluntary 
one, and so litigation and regulatory costs are low compared to other countries such as US 
and Canada (La Porta et al., 2006; Aerts and Tarca, 2010). Second, there are substantial parts 
of UK’s annual report narratives which are not readily verifiable or auditable (Athanasakou 
and Hussainey, 2014). Third, UK annual reports have a considerable level of impression 
management concerning firms’ performance (Clatworthy and Jones, 2006). Fourth, UK firms 
adopt IFRS in preparing and disclosing their annual reports. Fifth, the UK firms’ annual 
reports are disclosed in English which is the world’s first language and so could be easily 
analysed and interpreted. 
There were 256 firms recognised between 2007 and 2014 filtered from the FTSE all-share 
index. Bloomberg was used to download investment efficiency, corporate governance and 
control variables data. Existing disclosure scores from the CFIE were reconciled with the 
available data collected from Bloomberg. 
The selected sample comprises 9 different industrial sectors organised according to 
Bloomberg database over the period 2007-2014, as shown in table (5.1). The industrials 
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sector represents the highest number of companies among other sectors of 33.77%, while the 
lowest numbers of companies are from the telecommunications sector forming only 2.66% of 
the total companies.  
 
Table (5.1) 
Sample Sector Classification 
Sector No. of companies in the 
Sector 
% 
Materials 14 9.27% 
Consumer staples 12 7.95% 
Energy 7 4.64% 
Consumer discretionary 37 24.5% 
Utilities 6 3.97% 
Industrials 51 33.77% 
Telecommunications 4 2.66% 
Healthcare 6 3.97% 
IT 14 9.27% 
Total 151 100% 
 
5.3.3 Methods of statistical analysis 
 
Descriptive statistics such as mean, maximum, minimum and standard deviation, Pearson’s 
coefficient of correlation, and the regression analysis are applied to test the hypothesis. To 
check the OLS assumptions, regression diagnostics are performed. 
The mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values for the variables are used as 
the summary of statistics. Then, Pearson’s correlation is conducted to explore the association 
between the independent and dependent variables. 
The direction and strength of the variables are demonstrated by the correlation. The extent of 
the linear relationship between two variables is determined through the correlation analysis, 
but not the causal relationship. To detect the causal impact of the association between the 
variables, regression analysis is performed revealing the direction, strength and causal effect 
altogether. 
5.3.4 Variables measurements 
 
The measurements used for every factor in this study are discussed in that section. The 
voluntary disclosure represents the dependent variable; investment efficiency and corporate 
governance are the independent ones, and then the control variables. The prior studies 
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determine the control variables selected for this study where voluntary disclosure and 
disclosure tone were studied as dependent factors. 
5.3.4.1 Dependant variable 
 
The voluntary disclosure is the dependent variable having two proxies discussed in this 
section, as well as an explanation for the reasons behind selecting them and the source they 
are obtained from. 
First proxy “Wordcountsum” 
For obtaining the disclosure scores, the study uses the CFIE Wmatrix-import web tool 
allowing for batch scoring of UK annual report narratives6. Unstructured annual reports are 
processed in an electronic format and word count frequencies are produced based on 
predetermined dictionaries by the Wmatrix (Pappas, 2015). Electronic versions of the UK 
reports are collected by the CFIE for the years from 2002 till 2014. Concerning this study, 
the sample timing starts by 2007 and ends in 2014, covering the economic crisis period. Also, 
this timing was selected to allow for uniformity across the other samples’ timings of my 
thesis. 
The performance commentaries are the sections considered of the UK annual reports. These 
commentaries were selected instead of the overall voluntary disclosure since they discuss 
aspects of operating activities and financial performance. The performance commentaries do 
reflect a firm’s investment efficiency or inefficiency practices than the overall voluntary 
disclosure since it is more broad and general, for example; it includes CSR reports, 
remuneration reports or governance statements. 
The measurement employed is the total number of words of a section “s” in an annual report 
known as wordcountsum. Thus, the disclosure scores obtained as data collected were the 
word count for the collective performance commentary recognized as 
wordcountsum_Perfom. The performance keywords as indicated by the Wmatrix are as 
follows: Sales, revenue, Revenues, turnover, Trading, cost, Costs, expense, Expenses, 
income, Earnings, profits, loss, Profitability, margin, Results, Losses, Profit, result, Margins, 
and e.p.s 
 
                                                             
6 The CFIE Wmatrix web import tool is available at https://cfie.lancaster.ac.uk:8443/.   
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Second proxy “Disclosure tone” 
For being more specific and narrowing the focus concerning the UK annual reports 
performance commentaries, disclosure tone was chosen as an indicator of a firm’s 
performance. The net positive keywords divided by positive plus negative keywords for the 
performance commentary were selected for the same time interval and from the same source 
of data known as net_tone_performance. Therefore, the dependent variable disclosure tone 
shows the percentage of good news relative to the sum of good and bad news merged 
together. Firms have fluctuations in their levels of investment efficiencies, and this variable 
is important to them. As such fluctuations’ impact is discussed in the form of being good or 
bad news about the firms not only on the voluntary disclosure level. 
The negativity keywords as expressed by the Wmatrix are as follows: 
abando#, abdica#, aberra#, abetti#, abnorm#, abolis#, abroga#, abrupt#, absenc#, absent#, 
abuse#, abusin#, abusiv#, accide#, accusa#, accuse#, accusi#, acquie#, acquit#, adulte#, 
advers#, afterm#, agains#, aggrav#, alerte#, alerti#, aliena#, allega#, allege#, allegi#, annoy#, 
annul#, anomal#, antico#, antitr#, argue#, argued#, arguin#, argume#, arrear#, arrest#, artifi#, 
assaul#, assert#, attrit#, averse#, backda#, bad#, bail#, bailou#, balk#, balked#, bankru#, 
bans#, barred#, barrie#, below#, bottle#, boycot#, breach#, break#, bribe#, bribin#, bridge#, 
broken#, burden#, burned#, calami#, cancel#, carele#, casual#, catast#, cautio#, cease#, 
ceasin#, censur#, challe#, charge#, circum#, claimi#, claims#, clawba#, closed#, closeo#, 
closin#, closur#, coerce#, coerci#, collap#, collis#, collud#, collus#, compla#, compli#, 
compul#, concea#, conced#, concer#, concil#, condem#, condon#, confes#, confin#, confis#, 
confli#, confro#, confus#, conspi#, constr#, contem#, conten#, contes#, contra#, contro#, 
convic#, correc#, corrup#, costly#, counte#, crime#, crimin#, crises#, crisis#, critic#, crucia#, 
culpab#, cumber#, curtai#, cut#, damage#, damagi#, dampen#, danger#, deadlo#, deadwe#, 
debarm#, debarr#, deceas#, deceit#, deceiv#, decept#, declin#, decrea#, deepen#, deeper#, 
deepes#, deface#, defama#, defame#, defami#, defaul#, defeat#, defect#, defend#, defens#, 
defer#, defici#, defrau#, defunc#, degrad#, delay#, delaye#, delayi#, delays#, delete#, 
delibe#, delinq#, delist#, demise#, demisi#, demoli#, demote#, demoti#, denial#, denied#, 
denies#, denigr#, deny#, deplet#, deprec#, depres#, depriv#, dereli#, deroga#, destab#, 
destro#, destru#, detain#, detent#, deter#, detrac#, detrim#, devalu#, devast#, deviat#, 
devolv#, diffic#, dimini#, diminu#, disadv#, disaff#, disagr#, disall#, disapp#, disass#, 
disast#, disavo#, discip#, discla#, disclo#, discon#, discou#, discre#, disfav#, disgor#, 
disgra#, dishon#, disinc#, disint#, disloy#, dismal#, dismis#, disord#, dispar#, displa#, 
dispos#, dispro#, disput#, disqua#, disreg#, disrep#, disrup#, dissat#, dissen#, dissid#, 
dissol#, distor#, distra#, distre#, distur#, divers#, divert#, divest#, divorc#, divulg#, doubt#, 
down#, drag#, drasti#, drawba#, drop #, droppe#, droppi#, drops #, drough#, duress#, 
dysfun#, easing#, egregi#, embarg#, embarr#, embezz#, encroa#, encumb#, endang#, 
enjoin#, erode#, eroded#, erodes#, erodin#, erosio#, errati#, erred#, erring#, errone#, error#, 
errors#, errs#, escala#, evade#, evaded#, evades#, evadin#, evasio#, evasiv#, evict#, exacer#, 
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exagge#, excess#, exculp#, exoner#, exploi#, expose#, exposi#, exprop#, expuls#, extenu#, 
fail#, fall #, fals#, fatal#, fault#, fear#, fell #, feloni#, felony#, fictit#, fined#, fines#, fired#, 
firing#, flaw#, forbid#, force#, forcin#, forecl#, forego#, forest#, forfei#, forger#, fraud#, 
frauds#, fraudu#, frivol#, frustr#, fugiti#, gratui#, grieva#, grossl#, ground#, guilty#, halt#, 
hamper#, harass#, hardsh#, harm#, harsh#, hazard#, hinder#, hindra#, hostil#, hurdle#, hurt#, 
hurtin#, idle#, idling#, ignore#, ignori#, illega#, illegi#, illici#, illiqu#, imbala#, immatu#, 
immora#, impair#, impass#, impede#, impedi#, impend#, impera#, imperf#, imperi#, 
imperm#, implic#, imposs#, impoun#, imprac#, impris#, improp#, imprud#, inabil#, inacce#, 
inaccu#, inacti#, inadeq#, inadve#, inadvi#, inappl#, inappr#, inatte#, incapa#, incarc#, 
incide#, incomp#, inconc#, incons#, inconv#, incorr#, indece#, indefe#, indict#, ineffe#, 
ineffi#, inelig#, inequi#, inevit#, inexpe#, inferi#, inflic#, infrac#, infrin#, inhibi#, inimic#, 
injunc#, injure#, injuri#, injury#, inordi#, inquir#, insecu#, insens#, insolv#, instab#, insubo#, 
insuff#, insurr#, intent#, interf#, interm#, interr#, intimi#, intrus#, invali#, invest#, involu#, 
irreco#, irregu#, irrepa#, irreve#, jeopar#, justif#, kickba#, knowin#, lack#, lag#, lapse#, 
lapsin#, late#, launde#, layoff#, least #, less #, lie#, limita#, linger#, liquid#, litiga#, lockou#, 
lose#, losing#, loss#, lost#, low #, lying#, malfea#, malfun#, malice#, malici#, malpra#, 
manipu#, markdo#, misapp#, misbra#, miscal#, mischi#, miscla#, miscon#, misdat#, 
misdem#, misdir#, mishan#, misinf#, misint#, misjud#, mislab#, mislea#, misled#, misman#, 
mismat#, mispla#, misrep#, miss#, mistak#, mistri#, misund#, misuse#, misusi#, monopo#, 
morato#, mothba#, negati#, neglec#, neglig#, nonatt#, noncom#, noncon#, nondis#, nonfun#, 
nonpay#, nonper#, nonpro#, nonrec#, nonren#, nuisan#, nullif#, object#, obscen#, obsole#, 
obstac#, obstru#, offenc#, offend#, omissi#, omit#, onerou#, opport#, oppose#, opposi#, 
outage#, outdat#, outmod#, overag#, overbu#, overca#, overch#, overco#, overdu#, overes#, 
overlo#, overpa#, overpr#, overru#, oversh#, overst#, oversu#, overtl#, overtu#, overva#, 
panic#, panics#, penali#, penalt#, peril#, perils#, perjur#, perpet#, persis#, pervas#, petty#, 
picket#, plaint#, plea#, pled#, poor#, poses#, posing#, postpo#, precip#, preclu#, predat#, 
prejud#, premat#, pressi#, pretri#, preven#, proble#, prolon#, prone#, prosec#, protes#, 
protra#, provok#, punish#, puniti#, purpor#, questi#, quit#, racket#, ration#, reasse#, reassi#, 
recall#, recess#, reckle#, redact#, redres#, refina#, refusa#, refuse#, refusi#, reject#, relinq#, 
reluct#, renego#, renoun#, repara#, reposs#, repudi#, resign#, restat#, restru#, retali#, retrib#, 
revoca#, revoke#, revoki#, ridicu#, risk #, sabota#, sacrif#, scanda#, scruti#, secrec#, seize#, 
seizin#, senten#, seriou#, setbac#, sever#, severe#, severi#, sharpl#, shocke#, shorta#, 
shortf#, shrink#, shrunk#, shut#, slande#, slippa#, slow#, sluggi#, slump #, smalle#, solven#, 
stagge#, stagna#, stands#, stolen#, stoppa#, stoppe#, stoppi#, stops#, strain#, stress#, string#, 
subjec#, subpoe#, substa#, sue#, suffer#, suing#, summon#, surren#, suscep#, suspec#, 
suspen#, suspic#, taint#, tamper#, tense#, termin#, testif#, threat#, tighte#, tolera#, tortuo#, 
traged#, tragic#, trauma#, troubl#, turbul#, turmoi#, unable#, unacce#, unacco#, unanno#, 
unanti#, unappr#, unattr#, unauth#, unavai#, unavoi#, unawar#, uncert#, uncoll#, uncomp#, 
uncons#, uncont#, uncorr#, uncove#, undeli#, under #, undesi#, undete#, undisc#, undocu#, 
undue#, unduly#, unecon#, unempl#, unethi#, unexcu#, unexpe#, unfair#, unfavo#, unfeas#, 
unfit#, unfore#, unfors#, unfort#, unfoun#, unfrie#, unfulf#, unfund#, uninsu#, uninte#, 
unjust#, unknow#, unlawf#, unlice#, unliqu#, unmark#, unmerc#, unnece#, unneed#, 
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unobta#, unoccu#, unpaid#, unperf#, unplan#, unpopu#, unpred#, unprod#, unprof#, unqual#, 
unreal#, unreas#, unreco#, unreim#, unreli#, unreme#, unrepo#, unreso#, unrest#, unsafe#, 
unsala#, unsale#, unsati#, unsavo#, unsche#, unsett#, unsold#, unsoun#, unstab#, unsubs#, 
unsucc#, unsuit#, unsure#, unsusp#, unsust#, untena#, untime#, untrut#, unusab#, unwant#, 
unwarr#, unwelc#, unwill#, upset#, urgenc#, urgent#, usurio#, usurp#, usurpe#, usurpi#, 
usurps#, usury#, vandal#, verdic#, vetoed#, victim#, violat#, violen#, vitiat#, voided#, 
voidin#, volati#, vulner#, warn#, warned#, warnin#, warns#, wasted#, wastef#, wastin#, 
weak#, willfu#, worr#, worse#, worsen#, worst #, worthl#, writed#, writeo#, wrong# 
 
The positivity keywords as shown by the Wmatrix are as follows: 
able#, above#, abunda#, acclai#, accomp#, achiev#, adequa#, advanc#, advant#, allian#, 
assure#, assuri#, attain#, attrac#, beat#, beauti#, benefi#, best#, better#, bolste#, boom#, 
boost#, breakt#, brilli#, certai#, charit#, collab#, compli#, conclu#, conduc#, confid#, 
constr#, courte#, creati#, defini#, deligh#, delive#, depend#, desira#, desire#, despit#, 
destin#, dilige#, distin#, dream#, easier#, easily#, easy#, effic#, empowe#, enable#, enabli#, 
encour#, enhanc#, enjoy#, enthus#, exceed#, excel#, except#, excit#, exclus#, exempl#, 
expand#, expans#, fantas#, favora#, favore#, favori#, friend#, gain#, good#, great#, grew#, 
grow#, happi#, high#, honor#, ideal#, impres#, improv#, increa#, incred#, influe#, inform#, 
ingenu#, innova#, insigh#, inspir#, integr#, invent#, larger#, larges#, leader#, leadin#, loyal#, 
lucrat#, merito#, more#, most#, opport#, optimi#, outper#, outsta#, perfec#, pleasa#, please#, 
pleasu#, plenti#, popula#, positi#, preemi#, premie#, presti#, proact#, profic#, profit#, 
progre#, prospe#, reboun#, recept#, record#, regain#, resolv#, revolu#, reward#, rise#, 
rising#, rose#, satisf#, smooth#, solid#, solves#, solvin#, specta#, stabil#, stable#, streng#, 
strong#, succee#, succes#, superi#, surpas#, transp#, tremen#, unmatc#, unpara#, unsurp#, 
upturn#, valuab#, versat#, vibran#, win#, worthy# 
5.3.4.2 Independent variables 
 
The independent variables of this study are divided into three categories. The first is the 
independent variable, corporate investment efficiency, at which the two most commonly used 
proxies are employed to measure it (Biddle et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2011). The second is the 
independent variable corporate governance (Billett et al., 2011; Alhazaimeh et al., 2014; 
Martikainen et al., 2016). Third, the control variables discussed later are based on prior 
studies (Barako et al., 2006; Lan et al., 2013; Ressas and Hussainey, 2014; Habbash et al., 
2016; Aly et al., 2018). 
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First proxy  
As a measurement for investment efficiency, Chen et al. (2011) consider it as deviations 
from anticipated investments using a model that forecasts investment as a function of growth 
opportunities. This proxy is consistent with Biddle et al. (2009). Primarily, Hubbard (1998) 
estimates a prudent model for expected investment as a function of sales growth, since the 
relation between investment and sales growth could differ between sales ups and downs, a 
linear regression model is applied to reflect a differential predictability for sales fluctuations: 
 
Investi,t =α0+ α1NEGi,t-1+ α2SalesGrowthi,t-1+ α3NEG*SalesGrowthi,t-1+εi,t         (1) 
 
Equation 1 expresses Investi,t is the total investment of firm i in year t, defined as the net 
increase in tangible and intangible assets and scaled by lagged total assets. SalesGrowthi,t-1 is 
the annual sales growth rate for firm i in year t-1 and NEGi,t-1is an indicator variable which 
takes the value of one for negative sales growth and a zero otherwise (Gomariz and Ballesta, 
2014). 
The absolute residuals’ value is multiplied by negative one to compute investment efficiency 
or inefficiency as either over or under investment is not a good indication of a firm’s 
efficiency of investment level. When firms are making investments at a higher rate than 
expected according to the sales growth, this is shown by a positive residual. On the contrary, 
an underinvestment is reflected by a negative residual when real investment is less than 
expected. 
 
Second proxy 
The proxy proposed by Richardson (2006) and Biddle et al. (2009) is the most widely used 
one for calculating investment efficiency. A firm’s total investment for a given year is shown 
in equation 2, known by Investment (I), is measured as the sum of R&D, capital 
expenditures, and acquisition expenditures minus the cash receipts from the sales of PP&E 
multiplied by 100 and scaled by average total assets: 
It = RDt + CAPEXt + Acquisitionst – SalePPEt                    (2) 
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This proxy considers diverse investment items by including capital expenditures, 
acquisitions, sales of assets and R&D and so it is obviously differentiated from other proxies. 
These components were discussed and studied individually in prior researches; thereof 
incorporating these investment types is of significant importance nowadays.  
Over or underinvestment is determined by the residuals in the error term which are used as 
measurements for investment inefficiencies. Investment inefficiency takes values between 
zero and one, where underinvestment is represented by values of zero or values close to zero, 
whereas overinvestment is specified by values of one or close to one (Biddle et al., 2009).  
 
Corporate governance 
 
The corporate governance attributes are measured through a CG index (Environmental, social 
and governance (ESG) index) including all of them merged together, downloaded from 
Bloomberg. This measurement was selected due to various reasons. First, each of the 
corporate governance attributes including ownership structure, board of directors and audit 
characteristics discussed in section (5.2) provide mixed results concerning their relation with 
voluntary disclosure and disclosure tone. Second, the ESG index is depended upon and 
trusted by investors, analysts and corporate disclosures. Third, this index is collected from 
the firms’ disclosures and from the firms directly if needed. Fourth, the ESG index measures 
the quality of information disclosed by firms concerning their corporate governance, 
environment and social responsibility.  
 
Voluntary disclosure control variables (first proxy “Wordcountsum”) 
 
Frim size, leverage, profitability, liquidity, growth and age are considered the basic firm 
characteristics used as control variables according to prior literature.  
The firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of assets (Cooke, 1989a; Hassan et al., 
2006; Al-Hadi et al., 2016; Mohamed and Schwienbacher, 2016). Firm’s leverage is 
measured through the book value of debt to total assets ratio (Eng and Mak, 2003; Allegrini 
and Greco, 2013; Al-Hadi et al., 2016). Profitability is a firm’s ROA ratio applied (Meek et 
al., 1995; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Habbash et al., 2016). Liquidity is represented by the 
current ratio to test the firm’s ability to pay its short-term obligations (Watson et al., 2002; 
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Barako et al., 2006; Lan et al., 2013). The growth rate is arrived upon as the variation in 
sales from one year to another (Hassanein and Hussainey, 2015). In addition, the firm’s age 
is recognised as the natural logarithm of the number of years’ since their establishment 
(Hossain, 2008; Sehar et al., 2013; Habbash et al., 2016). 
 
Voluntary disclosure control variables (second proxy “Disclosure tone”) 
 
To control for the relation between dependent and independent variables, there are various 
control variables used. According to previous studies, firm size, leverage, profitability, a 
dummy variable for reporting a net loss, firm growth, market-to-book ratio, a dummy 
variable for dividend payments and firm age are the control variables elected. Firm size is 
proxied for as the natural logarithm of assets (Hackston and Milne, 1996; Kang and Gray, 
2011; Hassan et al., 2006; Ressas and Hussainey, 2014; Aly et al., 2018). Leverage is 
measured as the total debt to total assets (Barako et al., 2006; Ressas and Hussainey, 2014; 
Aly et al., 2018). Profitability uses the ROA ratio of a firm proxy (Kun Wang et al., 2008; 
Ressas and Hussainey, 2014). A dummy variable for reporting net loss known as LOSS is 
employed by this study (Rogers et al., 2011). The growth rate of a firm is computed as the 
change in sales from one year to another (Ressas and Hussainey, 2014; Hassanein and 
Hussainey, 2015; Aly et al., 2018). Market-to-book ratio is applied to control for an 
investment opportunity of firms and growth possibilities (Martikainen et al., 2016; Czerney 
et al., 2017). DIV is a dummy variable for detecting dividend payments (Hussainey and Aal-
Eisa, 2009; Ressas and Hussainey, 2014) and age is the natural logarithm of the number of 
years since their establishment (Muttakin and Khan, 2014; Aly et al., 2018). 
5.3.5 Research model 
 
The relationship between the dependent variable voluntary disclosure (first proxy “VOLDIS” 
and second proxy “DISTONE”), the independent variables corporate investment efficiency 
“err” for Chen et al. 2011 and “err2” for Biddle et al. 2009, corporate governance (CG), and 
joint effect variable merging both investment efficiency and corporate governance (errCG 
and err2CG), and the control variables can be expressed in the following regression models:  
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VOLDISi,t = β0 + β1INVEFF(1)i,t + β2CGi,t + β3INVEFF(1)*CGi,t +β4FSi,t + β5LEVi,t + 
β6PROFi,t + β7LIQi,t + β8SGi,t + β9AGEi,t + ∑Industry dummies + ∑Year dummies + εi,t                                 
(Model 1) 
 
VOLDISi,t = β0 + β1INVEFF(2)i,t + β2CGi,t + β3INVEFF(2)*CGi,t +β4FSi,t + β5LEVi,t + 
β6PROFi,t + β7LIQi,t + β8SGi,t + β9AGEi,t + ∑Industry dummies + ∑Year dummies + εi,t                      
(Model 2) 
 
Where; 
 VOLDIS= Voluntary disclosure 
 INVEFF(1)= Corporate investment efficiency (measurement 1) 
 INVEFF(2)= Corporate investment efficiency (measurement 2) 
 CG= Corporate Governance 
 INVEFF*CG= Investment efficiency*Corporate governance 
 FS= Firm size 
 LEV= Financial leverage 
 PROF= Firm profitability 
 LIQ= Firm liquidity 
 SG= Firm’s sales growth 
 AGE= Firm age 
 ε = Error term 
 
DISTONEi,t = β0 + β1INVEFF(1)i,t + β2CGi,t+ β3INVEFF(1)*CGi,t+ β4FSi,t + β5LEVi,t + 
β6PROFi,t + β7LOSSi,t + β8SGi,t + β9MTBi,t + β10DIVi,t + β11AGEi,t +∑Industry dummies + 
∑Year dummies + εi,t                                 (Model 3) 
 
DISTONEi,t = β0 + β1INVEFF(2)i,t + β2CGi,t + β3INVEFF(1)*CGi,t + β4FSi,t + β5LEVi,t + 
β6PROFi,t + β7LOSSi,t + β8SGi,t + β9MTBi,t + β10DIVi,t + β11AGEi,t + ∑Industry dummies 
+ ∑Year dummies + εi,t                                 (Model 4) 
 
Where; 
 DISTONE= Disclosure tone 
 INVEFF(1)= Corporate investment efficiency (measurement 1) 
 INVEFF(2)= Corporate investment efficiency (measurement 2) 
 CG= Corporate Governance 
 INVEFF*CG= Investment efficiency*Corporate governance 
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 FS= Firm size 
 LEV= Financial leverage 
 PROF= Firm profitability 
 LOSS= A binary variable (1 if a firm reported negative net income and 0 otherwise) 
 SG= Firm’s sales growth 
 MTB= Market-to-book ratio 
 DIV= A binary variable (1 if a firm paid out dividends and 0 otherwise) 
 AGE= Firm age 
 ε = Error term 
5.4 Findings and analysis 
 
This section reflects the results and analysis of the joint effect of corporate governance and 
investment efficiency on the two proxies of voluntary disclosure. 
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
In this part, the analysis results for the sample will be discussed in terms of mean, maximum, 
minimum and standard deviation. The variable used in this study as a dependent variable is 
voluntary disclosure. The independent variable is corporate investment efficiency. And 
finally, the control variables are firm size, financial leverage, firm profitability, firm 
liquidity, firm growth, and firm age. 
 
Table (5.2) 
Descriptive Statistics for 2007-2014 
 
 Dependent 
variable 
Independent variable Control variables 
VOLDIS INVEFF1 
(err) 
INVEFF2 
(err2) 
CG errCG err2CG FS LEV PROF LIQ SG AGE 
Mean 4.006 -0.603 -2.11 55.81 -33.65 -120.39 3.27 0.196 0.061 1.342 5.184 1.82 
Max 4.53 9.04 21.57 71.43 444.35 1117.16 4.71 0.57 0.24 4.09 49.61 2.41 
Min 2.71 -6.87 -16.05 42.86 -392.53 -859.67 1.99 0.00 -0.09 0.40 -31.90 0.85 
Std. Dev. 0.229 2.67 5.71 6.17 147.70 313.68 0.57 0.127 0.044 0.634 10.86 0.36 
Skewness 
Statistic 
-0.720 1.103 1.369 0.622 1.019 1.301 0.312 0.717 0.449 1.465 0.311 -0.66 
VOLDIS is voluntary disclosure proxied for as the word count for the aggregate performance commentary identified as 
wordcountsum_Perform; INVEFF is investment efficiency measured by the negative and positive residuals of the 
investment equation; CG is corporate governance measured by the ECG score from Bloomberg; FS is firm size measured as 
the natural logarithm of total assets; LEV is firm leverage measured as total liabilities divided by total assets; PROF is firm 
profitability measured by the return on assets ratio of a firm; LIQ is firm liquidity measured by the firm’s current ratio by 
dividing current assets by current liabilities; SG is sales growth measured by the change which is sales from year to year; 
AGE is firm age measured as the natural logarithm of the number of years’ since their establishment. 
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Concerning the independent variable investment efficiency, results in table (5.2) show an 
average of -0.603 for the first model (err) and -2.11 for the second model (err2). The err 
show better a result than err2, as values that are closer to zero indicate higher investment 
efficiency levels (Gomariz and Ballesta, 2014). The maximum levels show overinvestment 
by 9.04% and 21.57% for both models respectively, representing the extreme positive 
deviations from the expected investment levels. The minimum levels show underinvestment 
by -6.87% and -16.05% representing the extreme negative deviations from the anticipated 
investment levels.  
The corporate governance (CG) reveals a mean score of 55.81 similar to the results of 
Cheung et al. (2011) and a maximum CG score of 71.43 and minimum score applied by UK 
firms of 42.86.   
For both models, combining the effect of investment efficiency and corporate governance 
(errCG and err2CG) has a wider and higher effect. Merging both variables gives a more 
negative mean reaching -33.65 and -120.39 respectively. A boost in the maximum results 
reaches 444.35 and 1117.16, recording the highest maximum results among other variables 
of the sample. Same happens with the minimum which shows the extreme decline to be -
392.53 and -859.67. 
As for the dependent variable; voluntary disclosure (VOLDIS) specified a mean of 4.006 
which indicates that 10,049 of the keywords are about performance and are actually disclosed 
by the firms of the sample, a maximum of 4.53 (33,142 words), minimum of 2.71 (518 
words) and skewness of -0.720 indicating that data are symmetric around the mean. 
Finally, the control variables showed the following results, the mean firm size for UK firms 
is 1,799,360,000 (3.20) billion GBP as the value of firm assets, a maximum of 50.781 (4.71) 
billion GBP and a minimum assets’ value of 97.96 (1.99) billion. Firm financial leverage 
(LEV) represented a mean of 19.6% indicating that the sample firms are not highly 
leveraged, and a maximum of 57%, minimum of 0% show a large dispersion in firms’ debt 
ratios (Habbash et al., 2016). Firm profitability (PROF) reflects an average of 0.061, 
maximum 0.24, minimum -0.09, a standard deviation 0.044 and skewness of 0.449. Firm 
liquidity (LIQ) shows a mean of 1.342, maximum of 4.09, minimum of 0.40, a standard 
deviation of 0.634 and skewness of 1.465. Firm sales growth (SG) has a mean of 5.18 similar 
to Hassanein and Hussainey (2015) result, while a dispersion shows the maximum growth of 
firms by 49.61 and least (minimum) growing firms of -31.90 showing a deterioration. The 
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average firm has been in existence for 66 years (as 1.82 is after applying the natural 
logarithm), maximum of 255 years (2.41), minimum of 0.00, a standard deviation of 0.36 and 
skewness of -0.66. 
5.4.2 Regression diagnostics 
 
The linear regression is applied in this study using the OLS method. In order to justify the 
usage of OLS, the main assumptions were tested and their results were assessed (Cooke, 
1989). There are some regression models’ diagnostics performed in order to check the OLS 
linear regression assumptions, their models will be discussed in the following subsections. 
 
Checking linearity  
The dependent variable values are plotted versus the independent variables’ values to check 
whether the relationship between them is linear or not; and how well the fitted regression line 
represents their relationship. 
As shown in figure (5.1) in the appendix, the independent and control variables are plotted 
against the dependent variable VOLDIS to check whether there is a trend (linear relationship) 
or not. Results show that there is a mostly constant relationship with a strong trend between 
the independent, dependent and control variables; which supports and justifies the regression 
models done. 
Checking normality  
Normality plots have been conducted by the current study. Figures (5.2) and (5.3) in the 
appendix summarize all the methods used in this study for checking normality graphically for 
each of the regression models. 
Normality results showed that data were normally distributed in either the histogram or P-P 
Plot. 
 
Checking homoscedasticity  
The homoscedasticity assumption shows that the variance of error terms is constant for each 
observation. In this study, it is plotted graphically, by plotting the residuals versus predicted 
values and observes if residuals are getting more spread-out as a function of predicted values. 
After plotting the residuals versus the predicted values for the model, results of testing the 
model as shown in the figure (5.4) in the appendix indicated homoscedasticity. 
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Checking multicollinearity  
Table (5.1) in the appendix shows the variance inflation factor and tolerance of each 
explanatory variable for each of the regression models. The tests showed no multicollinearity 
for the variables. As expected, the correlation between INVEFF, errCG, and err2CG is very 
high. 
 
Checking autocorrelation  
Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic is used to determine whether there is an autocorrelation in the 
residuals of a regression. The test statistic can vary between 0 and 4 with a value of 2 
meaning that the residuals are uncorrelated. A value greater than 2 indicates a negative 
correlation between adjacent residuals, whereas values lower than 2 indicate a positive 
correlation. The size of the Durbin–Watson statistic depends upon the number of variables in 
the model and the number of observations (Durbin and Watson, 1951).  
Durbin-Watson was calculated for the two regression models and the results are shown in 
table (5.2) in the appendix of 1.796 and 1.766 respectively. Therefore, no autocorrelation was 
found in the sample.  
5.4.3 Pearson correlation 
 
For analysing the relationship among the variables of interest in the study, Pearson 
correlation analysis has been conducted. Table (5.3) shows the direction and strengths of the 
relationships between all variables with one another. 
 
Table (5.3) 
Pearson’s Correlation Matrix for (2007-2014) 
 VOLDIS err err2 CG errCG err2CG FS LEV PROF LIQ SG AGE 
VOLDIS  1 -0.101 -0.036 0.308** -0.099 -0.054 0.445** 0.101 -0.075 -0.168** -0.038 0.086 
             
Err   1 0.331** 0.002 0.994** 0.330
** -0.012 0.194** 0.061 -0.064 -0.021 0.172
** 
             
err2    1 -0.073 0.330** 0.994** -0.142** -0.029 0.082 -0.059 -0.100 0.026 
             
CG     1 -0.023 -0.115* 0.480** 0.109* -0.067 -0.203** -0.098 0.035 
             
errCG      1 0.334
** 
-0.012 0.199** 0.060 -0.048 -0.022 0.162
** 
             
err2CG       1 -0.155** -0.029 0.083 -0.045 -0.103 0.026 
              
FS        1 0.193** -0.188** -0.261** -0.058 0.155
** 
             
LEV         1 -0.267** -0.220** -0.016 -0.002 
             
PROF          1 0.169** 0.256
** 0.045 
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LIQ           1 -0.042 0.127* 
             
SG            1 0.072 
              
AGE             1 
              
 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).   
 * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).   
Variable definitions: see table (5.2) 
The correlation matrix in Table (5.3) shows that both models of investment efficiency (err 
and err2) have an insignificant positive relationship with voluntary disclosure (VOLDIS). 
The corporate governance (CG) indicated a positive highly significant relationship with 
VOLDIS. The combined variables of CG and investment efficiency (errCG and err2CG) 
have a negative insignificant relationship with VOLDIS. Considering the control variables, 
FS shows a positive significant relationship with VOLDIS, having a 99% confidence level, 
while LEV and AGE have a positive insignificant relation. LIQ also has a highly significant 
but negative relationship with VOLDIS with a confidence level of 99%, however, PROF and 
SG have a negative insignificant one. 
 
5.4.4 Regression analysis 
 
Based on section (2.3) that illustrates the possible scenarios for the joint effect of investment 
efficiency and corporate governance on voluntary disclosure, this relationship was tested by 
introducing corporate governance (CG) and the combined variable (INVEFF*CG) to the 
regression models.  
Regression results in tables (5.4) and (5.5) show that after adding CG, INVEFF(1)*CG 
(errCG) and INVEFF(2)*CG (err2CG), the ANOVA test still reflects that both models as a 
whole are significant. The R-squared and adjusted R-squared values increased slightly by on 
average 2%, which indicates that CG and INVEFF*CG do contribute in explaining the 
change in the dependent variable VOLDIS. 
The results show that the first model’s independent variables err, CG and errCG are having a 
significant impact on VOLDIS, while the second model’s independent factors err2, CG and 
err2CG have an insignificant relationship with VOLDIS.  
According to the hypotheses developed for estimating the scenarios which can explain the 
impact of CG and the joint effect of INVEFF*CG on VOLDIS (Hussainey and Walker, 
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2009), the first model’s variables can justify which of these hypotheses are accepted and 
which are not. 
Referring to table (5.6), the values of the coefficients for err, CG and errCG are -1.073, 0.121 
and 1.014 respectively, which applies to the third scenario explained before in the joint effect 
section. The sum of the coefficients on err, CG and errCG is significantly greater than the 
sum of the coefficients on err and CG, shown in the following equation: 
err+CG+errCG ≥ err+CG 
-1.073+0.121+1.014 ≥ -1.073+0.121 
0.062 ≥ -0.952 
 
Therefore, H1 is rejected and the third scenario applies which states that investment 
efficiency and corporate governance are complements. This complementary effect shows that 
investment efficiency and corporate governance provide related information and complete 
each others’ role.  
Considering the direction of the relationships, err has a negative significant impact on 
VOLDIS while CG and errCG have a positive significant one. The negative association 
between err and VOLDIS could be explained by the proprietary costs theory as when firms’ 
investment efficiency rise, the cost of disclosing information increases by threatening their 
competitive advantage and position. And so, these firms tend to disclose less (Verrecchia, 
1983; McKinnon, 1984; Feltham and Xie, 1992; Newman and Sansing, 1993; Darrough, 
1993; Gigler et al., 1994). The positive impact of corporate governance on VOLDIS is 
expected and supported by previous studies like Samaha et al. (2015), Habbash et al. (2016) 
and El-Diftar et al. (2017). So we can conclude that introducing the CG positive impact had 
reduced err negative impact reflected in the joint effect errCG which has a positive impact as 
well on VOLDIS, indicating that when firms having strong corporate governance and 
investing efficiently, they tend to disclose more. 
As for the control variables, for both models, FS shows a positive significant relation with 
VOLDIS supporting the findings of Hassan et al. (2006) and Al-Hadi et al. (2016), while the 
remaining control variables reveal an insignificant association with VOLDIS with respect to 
LEV having a negative relation and PROF, LIQ, SG, and AGE having a positive one.   
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Table (5.4) 
Corporate investment efficiency and voluntary disclosure 
 
Variables 
 
 Model 1 Predicted sign 
Constant Coefficient 3.010 NA 
t-value 22.69 
Sig. 0.000 
Err Coefficient -1.073 Positive 
t-value -2.306 
Sig. 0.022 
CG Coefficient 0.121 Positive 
t-value 2.107 
Sig. 0.036 
errCG Coefficient 1.014 Positive/Negative 
t-value 2.176 
Sig. 0.030 
FS Coefficient 0.451 Positive 
t-value 7.223 
Sig. 0.000 
LEV Coefficient 0.028 Positive 
t-value 0.518 
Sig. 0.605 
PROF Coefficient 0.071 Positive 
t-value 1.411 
Sig. 0.159 
LIQ Coefficient -0.055 Positive/Negative 
t-value -1.057 
Sig. 0.291 
SG Coefficient -0.015 Positive 
t-value -0.304 
Sig. 0.762 
AGE Coefficient 0.084 Positive 
t-value 1.587 
Sig. 0.113 
No. of observations 334 
R square 37.3% 
Adjusted R square 32.4% 
F 7.680 
ANOVA 0.000 
Variable definitions: see table (5.2) 
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 Table (5.5)  
Corporate investment efficiency and voluntary disclosure 
 
Variables 
 
 Model 2 Predicted sign 
Constant Coefficient 3.134 NA 
t-value 23.250 
Sig. 0.000 
err2 Coefficient 0.513 Positive 
t-value 1.128 
Sig. 0.260 
CG Coefficient 0.061 Positive 
t-value 1.015 
Sig. 0.311 
err2CG Coefficient -0.501 Positive/Negative 
t-value -1.094 
Sig. 0.275 
FS Coefficient 0.499 Positive 
t-value 8.081 
Sig. 0.000 
LEV Coefficient 0.023 Positive 
t-value 0.430 
Sig. 0.668 
PROF Coefficient 0.065 Positive 
t-value 1.277 
Sig. 0.203 
LIQ Coefficient -0.034 Positive/Negative 
t-value -0.641 
Sig. 0.522 
SG Coefficient -0.015 Positive 
t-value -0.291 
Sig. 0.771 
AGE Coefficient 0.062 Positive 
t-value 1.174 
Sig. 0.241 
No. of observations 334 
R square 36.3% 
Adjusted R square 31.3% 
F 7.354 
ANOVA 0.000 
Variable definitions: see table (5.2) 
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5.4.5 Considering the joint effect on corporate governance and investment efficiency on 
disclosure tone 
 
This section illustrates and explains the joint effect of corporate governance and investment 
efficiency on disclosure tone as a precise measurement for voluntary disclosure, showing 
how the good and bad news are affected by investment efficiency and corporate governance 
changes within firms and finally assess their combined impact. 
5.4.5.1 Descriptive statistics  
 
The variable used in this study as a dependent variable is disclosure tone. The independent 
variables are corporate investment efficiency and corporate governance, and finally, the 
control variables are firm size, financial leverage, firm profitability, loss, firm growth, 
market-to-book ratio, dividend payments, and firm age. 
 
Table (5.6) 
Descriptive Statistics for 2007-2014 
 
 Depend
ent 
variable 
Independent variable Control variables 
DISTO
NE 
INVEFF
1 (err) 
INVEFF2 
(err2) 
CG errCG err2CG FS LEV PRO
F 
LOSS SG MTB DIV AGE 
Mean 0.335 -0.705 -2.206 55.7 -39.57 -125.77 3.26 0.195 0.059 0.057 5.379 1.574 0.937 1.824 
Max 0.69 9.04 21.57 71.4 444.35 1117.16 4.71 0.57 0.18 1.00 49.61 3.84 1.00 2.47 
Min -0.06 -6.87 -16.05 42.8 -392.53 -859.67 1.99 0.00 -0.09 0.00 -31.9 0.71 0.00 0.85 
Std. Dev. 0.146 2.677 5.77 6.00 148.01 317.66 0.574 0.127 0.043 0.232 10.79 0.578 0.243 0.358 
Skewness 
Statistic 
-0.27 1.120 1.277 0.67 1.040 1.200 0.366 0.677 0.287 3.839 0.266 1.242 -3.624 -0.651 
DISTONE is disclosure tone proxied for as the net positive keywords divided by positive plus negative keywords for the 
performance commentary was selected known as net_tone_performance; INVEFF is investment efficiency measured by the 
negative and positive residuals of the investment equation; CG is corporate governance measured as the ECG score from 
Bloomberg; FS is firm size measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; LEV is firm leverage measured as total 
liabilities divided by total assets; PROF is firm profitability measured by the return on assets ratio of a firm; LOSS is a 
dummy variable for reporting a net loss; SG is sales growth measured by the change which is sales from year to year; MTB 
is market-to-book ratio; DIV is a dummy variable for dividend payments; AGE is firm age measured as the natural 
logarithm of the number of years’ since their establishment. 
 
In table (5.6) the independent variables are investment efficiency, corporate governance and 
the merged variables (errCG and err2CG), results are very similar to those of the first 
voluntary disclosure proxy in table (5.5). 
As for the dependent variable; disclosure tone (DISTONE) specified a mean of 0.335 which 
indicates that only 0.3% of the performance keywords include positive ones and are actually 
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disclosed by the firms of the sample, a maximum of 0.69 minimum of -0.06 (indicating bad 
news disclosure) and skewness of -0.27 indicating that data are symmetric around the mean. 
Finally, the control variables showed the following results, the mean firm size for UK firms 
is 1831.9 (3.26) billion GBP as the value of firm assets, a maximum of 50.781 (4.71) billion 
GBP and a minimum assets’ value of 97.96 (1.99) billion. Results of firm financial leverage 
(LEV) and sales growth (SG) are the same as in table (4.1). Firm profitability (PROF) 
reflects an average of 0.059, maximum 0.18, minimum -0.09, standard deviation of 0.043 and 
skewness of 0.287. The average firm has been in existence for 66 years (as 1.82 is after 
applying the natural logarithm), maximum of 296 years (2.47), minimum of 7 years (0.85), a 
standard deviation of 0.358 and skewness of -0.651. 
 
5.4.5.2 Regression diagnostics 
 
The linear regression is applied in this study using the OLS method. In order to justify the 
usage of OLS, the main assumptions were tested and their results were assessed (Cooke, 
1989). 
Checking linearity  
As shown in figure (5.5) in the appendix, the independent and control variables are plotted 
against the dependent variable DISTONE to check whether there is a trend (linear 
relationship) or not. Results show that there is a mostly constant relationship with a strong 
trend between the independent, dependent and control variables; which supports and justifies 
the regression models done. 
Checking normality 
Checking normality is shown by figures (5.6) and (5.7) in the appendix. Normality results 
showed that data were normally distributed in either the histogram or P-P Plot. 
 
Checking homoscedasticity of residuals  
After plotting the residuals versus the predicted values for the model, results of testing the 
model as shown in the figure (5.8) in the appendix showed homoscedasticity. 
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Checking multicollinearity  
Table (5.3) in the appendix shows the variance inflation factor and tolerance of each 
explanatory variable for each of the regression models. The tests showed no multicollinearity 
for the variables. As expected, the correlation between INVEFF, errCG and err2CG is very 
high. 
 
Checking autocorrelation 
Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic is used to determine whether there is an autocorrelation in the 
residuals of a regression. The test statistic can vary between 0 and 4 with a value of 2 
meaning that the residuals are uncorrelated. A value greater than 2 indicates a negative 
correlation between adjacent residuals, whereas values less than 2 reveal a positive 
correlation. The size of the Durbin–Watson statistic depends upon the number of variables in 
the model and the number of observations (Durbin and Watson, 1951). DW critical value 
tables are used to arrive on the exact DW value for a specified model. In this study, the 
number of variables existing (K) were not found in any of the tables, so an exact value was 
not found.  
Durbin-Watson was calculated for the two regression models and the results are shown in 
table (5.4) in the appendix of 1.349 and 1.381 respectively. Therefore, no autocorrelation was 
found in the sample. Field (2013) indicated that as a conventional rule of thumb, only values 
less than 1 or greater than 3 are a cause for concern, so both models’ DW values are within 
the safe limits. 
5.4.5.4 Pearson correlation  
 
For analysing the relationship among the variables of interest in the study, Pearson 
correlation analysis has been conducted. Table (5.7) shows the direction and strengths of the 
relationships between all variables with one another. 
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Table (5.7) 
Pearson’s Correlation Matrix for (2007-2014) 
 
 DISTONE err err2 CG errCG err2CG FS LEV PROF LOSS SG MTB DIV AGE 
DISTON
E 
 1 0.048 -0.038 -0.064 0.047 -0.047 -0.011 -0.020 0.241** -0.188
** 
0.163** 0.252
** 0.076 -0.024 
               
err   1 0.364** -0.014 0.994** 0.363
** -0.012 0.196** 0.085 -0.070 -0.040 0.074 0.139
** 0.155** 
               
err2    1 -0.079 0.363** 0.994** -0.159** -0.001 0.120* -0.031 -0.125* 0.240** 0.051 0.013 
               
CG     1 -0.039 -0.118* 0.480** 0.077 -0.060 0.001 -0.092 0.062 -0.006 0.042 
               
errCG      1 0.367
** 
-0.010 0.203** 0.081 -0.062 -0.041 0.069 0.139
** 0.144** 
               
err2CG       1 -0.168** 0.002 0.122* -0.023 -0.128* 0.241** 0.047 0.015 
                
FS        1 0.191** -0.157** 0.025 -0.050 -0.200
** -0.084 -0.157** 
               
LEV         1 -0.241** 0.087 -0.017 -0.134
* 0.036 0.003 
               
PROF          1 -0.477
** 
0.258** 0.674
** 0.215** 0.040 
               
LOSS           1 -0.157** -0.162** -0.241** -0.023 
               
SG            1 0.158** 0.156** 0.083 
                
MTB             1 0.137* 0.006 
                
DIV              1 0.073 
                
AGE               1 
                
  ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).    
  * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).    
Variable definitions: see table (5.6) 
 
The correlation matrix in table (5.7) shows that both models of investment efficiency (err and 
err2) have an insignificant relationship with disclosure tone (DISTONE), with the first model 
having a positive and the second having a negative relation. Corporate governance (CG) has 
a negative insignificant association with DISTONE. Also, the combined variables of 
corporate governance and investment efficiency (errCG and err2CG) have an insignificant 
relation with DISTONE. As for the control variables, PROF, SG, and MTB all have a 
positive highly significant relation (99% confidence level) with DISTONE, and LOSS 
relation with DISTONE has the same strength but with a negative direction. The remaining 
variables FS, LEV, DIV and AGE all have an insignificant relationship with DISTONE.  
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5.4.5.5 Regression analysis 
 
Based on the section that explains the possible scenarios of investment efficiency and 
corporate governance joint effect on disclosure tone, this relationship was tested by 
introducing corporate governance (CG) and the combined variable (INVEFF*CG) to the 
regression models. 
Regression results in tables (5.8) and (5.9) show that after adding CG, INVEFF(1)*CG 
(errCG) and INVEFF(2)*CG (err2CG), the ANOVA test still reflects that both models as a 
whole are significant. The R-squared and adjusted R-squared values increased slightly by on 
average 1.5%, which indicates that CG and INVEFF*CG do participate in explaining the 
change in the dependent variable DISTONE. 
The results show that the second model’s independent variables err2, CG and err2CG are 
having a significant impact on DISTONE, while the first model’s independent factors err and 
errCG have an insignificant relationship with DISTONE and CG has a negative significant 
one. 
According to the hypotheses developed for estimating the scenarios which can explain the 
impact of CG and the joint effect of INVEFF*CG on DISTONE (Hussainey and Walker, 
2009), the second model’s variables can justify which of these hypotheses is accepted and 
which is not. 
Referring to table (5.13), the values of the coefficients for err2, CG and err2CG are 0.991, -
0.189 and -1.081 respectively, which applies to the fourth scenario explained before in the 
joint effect section. The sum of the coefficients on err2, CG and err2CG is significantly less 
than the sum of the coefficients on err2 and CG, shown in the following equation: 
err2+CG+err2CG < err2+CG 
0.991-0.189-1.081 <0.991-0.189 
-0.279 <0.802 
 
Therefore, H1 is rejected and the fourth scenario applies which states that investment 
efficiency and corporate governance are substitutes. This substitution effect shows that 
investment efficiency and corporate governance provide related information and can replace 
each others’ role (similar role).  
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Considering the direction of the relationships, err2 has a positive significant impact on 
DISTONE while CG and err2CG have a negative significant one. The investment efficiency 
positive relation with disclosure tone is supported by the signaling theory, as Foster (1986) 
and Inchausti (1997) state that well-performing profitable company managers are encouraged 
to disclose more of these good news. Disclosure of such kind of news is considered one of 
the signaling ways to attract investments, improve firms’ reputation and justify directors’ 
compensation (Ross, 1977; Verrecchia, 1983; Campbell et al., 2002).  Investing efficiently is 
a sign of superior performance and so disclosing such information would achieve the stated 
benefits. Contrary to the results of corporate governance (CG) and VOLDIS stated above, 
CG shows a negative impact on DISTONE. Firms having strong governance can be more 
inclined to voluntarily disclose more (Samaha et al., 2015; Habbash et al., 2016) but not to 
disclose more of good news in specific. Managers may prefer not to disclose good news as 
their firms’ competitive advantage might be threatened. The proprietary costs theory can 
explain this relationship showing that the costs of disclosing such good news may exceed the 
benefits generated from it (Verrecchia, 1983; McKinnon, 1984; Feltham and Xie, 1992; 
Newman and Sansing, 1993; Darrough, 1993; Gigler et al., 1994). So it can be concluded 
that introducing CG negative impact had reduced err2 positive impact reflected in the joint 
effect of err2CG which has a negative impact as well on DISTONE, indicating that even if 
firms have improved investment efficiency, strong corporate governance effect still has a say 
in the selection of the type of voluntarily disclosed information.  
As for the control variables, LEV, SG and MTB show a positive significant impact on 
DISTONE with confidence levels of 90% and 99% respectively supporting the findings of 
(Hussainey and Aal-Eisa, 2009; Ressas and Hussainey, 2014). LOSS and AGE indicate a 
negative significant effect on DISTONE with confidence levels of 99% and 90% respectively 
supporting the findings of Rogers et al. (2011) and contradicting the findings of Aly et al. 
(2018). The remaining variables FS, PROF and DIV all show an insignificant relationship 
with DISTONE. 
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Table (5.8) 
Corporate investment efficiency and disclosure tone 
 
Variables 
 
 Model 1 Predicted sign 
 
Constant 
Coefficient 0.518 NA 
t-value 5.781 
Sig. 0.000 
 
err 
Coefficient 0.132 Positive 
t-value 0.269 
Sig. 0.788 
 
CG 
Coefficient -0.133 Positive 
t-value -2.172 
Sig. 0.031 
 
errCG 
Coefficient -0.174 Positive/Negative 
t-value -0.352 
Sig. 0.725 
 
FS 
Coefficient -0.008 Positive 
t-value -0.123 
Sig. 0.902 
 
LEV 
Coefficient 0.102 Positive 
t-value 1.841 
Sig. 0.067 
 
PROF 
Coefficient 0.010 Positive 
t-value 0.128 
Sig. 0.898 
 
LOSS 
Coefficient -0.148 Positive/Negative 
t-value -2.617 
Sig. 0.009 
 
SG 
Coefficient 0.151 Positive 
t-value 2.909 
Sig. 0.004 
 
MTB 
 
Coefficient 0.192 Positive 
t-value 2.636 
Sig. 0.009 
 
DIV 
Coefficient 0.000 Positive/Negative 
t-value -0.009 
Sig. 0.993 
 
AGE 
Coefficient -0.094 Positive 
t-value -1.796 
Sig. 0.073 
No. of observations 350 
R square 29.7% 
Adjusted R square 24.0% 
F 5.260 
ANOVA 0.000 
Variable definitions: see table (5.6) 
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Table (5.9) 
Corporate investment efficiency and disclosure tone 
 
Variables 
 
 Model 1 Predicted sign 
 
Constant 
Coefficient 0.566 NA 
t-value 6.282 
Sig. 0.000 
 
err2 
Coefficient 0.991 Positive 
t-value 2.074 
Sig. 0.039 
 
CG 
Coefficient -0.189 Positive 
t-value -2.981 
Sig. 0.003 
 
err2CG 
Coefficient -1.081 Positive/Negative 
t-value -2.238 
Sig. 0.026 
 
FS 
Coefficient 0.010 Positive 
t-value 0.156 
Sig. 0.876 
 
LEV 
Coefficient 0.100 Positive 
t-value 1.864 
Sig. 0.063 
 
PROF 
Coefficient -0.008 Positive 
t-value -0.098 
Sig. 0.922 
 
LOSS 
Coefficient -0.144 Positive/Negative 
t-value -2.562 
Sig. 0.011 
 
SG 
Coefficient 0.118 Positive 
t-value 2.208 
Sig. 0.028 
 
MTB 
 
Coefficient 0.238 Positive 
t-value 3.179 
Sig. 0.002 
 
DIV 
Coefficient -0.002 Positive/Negative 
t-value -0.034 
Sig. 0.973 
 
AGE 
Coefficient -0.092 Positive 
t-value -1.797 
Sig. 0.073 
No. of observations 350 
R square 31.0% 
Adjusted R square 25.5% 
F 5.604 
ANOVA 0.000 
Variable definitions: see table (5.6) 
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5.5 Summary 
 
This study’s aim was to test the joint effect of corporate investment efficiency and corporate 
governance on voluntary disclosure. The sample was selected from FTSE all share index for 
the period from 2007 until 2014. After introducing the effect of corporate governance and the 
joint effect of investment efficiency and corporate governance into the regression models, 
results reveal that there is a complementary effect on voluntary disclosure and a substitution 
effect on disclosure tone in specific (Hussainey and Walker, 2009). A complementary effect 
means that investment efficiency and corporate governance complete each other’s role. When 
a firm has a strong corporate governance structure, more monitoring, and strict rules control 
the managers’ actions and thereof limiting an overinvestment in negative NPV projects or 
underinvesting by neglecting positive NPV ones. On the other part, a substitutional effect 
reflects that investment efficiency and governance can act as substitutes. Disclosing good 
news about having either a strong governance system or a high level of efficient investment 
this would have the same positive impact on stakeholders and vice versa if bad news. 
These findings would have several implications on various stakeholders; as shareholders will 
be attracted when transparency rise as it gives an indication of the positive complementary 
effect of having strong governance and efficient investments. Disclosure calms down lenders 
as well by reflecting the firm’s governance and investments position. Governments also 
would act for the firm’s benefit if transparency increases by providing subsidies or tax 
exemptions for encouraging good performance. Investigating the effect of investment 
efficiency, corporate governance and voluntary disclosure on firms’ stock prices would be a 
good opportunity for future research as stock prices could be an indicator for the markets’ 
response to changes in these variables. 
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Appendix (D) 
Regression diagnostics “Volunatry disclosure” 
Linearity figures 
Figure (5.1) 
Checking Linearity of VOLDIS vs. Independent Variables 
VOLDIS vs. INVEFF1 
 
VOLDIS vs. INVEFF2 
 
 
VOLDIS vs. CG 
 
VOLDIS vs. errCG 
 
VOLDIS vs. err2CG 
 
VOLDIS vs. FS 
 
VOLDIS vs. LEV VOLDIS vs. PROF 
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VOLDIS vs. LIQ 
 
VOLDIS vs. SG 
 
VOLDIS vs. AGE 
 
Variable definitions: see table (5.2) 
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Normality figures 
Checking normality 
Figure (5.2) and figure (5.3) 
Figure (5.2) 
Model 1 
 
 
Figure (5.3) 
Model 1 
 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 2 
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Homoscedasticity figure 
Figure (5.4) 
Checking Homoscedasticity of both models 
Model 1 
 
 
Model 2 
 
 
 
Multicollinearity table 
Table (5.1) 
Checking Multicollinearity (VOLDIS and independent variables) 
 Model 1 (err) Model 2 (err2) 
Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
INVEFF 0.009 106.901 0.010 100.689 
CG 0.615 1.63 0.568 1.762 
errCG 0.009 107.27 - - 
err2CG - - 0.010 102.084 
FS 0.520 1.924 0.539 1.855 
LEV 0.707 1.414 0.727 1.375 
PROF 0.791 1.264 0.790 1.266 
LIQ 0.744 1.344 0.746 1.340 
SG 0.792 1.262 0.747 1.339 
AGE 0.729 1.372 0.742 1.348 
Variable definitions: see table (5.2) 
Autocorrelation table 
Table (5.2) 
Checking Autocorrelation 
Model DW 
 1 (err) 1.796 
2 (err2) 1.766 
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Regression diagnostics “Disclosure tone” 
Linearity figures 
Figure (5.5) 
Checking Linearity of DISTONE vs. Independent Variables 
DISTONE vs. INVEFF1 
 
DISTONE vs. INVEFF2 
 
DISTONE vs. CG 
 
DISTONE vs. errCG 
 
DISTONE vs. err2CG 
 
DISTONE vs. FS 
 
DISTONE vs. LEV 
 
DISTONE vs. PROF 
 
DISTONE vs. LOSS DISTONE vs. SG 
218 
 
 
 
DISTONE vs. MTB 
 
DISTONE vs. AGE 
 
Variable definitions: see table (5.6) 
Normality figures 
Checking normality 
Figure (5.6) and figure (5.7) 
Figure (5.6) 
Model 1 
 
Figure (5.7) 
Model 1 
 
219 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 2 
 
 
Homoscedasticity figure 
Figure (5.8) 
Checking Homoscedasticity of both models 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
 
Multicollinearity table 
Table (5.3) 
Checking Multicollinearity (DISTONE and independent variables) 
 Model 1 (err) Model 2 (err2) 
Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
INVEFF 0.009 111.330 0.009 107.201 
CG 0.575 1.739 0.529 1.890 
errCG 0.009 112.245 - - 
err2CG - - 0.009 109.478 
FS 0.506 1.975 0.520 1.924 
LEV 0.708 1.412 0.733 1.364 
PROF 0.331 3.019 0.331 3.018 
LOSS 0.676 1.480 0.675 1.482 
SG 0.807 1.239 0.744 1.345 
MTB 0.409 2.447 0.381 2.624 
DIV 0.842 1.188 0.843 1.186 
AGE 0.791 1.265 0.803 1.245 
Variable definitions: see table (5.6) 
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Autocorrelation table 
Table (5.4) 
Checking Autocorrelation 
Model DW 
 Model 1 (err) 1.349 
Model 2 (err2) 1.381 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Conclusion 
6.1 Summary and findings 
 
In this thesis, an investigation is done for corporate investment efficiency as being one time a 
dependent and the other an independent factor. More distinctively, the thesis examines; first, 
an analytical review for previous literature related to corporate investment efficiency; second, 
how the macroeconomic factors do affect investment efficiency; third, whether the 
investment efficiency influences the disclosure practices of a firm. And fourth, whether 
corporate governance joint effect with investment efficiency do impact voluntary disclosure. 
The following paragraphs present a brief summary of the four essay’s findings, along with 
addressing the limitations and providing opportunities for future research.  
Concerning chapter two, this study achieves and comes up with the following points; first, 
assessing the findings of related prior literature about the importance of corporate investment 
efficiency. Second, it examines how information asymmetry is mitigated to advance 
investment efficiency. Third, it explores how investment efficiency is determined by the 
financing factors of a firm. Fourth, it investigates and reviews the measurements of corporate 
investment efficiency and recommending Biddle et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2011) as the 
most appropriate proxies to be used by future research. Fifth, it provides a methodology 
section for classifying and analysing preceding literature related to investment efficiency. 
The main findings of this section indicate that 33% of the publications reviewed were 
accounting ones and the other 33% were finance. The journal of accounting and economics 
and the journal of financial economics encompass the highest portions representing 30% and 
42% respectively. Sixth, a discussion section includes an analysis for top-ranked studies 
directly linked with investment efficiency, an expression of the study’s limitations and a 
provision of different opportunities for future research all explained in details in the chapter. 
In chapter three, the aim of this study is to examine the impact of the macroeconomic factors 
on corporate investment efficiency for six countries one from each continent covering the 
period from 2007 until 2015. The macroeconomic variables tested are GDP growth, 
unemployment rates, trade openness, inflation rates, and interest rates. According to the 
results of tests applied, GDP growth and inflation rates do influence corporate investment 
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efficiency. GDP growth reflects a positive effect while inflation rates show a negative one. 
These results are supported by the economic growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; 
Najarzadeh et al., 2014), pecking order (Myers and Majluf et al., 1984) and agency (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983) theories.   
Regarding chapter four, the effect of corporate investment efficiency on voluntary disclosure 
is studied. The FTSE all share index is selected as a sample covering the period from 2007 to 
2014. The findings reveal that investment efficiency positively affects voluntary disclosure 
(first measurement), which indicates that firms investing efficiently would be glad to share 
these achievements with its stakeholders and vice versa if there is inefficiency of 
investments. When it comes to disclosure tone (second measurement of voluntary 
disclosure), investment efficiency affects it negatively, at which managers become 
discouraged to disclose good news when their firms are investing efficiently to protect their 
competitive advantage. This justification is supported by the proprietary costs theory 
(Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981; Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1986). 
In chapter five, there is an analysis of the joint effect of investment efficiency and corporate 
governance on voluntary disclosure. This study acts as an extension for the previous one 
when corporate governance is introduced to the model. The results show that corporate 
governance and investment efficiency have a complementary effect on voluntary disclosure 
and a substitution effect on disclosure tone in particular. 
6.2 Implications 
 
The findings of the thesis would have diverse practical implications on a corporation’s 
stakeholders. Potential shareholders and existing ones will be attracted when transparency 
rise as it gives an indication of the positive complementary effect of having strong 
governance and efficient investments. Disclosure calms down lenders as well by reflecting 
the firm’s governance and investments position. Governments also would act for the firm’s 
benefit if transparency increases by providing subsidies or tax exemptions for encouraging 
good performance. Concerning the practical implications on corporations, whether they do 
invest efficiently or not would be of benefit for various reasons. First, this could help in 
determining share prices. Second, if there is inefficiency of investments, corrective actions 
should be taken by the management. Third, if investing is done efficiently, this would 
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encourage firms to go globally and expand its operations when investment opportunities are 
promising. 
When it comes to the theoretical implications, by applying the suggestions provided for 
future research, a complete picture will be available for researchers and corporations 
enabling them to assess a corporation’s investment efficiency without dropping any essential 
factor. As factors which do affect and are affected by corporate investment efficiency gives 
theoretical evidence that the whole topic was investigated appropriately which could be used 
as a reference for diverse stakeholders. 
6.3 Limitations 
 
Although this thesis tries to tackle all the issues related to corporate investment efficiency 
and provide validated results, still some limitations remain clear.  
The limitations of the thesis deal with the timing and measurements applied. The samples’ 
timing for chapter three was from 2007 until 2015 and for chapters four and five were from 
2007 until 2014. This selection was due to data unavailability on both the World Bank site 
(for chapter three) and data stream. It would have been more accurate results and analysis if 
the samples were extended to cover earlier years before 2007 and recent years until 2018.  
In addition, in chapter three, only one of the investment efficiency measurements of Chen et 
al. (2011) was applied. The choice of this proxy was based on data available on the data 
stream concerning the six countries investigated. And so applying further investment 
efficiency measurements for comparison purposes would be a good idea. 
Moreover, in chapters four and five, the voluntary disclosure measurement considered was 
only the performance commentary scores not the overall disclosure score. As a justification 
for the limitation; choosing the performance commentary was because of needing to be 
precise and concentrating on the commentary which mostly reflects a firm’s investment 
efficiency performance instead of investigating an aggregate one. Although a justification is 
provided, still an overall disclosure score must be considered since it reflects the effect on 
overall voluntary disclosure practice, not only a single type of disclosure. 
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6.4 Opportunities for future research 
 
Studying corporate investment efficiency, factors that affect it and those affected by it opens 
new arrays concerning future research.  
In chapter two, there are various opportunities provided for future studies. The first is 
extending the context and sample of certain variables (e.g. earnings management and capital 
structure) linked with corporate investment efficiency to comprise a diversified set of 
countries like MENA region, European region, developed or developing countries. That 
would be beneficial for comparison purposes. Second, it assesses the impact of factors like 
taxes or debts on FRQ and eventually on investment efficiency that may provide a clearer 
view for this relationship, as prior studies like that of Hanlon et al. (2014) and Ding et al. 
(2016) highlight the link between such variables and FRQ. Therefore, assessing the indirect 
association between FRQ and investment efficiency is of great importance as the direct one. 
The same indirect relationship would be investigated concerning factors affecting earnings 
management like ethics and capital market incentives. Third, an assessment of the impact of 
the intended and unintended consequences of IFRS mandatory adoption on corporate 
investment efficiency is needed. Fourth, according to the best of my knowledge, the relation 
between the R&D disclosure and investment efficiency was not studied before, marking it an 
area requiring further investigation due to the reasons mentioned in the chapter. Fifth, when 
linking audit quality and investment efficiency, specific crucial audit quality measurements 
must be considered for comparison purposes and increasing the results’ validity like auditor 
size, audit fees, and discretionary accruals. Sixth, a cross-country study is required with more 
than one investment efficiency measurement when analysing the impact of capital structure 
on investment efficiency. Seventh, studying the effect of firm-related factors all together on 
investment efficiency in one research would be of great benefit since some of these variables 
already affect each other (Habib and Jiang, 2015; Capkun et al., 2016; Cheng, 2016). 
Thereof, checking their combined impact would give a signal about which factor would act 
as a complement or a substitute for the other, which has a moderating effect, which has the 
strongest and which has the weakest effect.  
In chapter three, the suggested chances for future studies are as follows. First, the impacts of 
macroeconomic factors on variables determine corporate investment efficiency like corporate 
social responsibility, corporate governance, IFRS and disclosure levels. Second, extending 
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the sample’s timing as well as testing countries of the same continent would allow 
researchers to evaluate each continent’s performance separately. Third, it has to do with 
applying more investment efficiency measurements and comparing their findings. 
Finally, chapters four and five recommend a comparative study which includes more than 
one country, as well as employing additional investment efficiency and managerial ability 
proxies to study their effect on voluntary disclosure. In addition, future research might 
consider examining the impact of corporate investment efficiency on mandatory disclosure. 
Finally, investigating the effect of investment efficiency, corporate governance and voluntary 
disclosure on firms’ stock prices would be a good opportunity for future research as stock 
prices could be an indicator for the markets’ response to changes in these variables. 
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